CVE-2026-89426

The Knit Pay – Cashfree, Instamojo, Razorpay, PayPal and more plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 9.6.1.0. This is due to the maybe_update_user_role() function reading the target role directly from an attacker-controlled Gravity Forms entry field — configured via the feed's user_role_field_id — and passing it to WP_User::set_role() without validating the supplied value against an allowlist of permitted roles. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to elevate their privileges to administrator by tampering with the hidden role field value at form submission time. Exploitation is further enabled by the fact that $0 orders are synchronously marked as SUCCESS during form submission without requiring a real payment, and when no GF User Registration user can be resolved, the role assignment target falls back to $lead['created_by'] — the currently authenticated submitter's own user ID — making any authenticated form submitter an eligible exploitation target.

The Knit Pay – Cashfree, Instamojo, Razorpay, PayPal and more plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 9.6.1.0. This is due to the maybe_update_user_role() function reading the target role directly from an attacker-controlled Gravity Forms entry field — configured via the feed's user_role_field_id — and passing it to WP_User::set_role() without validating the supplied value against an allowlist of permitted roles. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to elevate their privileges to administrator by tampering with the hidden role field value at form submission time. Exploitation is further enabled by the fact that $0 orders are synchronously marked as SUCCESS during form submission without requiring a real payment, and when no GF User Registration user can be resolved, the role assignment target falls back to $lead['created_by'] — the currently authenticated submitter's own user ID — making any authenticated form submitter an eligible exploitation target.

The Knit Pay – Cashfree, Instamojo, Razorpay, PayPal and more plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 9.6.1.0. This is due to the maybe_update_user_role() function reading the target role directly from an attacker-controlled Gravity Forms entry field — configured via the feed's user_role_field_id — and passing it to WP_User::set_role() without validating the supplied value against an allowlist of permitted roles. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to elevate their privileges to administrator by tampering with the hidden role field value at form submission time. Exploitation is further enabled by the fact that $0 orders are synchronously marked as SUCCESS during form submission without requiring a real payment, and when no GF User Registration user can be resolved, the role assignment target falls back to $lead['created_by'] — the currently authenticated submitter's own user ID — making any authenticated form submitter an eligible exploitation target.

The Knit Pay – Cashfree, Instamojo, Razorpay, PayPal and more plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 9.6.1.0. This is due to the maybe_update_user_role() function reading the target role directly from an attacker-controlled Gravity Forms entry field — configured via the feed's user_role_field_id — and passing it to WP_User::set_role() without validating the supplied value against an allowlist of permitted roles. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to elevate their privileges to administrator by tampering with the hidden role field value at form submission time. Exploitation is further enabled by the fact that $0 orders are synchronously marked as SUCCESS during form submission without requiring a real payment, and when no GF User Registration user can be resolved, the role assignment target falls back to $lead['created_by'] — the currently authenticated submitter's own user ID — making any authenticated form submitter an eligible exploitation target.