CVE-2026-98658

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

iio: proximity: aw96103: validate firmware data length

The firmware parser reads a length from the binary header and then uses it to walk six-byte register/value entries. A truncated firmware image can make the parser read beyond the copied firmware buffer. A value smaller than the four-byte count field also underflows, producing a very large length.

Read the little-endian field with get_unaligned_le32(), as previously proposed by David Lechner. Validate the header size, reject an underflowed length, ensure the resulting payload is contained in the firmware image, and require it to contain whole register/value entries.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

iio: proximity: aw96103: validate firmware data length

The firmware parser reads a length from the binary header and then uses it to walk six-byte register/value entries. A truncated firmware image can make the parser read beyond the copied firmware buffer. A value smaller than the four-byte count field also underflows, producing a very large length.

Read the little-endian field with get_unaligned_le32(), as previously proposed by David Lechner. Validate the header size, reject an underflowed length, ensure the resulting payload is contained in the firmware image, and require it to contain whole register/value entries.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

iio: proximity: aw96103: validate firmware data length

The firmware parser reads a length from the binary header and then uses it to walk six-byte register/value entries. A truncated firmware image can make the parser read beyond the copied firmware buffer. A value smaller than the four-byte count field also underflows, producing a very large length.

Read the little-endian field with get_unaligned_le32(), as previously proposed by David Lechner. Validate the header size, reject an underflowed length, ensure the resulting payload is contained in the firmware image, and require it to contain whole register/value entries.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

iio: proximity: aw96103: validate firmware data length

The firmware parser reads a length from the binary header and then uses it to walk six-byte register/value entries. A truncated firmware image can make the parser read beyond the copied firmware buffer. A value smaller than the four-byte count field also underflows, producing a very large length.

Read the little-endian field with get_unaligned_le32(), as previously proposed by David Lechner. Validate the header size, reject an underflowed length, ensure the resulting payload is contained in the firmware image, and require it to contain whole register/value entries.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

iio: proximity: aw96103: validate firmware data length

The firmware parser reads a length from the binary header and then uses it to walk six-byte register/value entries. A truncated firmware image can make the parser read beyond the copied firmware buffer. A value smaller than the four-byte count field also underflows, producing a very large length.

Read the little-endian field with get_unaligned_le32(), as previously proposed by David Lechner. Validate the header size, reject an underflowed length, ensure the resulting payload is contained in the firmware image, and require it to contain whole register/value entries.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: proximity: aw96103: validate firmware data length The firmware parser reads a length from the binary header and then uses it to walk six-byte register/value entries. A truncated firmware image can make the parser read beyond the copied firmware buffer. A value smaller than the four-byte count field also underflows, producing a very large length. Read the little-endian field with get_unaligned_le32(), as previously proposed by David Lechner. Validate the header size, reject an underflowed length, ensure the resulting payload is contained in the firmware image, and require it to contain whole register/value entries.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: proximity: aw96103: validate firmware data length The firmware parser reads a length from the binary header and then uses it to walk six-byte register/value entries. A truncated firmware image can make the parser read beyond the copied firmware buffer. A value smaller than the four-byte count field also underflows, producing a very large length. Read the little-endian field with get_unaligned_le32(), as previously proposed by David Lechner. Validate the header size, reject an underflowed length, ensure the resulting payload is contained in the firmware image, and require it to contain whole register/value entries.