CVE-2026-97228

Rapid7 Bulk Export MCP versions 0.2.5 through 0.6.1 suffer from a GraphQL query injection issue in the export-status component (get_export_status in src/export_manager.py), whereby the export_id value — an unvalidated MCP tool argument reaching the function via the check_rapid7_export_status and download_rapid7_export tools — is interpolated directly into the GraphQL query string. A crafted export_id containing quote and brace characters can terminate the intended export(id: "...") selection early and append attacker-controlled root-level selections (for example, schema introspection), producing a single well-formed GraphQL document that is then sent to the Rapid7 export API under the operator's own API key.

Notably, this issue does not grant an existing actor any access they do not already have: every injected query executes within the operator's own already-authenticated API scope, using the operator's own valid API key, and cannot cross a tenant or account boundary. A directly-malicious operator gains nothing they could not already do by calling the API directly; the realistic exposure is limited to a compromised or careless upstream MCP client, or indirect prompt injection forwarding an unvalidated identifier. This is fixed in version 0.6.2, which passes export_id as a parameterized GraphQL variable ($exportId: ID!).

Rapid7 Bulk Export MCP versions 0.2.5 through 0.6.1 suffer from a GraphQL query injection issue in the export-status component (get_export_status in src/export_manager.py), whereby the export_id value — an unvalidated MCP tool argument reaching the function via the check_rapid7_export_status and download_rapid7_export tools — is interpolated directly into the GraphQL query string. A crafted export_id containing quote and brace characters can terminate the intended export(id: "...") selection early and append attacker-controlled root-level selections (for example, schema introspection), producing a single well-formed GraphQL document that is then sent to the Rapid7 export API under the operator's own API key.

Notably, this issue does not grant an existing actor any access they do not already have: every injected query executes within the operator's own already-authenticated API scope, using the operator's own valid API key, and cannot cross a tenant or account boundary. A directly-malicious operator gains nothing they could not already do by calling the API directly; the realistic exposure is limited to a compromised or careless upstream MCP client, or indirect prompt injection forwarding an unvalidated identifier. This is fixed in version 0.6.2, which passes export_id as a parameterized GraphQL variable ($exportId: ID!).

Rapid7 Bulk Export MCP versions 0.2.5 through 0.6.1 suffer from a GraphQL query injection issue in the export-status component (get_export_status in src/export_manager.py), whereby the export_id value — an unvalidated MCP tool argument reaching the function via the check_rapid7_export_status and download_rapid7_export tools — is interpolated directly into the GraphQL query string. A crafted export_id containing quote and brace characters can terminate the intended export(id: "...") selection early and append attacker-controlled root-level selections (for example, schema introspection), producing a single well-formed GraphQL document that is then sent to the Rapid7 export API under the operator's own API key.

Notably, this issue does not grant an existing actor any access they do not already have: every injected query executes within the operator's own already-authenticated API scope, using the operator's own valid API key, and cannot cross a tenant or account boundary. A directly-malicious operator gains nothing they could not already do by calling the API directly; the realistic exposure is limited to a compromised or careless upstream MCP client, or indirect prompt injection forwarding an unvalidated identifier. This is fixed in version 0.6.2, which passes export_id as a parameterized GraphQL variable ($exportId: ID!).

Rapid7 Bulk Export MCP versions 0.2.5 through 0.6.1 suffer from a GraphQL query injection issue in the export-status component (get_export_status in src/export_manager.py), whereby the export_id value — an unvalidated MCP tool argument reaching the function via the check_rapid7_export_status and download_rapid7_export tools — is interpolated directly into the GraphQL query string. A crafted export_id containing quote and brace characters can terminate the intended export(id: "...") selection early and append attacker-controlled root-level selections (for example, schema introspection), producing a single well-formed GraphQL document that is then sent to the Rapid7 export API under the operator's own API key.

Notably, this issue does not grant an existing actor any access they do not already have: every injected query executes within the operator's own already-authenticated API scope, using the operator's own valid API key, and cannot cross a tenant or account boundary. A directly-malicious operator gains nothing they could not already do by calling the API directly; the realistic exposure is limited to a compromised or careless upstream MCP client, or indirect prompt injection forwarding an unvalidated identifier. This is fixed in version 0.6.2, which passes export_id as a parameterized GraphQL variable ($exportId: ID!).

Rapid7 Bulk Export MCP versions 0.2.5 through 0.6.1 suffer from a GraphQL query injection issue in the export-status component (get_export_status in src/export_manager.py), whereby the export_id value — an unvalidated MCP tool argument reaching the function via the check_rapid7_export_status and download_rapid7_export tools — is interpolated directly into the GraphQL query string. A crafted export_id containing quote and brace characters can terminate the intended export(id: "...") selection early and append attacker-controlled root-level selections (for example, schema introspection), producing a single well-formed GraphQL document that is then sent to the Rapid7 export API under the operator's own API key.

Notably, this issue does not grant an existing actor any access they do not already have: every injected query executes within the operator's own already-authenticated API scope, using the operator's own valid API key, and cannot cross a tenant or account boundary. A directly-malicious operator gains nothing they could not already do by calling the API directly; the realistic exposure is limited to a compromised or careless upstream MCP client, or indirect prompt injection forwarding an unvalidated identifier. This is fixed in version 0.6.2, which passes export_id as a parameterized GraphQL variable ($exportId: ID!).