CVE-2026-93603

vm2 through 3.12.0 (fixed in 3.12.1) does not correctly handle a nullish this receiver in the apply trap of its bridge (lib/bridge.js): when sandboxed code calls a host-provided non-strict (sloppy-mode) function without a receiver — e.g. fn(), a detached method, fn.call(), fn.apply(undefined), Reflect.apply(fn, undefined, []), or fn.bind()() — the undefined receiver is passed straight through to the host call, and V8 substitutes the host realm's global object for this. vm2 then wraps and returns that object to the sandbox, giving sandboxed script a live proxy of the host global. This allows a complete sandbox escape: untrusted script can reach process and execute arbitrary code/commands on the host (for example via process.getBuiltinModule('child_process').execSync). Exploitation requires that the embedding application expose at least one non-strict host function to the sandbox; strict-mode and ES module host functions are not affected.

vm2 through 3.12.0 (fixed in 3.12.1) does not correctly handle a nullish this receiver in the apply trap of its bridge (lib/bridge.js): when sandboxed code calls a host-provided non-strict (sloppy-mode) function without a receiver — e.g. fn(), a detached method, fn.call(), fn.apply(undefined), Reflect.apply(fn, undefined, []), or fn.bind()() — the undefined receiver is passed straight through to the host call, and V8 substitutes the host realm's global object for this. vm2 then wraps and returns that object to the sandbox, giving sandboxed script a live proxy of the host global. This allows a complete sandbox escape: untrusted script can reach process and execute arbitrary code/commands on the host (for example via process.getBuiltinModule('child_process').execSync). Exploitation requires that the embedding application expose at least one non-strict host function to the sandbox; strict-mode and ES module host functions are not affected.

vm2 through 3.12.0 (fixed in 3.12.1) does not correctly handle a nullish this receiver in the apply trap of its bridge (lib/bridge.js): when sandboxed code calls a host-provided non-strict (sloppy-mode) function without a receiver — e.g. fn(), a detached method, fn.call(), fn.apply(undefined), Reflect.apply(fn, undefined, []), or fn.bind()() — the undefined receiver is passed straight through to the host call, and V8 substitutes the host realm's global object for this. vm2 then wraps and returns that object to the sandbox, giving sandboxed script a live proxy of the host global. This allows a complete sandbox escape: untrusted script can reach process and execute arbitrary code/commands on the host (for example via process.getBuiltinModule('child_process').execSync). Exploitation requires that the embedding application expose at least one non-strict host function to the sandbox; strict-mode and ES module host functions are not affected.

vm2 through 3.12.0 (fixed in 3.12.1) does not correctly handle a nullish this receiver in the apply trap of its bridge (lib/bridge.js): when sandboxed code calls a host-provided non-strict (sloppy-mode) function without a receiver — e.g. fn(), a detached method, fn.call(), fn.apply(undefined), Reflect.apply(fn, undefined, []), or fn.bind()() — the undefined receiver is passed straight through to the host call, and V8 substitutes the host realm's global object for this. vm2 then wraps and returns that object to the sandbox, giving sandboxed script a live proxy of the host global. This allows a complete sandbox escape: untrusted script can reach process and execute arbitrary code/commands on the host (for example via process.getBuiltinModule('child_process').execSync). Exploitation requires that the embedding application expose at least one non-strict host function to the sandbox; strict-mode and ES module host functions are not affected.

vm2 through 3.12.0 (fixed in 3.12.1) does not correctly handle a nullish this receiver in the apply trap of its bridge (lib/bridge.js): when sandboxed code calls a host-provided non-strict (sloppy-mode) function without a receiver — e.g. fn(), a detached method, fn.call(), fn.apply(undefined), Reflect.apply(fn, undefined, []), or fn.bind()() — the undefined receiver is passed straight through to the host call, and V8 substitutes the host realm's global object for this. vm2 then wraps and returns that object to the sandbox, giving sandboxed script a live proxy of the host global. This allows a complete sandbox escape: untrusted script can reach process and execute arbitrary code/commands on the host (for example via process.getBuiltinModule('child_process').execSync). Exploitation requires that the embedding application expose at least one non-strict host function to the sandbox; strict-mode and ES module host functions are not affected.