CVE-2026-93757
Wild Apricot Login <= 1.0.18 - Authentication Bypass via SSO Email-Collision Account Binding on Multisite
The Wild Apricot Login plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via SSO Email-Collision Account Binding in all versions up to, and including, 1.0.18. When no WildApricot contact-ID mapping is found for an incoming SSO login, the plugin falls back to a network-global get_user_by('email', ...) lookup in Module.php to resolve a WordPress user, then UserSynchronizer::syncWaContact() binds and Controller::login() issues a session cookie via wp_set_auth_cookie() for that resolved user — both guarded only by is_super_admin() — without ever requiring proof of ownership of the matched WordPress account such as a password, local account-linking confirmation, inbox verification, or administrator approval. This makes it possible for attackers with custom-level WildApricot membership access to authenticate as an existing WordPress subsite administrator on a path-based Multisite network, obtaining a valid network-global authentication cookie for the victim without their credentials. Exploitation requires that the attacker control a WildApricot contact whose email address matches the target WordPress administrator's email — achievable via a public zero-fee membership application on the connected WildApricot organization — and that they complete the SSO flow on any subsite where Wild Apricot Login is active; because WordPress user identities and authentication cookies are network-global, the cookie issued on that subsite is equally valid on any other subsite where the victim user holds an administrator role.
Attack profile
How easy it is to exploit
- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- High
- Privileges needed
- Low
- User interaction
- None
What an attacker can affect
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
Exploit likelihood
What each source reports
CVE List Score used
7.5
Wild Apricot Login <= 1.0.18 - Authentication Bypass via SSO Email-Collision Account Binding on Multisite
The Wild Apricot Login plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via SSO Email-Collision Account Binding in all versions up to, and including, 1.0.18. When no WildApricot contact-ID mapping is found for an incoming SSO login, the plugin falls back to a network-global get_user_by('email', ...) lookup in Module.php to resolve a WordPress user, then UserSynchronizer::syncWaContact() binds and Controller::login() issues a session cookie via wp_set_auth_cookie() for that resolved user — both guarded only by is_super_admin() — without ever requiring proof of ownership of the matched WordPress account such as a password, local account-linking confirmation, inbox verification, or administrator approval. This makes it possible for attackers with custom-level WildApricot membership access to authenticate as an existing WordPress subsite administrator on a path-based Multisite network, obtaining a valid network-global authentication cookie for the victim without their credentials. Exploitation requires that the attacker control a WildApricot contact whose email address matches the target WordPress administrator's email — achievable via a public zero-fee membership application on the connected WildApricot organization — and that they complete the SSO flow on any subsite where Wild Apricot Login is active; because WordPress user identities and authentication cookies are network-global, the cookie issued on that subsite is equally valid on any other subsite where the victim user holds an administrator role.
- Record
CVE-2026-93757- CVSS 3.1
- 7.5 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-287
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
EUVDEUVD-2026-112591
7.5
The Wild Apricot Login plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via SSO Email-Collision Account Binding in all versions up to, and including, 1.0.18. When no WildApricot contact-ID mapping is found for an incoming SSO login, the plugin falls back to a network-global get_user_by('email', ...) lookup in Module.php to resolve a WordPress user, then UserSynchronizer::syncWaContact() binds and Controller::login() issues a session cookie via wp_set_auth_cookie() for that resolved user — both guarded only by is_super_admin() — without ever requiring proof of ownership of the matched WordPress account such as a password, local account-linking confirmation, inbox verification, or administrator approval. This makes it possible for attackers with custom-level WildApricot membership access to authenticate as an existing WordPress subsite administrator on a path-based Multisite network, obtaining a valid network-global authentication cookie for the victim without their credentials. Exploitation requires that the attacker control a WildApricot contact whose email address matches the target WordPress administrator's email — achievable via a public zero-fee membership application on the connected WildApricot organization — and that they complete the SSO flow on any subsite where Wild Apricot Login is active; because WordPress user identities and authentication cookies are network-global, the cookie issued on that subsite is equally valid on any other subsite where the victim user holds an administrator role.
- Record
EUVD-2026-112591- CVSS 3.1
- 7.5 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - Updated
- 2026-11-02
GitHub AdvisoriesGHSA-j3xg-qwqj-hq74
7.5
The Wild Apricot Login plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via SSO Email...
The Wild Apricot Login plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via SSO Email-Collision Account Binding in all versions up to, and including, 1.0.18. When no WildApricot contact-ID mapping is found for an incoming SSO login, the plugin falls back to a network-global get_user_by('email', ...) lookup in Module.php to resolve a WordPress user, then UserSynchronizer::syncWaContact() binds and Controller::login() issues a session cookie via wp_set_auth_cookie() for that resolved user — both guarded only by is_super_admin() — without ever requiring proof of ownership of the matched WordPress account such as a password, local account-linking confirmation, inbox verification, or administrator approval. This makes it possible for attackers with custom-level WildApricot membership access to authenticate as an existing WordPress subsite administrator on a path-based Multisite network, obtaining a valid network-global authentication cookie for the victim without their credentials. Exploitation requires that the attacker control a WildApricot contact whose email address matches the target WordPress administrator's email — achievable via a public zero-fee membership application on the connected WildApricot organization — and that they complete the SSO flow on any subsite where Wild Apricot Login is active; because WordPress user identities and authentication cookies are network-global, the cookie issued on that subsite is equally valid on any other subsite where the victim user holds an administrator role.
- Record
GHSA-j3xg-qwqj-hq74- CVSS 3.1
- 7.5 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-287
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
NVD
7.5
The Wild Apricot Login plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via SSO Email-Collision Account Binding in all versions up to, and including, 1.0.18. When no WildApricot contact-ID mapping is found for an incoming SSO login, the plugin falls back to a network-global get_user_by('email', ...) lookup in Module.php to resolve a WordPress user, then UserSynchronizer::syncWaContact() binds and Controller::login() issues a session cookie via wp_set_auth_cookie() for that resolved user — both guarded only by is_super_admin() — without ever requiring proof of ownership of the matched WordPress account such as a password, local account-linking confirmation, inbox verification, or administrator approval. This makes it possible for attackers with custom-level WildApricot membership access to authenticate as an existing WordPress subsite administrator on a path-based Multisite network, obtaining a valid network-global authentication cookie for the victim without their credentials. Exploitation requires that the attacker control a WildApricot contact whose email address matches the target WordPress administrator's email — achievable via a public zero-fee membership application on the connected WildApricot organization — and that they complete the SSO flow on any subsite where Wild Apricot Login is active; because WordPress user identities and authentication cookies are network-global, the cookie issued on that subsite is equally valid on any other subsite where the victim user holds an administrator role.
- Record
CVE-2026-93757- CVSS 3.1
- 7.5 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-287
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
Affected products
History
| Recorded | Changed | Sources |
|---|---|---|
| first indexed | CVE List, EUVD, GitHub Advisories, NVD |
Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.
In short
CVE-2026-93757 is a high vulnerability (CVSS 7.5) in Wild-apricot Wild Apricot Login, published October 29, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.43%, the 37th percentile. No source names a fixed version.
References
wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/9adbe55e-f1a1-4fa8-b28d-539d90d81c68?source=cve
plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wild-apricot-login/tags/1.0.18/Modules/Authorization/WaLogin/Controller.php
plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wild-apricot-login/tags/1.0.18/Modules/Core/WaApi/Client.php
plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wild-apricot-login/tags/1.0.18/Modules/Core/Module.php
plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wild-apricot-login/tags/1.0.18/Modules/Synchronization/UserSynchronizer.php
nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-93757
github.com/advisories/GHSA-j3xg-qwqj-hq74