CVE-2026-91989

atomic-agents-stack before 1.1.0 contains a path traversal vulnerability in the dashboard HTTP server that allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files by supplying directory traversal sequences in request paths. Attackers can bypass path containment checks by including '../' segments in requests to the DashboardHandler.do_GET endpoint to access files outside the intended agents_root directory.

atomic-agents-stack before 1.1.0 contains a path traversal vulnerability in the dashboard HTTP server that allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files by supplying directory traversal sequences in request paths. Attackers can bypass path containment checks by including '../' segments in requests to the DashboardHandler.do_GET endpoint to access files outside the intended agents_root directory.

atomic-agents-stack before 1.1.0 contains a path traversal vulnerability in the dashboard HTTP server that allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files by supplying directory traversal sequences in request paths. Attackers can bypass path containment checks by including '../' segments in requests to the DashboardHandler.do_GET endpoint to access files outside the intended agents_root directory.

The optional dashboard HTTP server (atomic_agents/dashboard/serve.py) builds filesystem paths directly from the request path and serves them without a containment check. It is the only per-request untrusted-path site in the codebase that does not route through _io.safe_resolve_under. Literal ../ segments survive urlparse and Path joining, so a request can read files outside the intended agents_root (including via the static branch).

Impact: arbitrary file read. The default bind is loopback, but --host is an operator-settable documented flag; binding 0.0.0.0 exposes this to the LAN. Even on loopback it is reachable via DNS-rebinding from a browser or SSRF from a co-located service.

Affected: dashboard/serve.py (DashboardHandler.do_GET / _serve_file), all versions through 1.0.0.

Fix: route every served path through _io.safe_resolve_under against the intended root and return 404 on PathTraversalError; reject ../separators early; optionally refuse a non-loopback --host unless an explicit auth/allow flag is set (matching serve/_app.py).

atomic-agents-stack before 1.1.0 contains a path traversal vulnerability in the dashboard HTTP server that allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files by supplying directory traversal sequences in request paths. Attackers can bypass path containment checks by including '../' segments in requests to the DashboardHandler.do_GET endpoint to access files outside the intended agents_root directory.

atomic-agents-stack before 1.1.0 contains a path traversal vulnerability in the dashboard HTTP server that allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files by supplying directory traversal sequences in request paths. Attackers can bypass path containment checks by including '../' segments in requests to the DashboardHandler.do_GET endpoint to access files outside the intended agents_root directory.

The optional dashboard HTTP server (atomic_agents/dashboard/serve.py) builds filesystem paths directly from the request path and serves them without a containment check. It is the only per-request untrusted-path site in the codebase that does not route through _io.safe_resolve_under. Literal ../ segments survive urlparse and Path joining, so a request can read files outside the intended agents_root (including via the static branch).

Impact: arbitrary file read. The default bind is loopback, but --host is an operator-settable documented flag; binding 0.0.0.0 exposes this to the LAN. Even on loopback it is reachable via DNS-rebinding from a browser or SSRF from a co-located service.

Affected: dashboard/serve.py (DashboardHandler.do_GET / _serve_file), all versions through 1.0.0.

Fix: route every served path through _io.safe_resolve_under against the intended root and return 404 on PathTraversalError; reject ../separators early; optionally refuse a non-loopback --host unless an explicit auth/allow flag is set (matching serve/_app.py).