CVE-2026-97343

The Burst Statistics – Simple WordPress Analytics (Google Analytics Alternative) plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Improper Authentication leading to Account Persistence in all versions up to, and including, 3.7.1. This is due to the maybe_load_shared_dashboard() handler issuing a genuine WordPress session cookie for the burst_statistics_viewer account to any visitor presenting a valid share token via wp_set_auth_cookie(), while the plugin only blocks Application Passwords for the resulting burst_viewer role and does not restrict the core /wp-json/wp/v2/users/me password update endpoint or filter the edit_user capability for that account — leaving WordPress core's built-in rule that any authenticated user may update their own account fully in effect. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to set an attacker-chosen password on the burst_statistics_viewer WordPress account, constituting a permanent takeover of that limited-privilege (view_burst_statistics) account that persists through share-token revocation, share-token expiration, and execution of the plugin's daily cleanup_viewer_sessions() routine. Exploitation requires that the attacker have obtained a valid burst_share_token, such as one that has been shared publicly or distributed to an untrusted party.

The Burst Statistics – Simple WordPress Analytics (Google Analytics Alternative) plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Improper Authentication leading to Account Persistence in all versions up to, and including, 3.7.1. This is due to the maybe_load_shared_dashboard() handler issuing a genuine WordPress session cookie for the burst_statistics_viewer account to any visitor presenting a valid share token via wp_set_auth_cookie(), while the plugin only blocks Application Passwords for the resulting burst_viewer role and does not restrict the core /wp-json/wp/v2/users/me password update endpoint or filter the edit_user capability for that account — leaving WordPress core's built-in rule that any authenticated user may update their own account fully in effect. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to set an attacker-chosen password on the burst_statistics_viewer WordPress account, constituting a permanent takeover of that limited-privilege (view_burst_statistics) account that persists through share-token revocation, share-token expiration, and execution of the plugin's daily cleanup_viewer_sessions() routine. Exploitation requires that the attacker have obtained a valid burst_share_token, such as one that has been shared publicly or distributed to an untrusted party.

The Burst Statistics – Simple WordPress Analytics (Google Analytics Alternative) plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Improper Authentication leading to Account Persistence in all versions up to, and including, 3.7.1. This is due to the maybe_load_shared_dashboard() handler issuing a genuine WordPress session cookie for the burst_statistics_viewer account to any visitor presenting a valid share token via wp_set_auth_cookie(), while the plugin only blocks Application Passwords for the resulting burst_viewer role and does not restrict the core /wp-json/wp/v2/users/me password update endpoint or filter the edit_user capability for that account — leaving WordPress core's built-in rule that any authenticated user may update their own account fully in effect. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to set an attacker-chosen password on the burst_statistics_viewer WordPress account, constituting a permanent takeover of that limited-privilege (view_burst_statistics) account that persists through share-token revocation, share-token expiration, and execution of the plugin's daily cleanup_viewer_sessions() routine. Exploitation requires that the attacker have obtained a valid burst_share_token, such as one that has been shared publicly or distributed to an untrusted party.

The Burst Statistics – Simple WordPress Analytics (Google Analytics Alternative) plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Improper Authentication leading to Account Persistence in all versions up to, and including, 3.7.1. This is due to the maybe_load_shared_dashboard() handler issuing a genuine WordPress session cookie for the burst_statistics_viewer account to any visitor presenting a valid share token via wp_set_auth_cookie(), while the plugin only blocks Application Passwords for the resulting burst_viewer role and does not restrict the core /wp-json/wp/v2/users/me password update endpoint or filter the edit_user capability for that account — leaving WordPress core's built-in rule that any authenticated user may update their own account fully in effect. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to set an attacker-chosen password on the burst_statistics_viewer WordPress account, constituting a permanent takeover of that limited-privilege (view_burst_statistics) account that persists through share-token revocation, share-token expiration, and execution of the plugin's daily cleanup_viewer_sessions() routine. Exploitation requires that the attacker have obtained a valid burst_share_token, such as one that has been shared publicly or distributed to an untrusted party.

The Burst Statistics – Simple WordPress Analytics (Google Analytics Alternative) plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Improper Authentication leading to Account Persistence in all versions up to, and including, 3.7.1. This is due to the maybe_load_shared_dashboard() handler issuing a genuine WordPress session cookie for the burst_statistics_viewer account to any visitor presenting a valid share token via wp_set_auth_cookie(), while the plugin only blocks Application Passwords for the resulting burst_viewer role and does not restrict the core /wp-json/wp/v2/users/me password update endpoint or filter the edit_user capability for that account — leaving WordPress core's built-in rule that any authenticated user may update their own account fully in effect. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to set an attacker-chosen password on the burst_statistics_viewer WordPress account, constituting a permanent takeover of that limited-privilege (view_burst_statistics) account that persists through share-token revocation, share-token expiration, and execution of the plugin's daily cleanup_viewer_sessions() routine. Exploitation requires that the attacker have obtained a valid burst_share_token, such as one that has been shared publicly or distributed to an untrusted party.