CVE-2026-98918

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mm/damon/ops-common: use a page-aligned address in damon_ptep_mkold()

__damon_va_prepare_access_check() picks a random byte address within the region and stores it in r->sampling_addr. damon_va_mkold() passes it into a page table walk, which hands it to damon_ptep_mkold() as the address of the page to sample:

damon_va_mkold(mm, r->sampling_addr) damon_va_walk_page_range(mm, addr, addr + 1) damon_mkold_pmd_entry() damon_ptep_mkold(pte, vma, addr) ptep_test_and_clear_young(vma, addr, pte) mmu_notifier_clear_young(mm, addr, addr + PAGE_SIZE)

For arm64, before commit 6f0e1142173a ("arm64: mm: support batch clearing of the young flag for large folios"), the contpte helper walked exactly CONT_PTES entries from the aligned-down page table pointer and used @addr only to pass down to each entry, so an unaligned value was harmless:

    ptep = contpte_align_down(ptep);
    addr = ALIGN_DOWN(addr, CONT_PTE_SIZE);
    for (i = 0; i < CONT_PTES; i++, ptep++, addr += PAGE_SIZE)

Now the range to walk is derived from @addr instead: end = addr + nr * PAGE_SIZE, rounded up to CONT_PTE_SIZE. For a sample in the last page of a contpte block, the sub-page offset puts end just past the block boundary, so the round-up lands a whole block further and the walk clears PTE_AF in CONT_PTES entries beyond the sampled block. For the last block in a page table page, those entries are past the end of that page, so the walk writes into the page that follows.

Triggered by the full 7.1/7.2 kernel selftest suite on arm64 (EC2 c/m6g.4xlarge). The kernel sometimes crashes at or shortly after the DAMON test.

What the overrun does depends on the page that happens to follow the page table, so there is no single signature. If that page is read-only, the write faults in the sampling path itself:

Unable to handle kernel write to read-only memory at virtual address ffff0003c5d2d000 FSC = 0x0f: level 3 permission fault CM = 0, WnR = 1, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 CPU: 10 UID: 0 PID: 3487 Comm: kdamond.2 pc : contpte_test_and_clear_young_ptes+0x70/0xc0 lr : damon_ptep_mkold+0x1e8/0x1f8 Call trace: contpte_test_and_clear_young_ptes+0x70/0xc0 (P) damon_mkold_pmd_entry+0x150/0x170 walk_pmd_range+0x110/0x2b0 walk_pud_range+0x10c/0x208 walk_pgd_range+0x134/0x258 __walk_page_range+0x98/0x1b0 walk_page_range_vma_unsafe+0x90/0x148 walk_page_range_vma+0x28/0x40 damon_va_walk_page_range+0x114/0x2b8 damon_va_prepare_access_checks+0xec/0x1a8 kdamond_fn+0x534/0x770 kthread+0x128/0x138 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20

Otherwise the page is writable, the PTE_AF clearing succeeds silently and the damage only surfaces later, in whatever happened to own the page, so the backtrace is unrelated to DAMON and differs between runs.

Pass a page-aligned address to the ptep_test_and_clear_young() call in damon_ptep_mkold(), which is the only place DAMON can reach contpte_test_and_clear_young_ptes() from. Nothing else sees the aligned address, and r->sampling_addr itself is left as is, so the sampling and region bookkeeping semantics are unchanged.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mm/damon/ops-common: use a page-aligned address in damon_ptep_mkold()

__damon_va_prepare_access_check() picks a random byte address within the region and stores it in r->sampling_addr. damon_va_mkold() passes it into a page table walk, which hands it to damon_ptep_mkold() as the address of the page to sample:

damon_va_mkold(mm, r->sampling_addr) damon_va_walk_page_range(mm, addr, addr + 1) damon_mkold_pmd_entry() damon_ptep_mkold(pte, vma, addr) ptep_test_and_clear_young(vma, addr, pte) mmu_notifier_clear_young(mm, addr, addr + PAGE_SIZE)

For arm64, before commit 6f0e1142173a ("arm64: mm: support batch clearing of the young flag for large folios"), the contpte helper walked exactly CONT_PTES entries from the aligned-down page table pointer and used @addr only to pass down to each entry, so an unaligned value was harmless:

    ptep = contpte_align_down(ptep);
    addr = ALIGN_DOWN(addr, CONT_PTE_SIZE);
    for (i = 0; i < CONT_PTES; i++, ptep++, addr += PAGE_SIZE)

Now the range to walk is derived from @addr instead: end = addr + nr * PAGE_SIZE, rounded up to CONT_PTE_SIZE. For a sample in the last page of a contpte block, the sub-page offset puts end just past the block boundary, so the round-up lands a whole block further and the walk clears PTE_AF in CONT_PTES entries beyond the sampled block. For the last block in a page table page, those entries are past the end of that page, so the walk writes into the page that follows.

Triggered by the full 7.1/7.2 kernel selftest suite on arm64 (EC2 c/m6g.4xlarge). The kernel sometimes crashes at or shortly after the DAMON test.

What the overrun does depends on the page that happens to follow the page table, so there is no single signature. If that page is read-only, the write faults in the sampling path itself:

Unable to handle kernel write to read-only memory at virtual address ffff0003c5d2d000 FSC = 0x0f: level 3 permission fault CM = 0, WnR = 1, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 CPU: 10 UID: 0 PID: 3487 Comm: kdamond.2 pc : contpte_test_and_clear_young_ptes+0x70/0xc0 lr : damon_ptep_mkold+0x1e8/0x1f8 Call trace: contpte_test_and_clear_young_ptes+0x70/0xc0 (P) damon_mkold_pmd_entry+0x150/0x170 walk_pmd_range+0x110/0x2b0 walk_pud_range+0x10c/0x208 walk_pgd_range+0x134/0x258 __walk_page_range+0x98/0x1b0 walk_page_range_vma_unsafe+0x90/0x148 walk_page_range_vma+0x28/0x40 damon_va_walk_page_range+0x114/0x2b8 damon_va_prepare_access_checks+0xec/0x1a8 kdamond_fn+0x534/0x770 kthread+0x128/0x138 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20

Otherwise the page is writable, the PTE_AF clearing succeeds silently and the damage only surfaces later, in whatever happened to own the page, so the backtrace is unrelated to DAMON and differs between runs.

Pass a page-aligned address to the ptep_test_and_clear_young() call in damon_ptep_mkold(), which is the only place DAMON can reach contpte_test_and_clear_young_ptes() from. Nothing else sees the aligned address, and r->sampling_addr itself is left as is, so the sampling and region bookkeeping semantics are unchanged.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mm/damon/ops-common: use a page-aligned address in damon_ptep_mkold()

__damon_va_prepare_access_check() picks a random byte address within the region and stores it in r->sampling_addr. damon_va_mkold() passes it into a page table walk, which hands it to damon_ptep_mkold() as the address of the page to sample:

damon_va_mkold(mm, r->sampling_addr) damon_va_walk_page_range(mm, addr, addr + 1) damon_mkold_pmd_entry() damon_ptep_mkold(pte, vma, addr) ptep_test_and_clear_young(vma, addr, pte) mmu_notifier_clear_young(mm, addr, addr + PAGE_SIZE)

For arm64, before commit 6f0e1142173a ("arm64: mm: support batch clearing of the young flag for large folios"), the contpte helper walked exactly CONT_PTES entries from the aligned-down page table pointer and used @addr only to pass down to each entry, so an unaligned value was harmless:

    ptep = contpte_align_down(ptep);
    addr = ALIGN_DOWN(addr, CONT_PTE_SIZE);
    for (i = 0; i < CONT_PTES; i++, ptep++, addr += PAGE_SIZE)

Now the range to walk is derived from @addr instead: end = addr + nr * PAGE_SIZE, rounded up to CONT_PTE_SIZE. For a sample in the last page of a contpte block, the sub-page offset puts end just past the block boundary, so the round-up lands a whole block further and the walk clears PTE_AF in CONT_PTES entries beyond the sampled block. For the last block in a page table page, those entries are past the end of that page, so the walk writes into the page that follows.

Triggered by the full 7.1/7.2 kernel selftest suite on arm64 (EC2 c/m6g.4xlarge). The kernel sometimes crashes at or shortly after the DAMON test.

What the overrun does depends on the page that happens to follow the page table, so there is no single signature. If that page is read-only, the write faults in the sampling path itself:

Unable to handle kernel write to read-only memory at virtual address ffff0003c5d2d000 FSC = 0x0f: level 3 permission fault CM = 0, WnR = 1, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 CPU: 10 UID: 0 PID: 3487 Comm: kdamond.2 pc : contpte_test_and_clear_young_ptes+0x70/0xc0 lr : damon_ptep_mkold+0x1e8/0x1f8 Call trace: contpte_test_and_clear_young_ptes+0x70/0xc0 (P) damon_mkold_pmd_entry+0x150/0x170 walk_pmd_range+0x110/0x2b0 walk_pud_range+0x10c/0x208 walk_pgd_range+0x134/0x258 __walk_page_range+0x98/0x1b0 walk_page_range_vma_unsafe+0x90/0x148 walk_page_range_vma+0x28/0x40 damon_va_walk_page_range+0x114/0x2b8 damon_va_prepare_access_checks+0xec/0x1a8 kdamond_fn+0x534/0x770 kthread+0x128/0x138 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20

Otherwise the page is writable, the PTE_AF clearing succeeds silently and the damage only surfaces later, in whatever happened to own the page, so the backtrace is unrelated to DAMON and differs between runs.

Pass a page-aligned address to the ptep_test_and_clear_young() call in damon_ptep_mkold(), which is the only place DAMON can reach contpte_test_and_clear_young_ptes() from. Nothing else sees the aligned address, and r->sampling_addr itself is left as is, so the sampling and region bookkeeping semantics are unchanged.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mm/damon/ops-common: use a page-aligned address in damon_ptep_mkold()

__damon_va_prepare_access_check() picks a random byte address within the region and stores it in r->sampling_addr. damon_va_mkold() passes it into a page table walk, which hands it to damon_ptep_mkold() as the address of the page to sample:

damon_va_mkold(mm, r->sampling_addr) damon_va_walk_page_range(mm, addr, addr + 1) damon_mkold_pmd_entry() damon_ptep_mkold(pte, vma, addr) ptep_test_and_clear_young(vma, addr, pte) mmu_notifier_clear_young(mm, addr, addr + PAGE_SIZE)

For arm64, before commit 6f0e1142173a ("arm64: mm: support batch clearing of the young flag for large folios"), the contpte helper walked exactly CONT_PTES entries from the aligned-down page table pointer and used @addr only to pass down to each entry, so an unaligned value was harmless:

    ptep = contpte_align_down(ptep);
    addr = ALIGN_DOWN(addr, CONT_PTE_SIZE);
    for (i = 0; i < CONT_PTES; i++, ptep++, addr += PAGE_SIZE)

Now the range to walk is derived from @addr instead: end = addr + nr * PAGE_SIZE, rounded up to CONT_PTE_SIZE. For a sample in the last page of a contpte block, the sub-page offset puts end just past the block boundary, so the round-up lands a whole block further and the walk clears PTE_AF in CONT_PTES entries beyond the sampled block. For the last block in a page table page, those entries are past the end of that page, so the walk writes into the page that follows.

Triggered by the full 7.1/7.2 kernel selftest suite on arm64 (EC2 c/m6g.4xlarge). The kernel sometimes crashes at or shortly after the DAMON test.

What the overrun does depends on the page that happens to follow the page table, so there is no single signature. If that page is read-only, the write faults in the sampling path itself:

Unable to handle kernel write to read-only memory at virtual address ffff0003c5d2d000 FSC = 0x0f: level 3 permission fault CM = 0, WnR = 1, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 CPU: 10 UID: 0 PID: 3487 Comm: kdamond.2 pc : contpte_test_and_clear_young_ptes+0x70/0xc0 lr : damon_ptep_mkold+0x1e8/0x1f8 Call trace: contpte_test_and_clear_young_ptes+0x70/0xc0 (P) damon_mkold_pmd_entry+0x150/0x170 walk_pmd_range+0x110/0x2b0 walk_pud_range+0x10c/0x208 walk_pgd_range+0x134/0x258 __walk_page_range+0x98/0x1b0 walk_page_range_vma_unsafe+0x90/0x148 walk_page_range_vma+0x28/0x40 damon_va_walk_page_range+0x114/0x2b8 damon_va_prepare_access_checks+0xec/0x1a8 kdamond_fn+0x534/0x770 kthread+0x128/0x138 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20

Otherwise the page is writable, the PTE_AF clearing succeeds silently and the damage only surfaces later, in whatever happened to own the page, so the backtrace is unrelated to DAMON and differs between runs.

Pass a page-aligned address to the ptep_test_and_clear_young() call in damon_ptep_mkold(), which is the only place DAMON can reach contpte_test_and_clear_young_ptes() from. Nothing else sees the aligned address, and r->sampling_addr itself is left as is, so the sampling and region bookkeeping semantics are unchanged.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mm/damon/ops-common: use a page-aligned address in damon_ptep_mkold()

__damon_va_prepare_access_check() picks a random byte address within the region and stores it in r->sampling_addr. damon_va_mkold() passes it into a page table walk, which hands it to damon_ptep_mkold() as the address of the page to sample:

damon_va_mkold(mm, r->sampling_addr) damon_va_walk_page_range(mm, addr, addr + 1) damon_mkold_pmd_entry() damon_ptep_mkold(pte, vma, addr) ptep_test_and_clear_young(vma, addr, pte) mmu_notifier_clear_young(mm, addr, addr + PAGE_SIZE)

For arm64, before commit 6f0e1142173a ("arm64: mm: support batch clearing of the young flag for large folios"), the contpte helper walked exactly CONT_PTES entries from the aligned-down page table pointer and used @addr only to pass down to each entry, so an unaligned value was harmless:

    ptep = contpte_align_down(ptep);
    addr = ALIGN_DOWN(addr, CONT_PTE_SIZE);
    for (i = 0; i < CONT_PTES; i++, ptep++, addr += PAGE_SIZE)

Now the range to walk is derived from @addr instead: end = addr + nr * PAGE_SIZE, rounded up to CONT_PTE_SIZE. For a sample in the last page of a contpte block, the sub-page offset puts end just past the block boundary, so the round-up lands a whole block further and the walk clears PTE_AF in CONT_PTES entries beyond the sampled block. For the last block in a page table page, those entries are past the end of that page, so the walk writes into the page that follows.

Triggered by the full 7.1/7.2 kernel selftest suite on arm64 (EC2 c/m6g.4xlarge). The kernel sometimes crashes at or shortly after the DAMON test.

What the overrun does depends on the page that happens to follow the page table, so there is no single signature. If that page is read-only, the write faults in the sampling path itself:

Unable to handle kernel write to read-only memory at virtual address ffff0003c5d2d000 FSC = 0x0f: level 3 permission fault CM = 0, WnR = 1, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 CPU: 10 UID: 0 PID: 3487 Comm: kdamond.2 pc : contpte_test_and_clear_young_ptes+0x70/0xc0 lr : damon_ptep_mkold+0x1e8/0x1f8 Call trace: contpte_test_and_clear_young_ptes+0x70/0xc0 (P) damon_mkold_pmd_entry+0x150/0x170 walk_pmd_range+0x110/0x2b0 walk_pud_range+0x10c/0x208 walk_pgd_range+0x134/0x258 __walk_page_range+0x98/0x1b0 walk_page_range_vma_unsafe+0x90/0x148 walk_page_range_vma+0x28/0x40 damon_va_walk_page_range+0x114/0x2b8 damon_va_prepare_access_checks+0xec/0x1a8 kdamond_fn+0x534/0x770 kthread+0x128/0x138 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20

Otherwise the page is writable, the PTE_AF clearing succeeds silently and the damage only surfaces later, in whatever happened to own the page, so the backtrace is unrelated to DAMON and differs between runs.

Pass a page-aligned address to the ptep_test_and_clear_young() call in damon_ptep_mkold(), which is the only place DAMON can reach contpte_test_and_clear_young_ptes() from. Nothing else sees the aligned address, and r->sampling_addr itself is left as is, so the sampling and region bookkeeping semantics are unchanged.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/damon/ops-common: use a page-aligned address in damon_ptep_mkold() __damon_va_prepare_access_check() picks a random byte address within the region and stores it in r->sampling_addr. damon_va_mkold() passes it into a page table walk, which hands it to damon_ptep_mkold() as the address of the page to sample: damon_va_mkold(mm, r->sampling_addr) damon_va_walk_page_range(mm, addr, addr + 1) damon_mkold_pmd_entry() damon_ptep_mkold(pte, vma, addr) ptep_test_and_clear_young(vma, addr, pte) mmu_notifier_clear_young(mm, addr, addr + PAGE_SIZE) For arm64, before commit 6f0e1142173a ("arm64: mm: support batch clearing of the young flag for large folios"), the contpte helper walked exactly CONT_PTES entries from the aligned-down page table pointer and used @addr only to pass down to each entry, so an unaligned value was harmless: ptep = contpte_align_down(ptep); addr = ALIGN_DOWN(addr, CONT_PTE_SIZE); for (i = 0; i < CONT_PTES; i++, ptep++, addr += PAGE_SIZE) Now the range to walk is derived from @addr instead: end = addr + nr * PAGE_SIZE, rounded up to CONT_PTE_SIZE. For a sample in the last page of a contpte block, the sub-page offset puts end just past the block boundary, so the round-up lands a whole block further and the walk clears PTE_AF in CONT_PTES entries beyond the sampled block. For the last block in a page table page, those entries are past the end of that page, so the walk writes into the page that follows. Triggered by the full 7.1/7.2 kernel selftest suite on arm64 (EC2 c/m6g.4xlarge). The kernel sometimes crashes at or shortly after the DAMON test. What the overrun does depends on the page that happens to follow the page table, so there is no single signature. If that page is read-only, the write faults in the sampling path itself: Unable to handle kernel write to read-only memory at virtual address ffff0003c5d2d000 FSC = 0x0f: level 3 permission fault CM = 0, WnR = 1, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 CPU: 10 UID: 0 PID: 3487 Comm: kdamond.2 pc : contpte_test_and_clear_young_ptes+0x70/0xc0 lr : damon_ptep_mkold+0x1e8/0x1f8 Call trace: contpte_test_and_clear_young_ptes+0x70/0xc0 (P) damon_mkold_pmd_entry+0x150/0x170 walk_pmd_range+0x110/0x2b0 walk_pud_range+0x10c/0x208 walk_pgd_range+0x134/0x258 __walk_page_range+0x98/0x1b0 walk_page_range_vma_unsafe+0x90/0x148 walk_page_range_vma+0x28/0x40 damon_va_walk_page_range+0x114/0x2b8 damon_va_prepare_access_checks+0xec/0x1a8 kdamond_fn+0x534/0x770 kthread+0x128/0x138 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Otherwise the page is writable, the PTE_AF clearing succeeds silently and the damage only surfaces later, in whatever happened to own the page, so the backtrace is unrelated to DAMON and differs between runs. Pass a page-aligned address to the ptep_test_and_clear_young() call in damon_ptep_mkold(), which is the only place DAMON can reach contpte_test_and_clear_young_ptes() from. Nothing else sees the aligned address, and r->sampling_addr itself is left as is, so the sampling and region bookkeeping semantics are unchanged.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/damon/ops-common: use a page-aligned address in damon_ptep_mkold() __damon_va_prepare_access_check() picks a random byte address within the region and stores it in r->sampling_addr. damon_va_mkold() passes it into a page table walk, which hands it to damon_ptep_mkold() as the address of the page to sample: damon_va_mkold(mm, r->sampling_addr) damon_va_walk_page_range(mm, addr, addr + 1) damon_mkold_pmd_entry() damon_ptep_mkold(pte, vma, addr) ptep_test_and_clear_young(vma, addr, pte) mmu_notifier_clear_young(mm, addr, addr + PAGE_SIZE) For arm64, before commit 6f0e1142173a ("arm64: mm: support batch clearing of the young flag for large folios"), the contpte helper walked exactly CONT_PTES entries from the aligned-down page table pointer and used @addr only to pass down to each entry, so an unaligned value was harmless: ptep = contpte_align_down(ptep); addr = ALIGN_DOWN(addr, CONT_PTE_SIZE); for (i = 0; i < CONT_PTES; i++, ptep++, addr += PAGE_SIZE) Now the range to walk is derived from @addr instead: end = addr + nr * PAGE_SIZE, rounded up to CONT_PTE_SIZE. For a sample in the last page of a contpte block, the sub-page offset puts end just past the block boundary, so the round-up lands a whole block further and the walk clears PTE_AF in CONT_PTES entries beyond the sampled block. For the last block in a page table page, those entries are past the end of that page, so the walk writes into the page that follows. Triggered by the full 7.1/7.2 kernel selftest suite on arm64 (EC2 c/m6g.4xlarge). The kernel sometimes crashes at or shortly after the DAMON test. What the overrun does depends on the page that happens to follow the page table, so there is no single signature. If that page is read-only, the write faults in the sampling path itself: Unable to handle kernel write to read-only memory at virtual address ffff0003c5d2d000 FSC = 0x0f: level 3 permission fault CM = 0, WnR = 1, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 CPU: 10 UID: 0 PID: 3487 Comm: kdamond.2 pc : contpte_test_and_clear_young_ptes+0x70/0xc0 lr : damon_ptep_mkold+0x1e8/0x1f8 Call trace: contpte_test_and_clear_young_ptes+0x70/0xc0 (P) damon_mkold_pmd_entry+0x150/0x170 walk_pmd_range+0x110/0x2b0 walk_pud_range+0x10c/0x208 walk_pgd_range+0x134/0x258 __walk_page_range+0x98/0x1b0 walk_page_range_vma_unsafe+0x90/0x148 walk_page_range_vma+0x28/0x40 damon_va_walk_page_range+0x114/0x2b8 damon_va_prepare_access_checks+0xec/0x1a8 kdamond_fn+0x534/0x770 kthread+0x128/0x138 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Otherwise the page is writable, the PTE_AF clearing succeeds silently and the damage only surfaces later, in whatever happened to own the page, so the backtrace is unrelated to DAMON and differs between runs. Pass a page-aligned address to the ptep_test_and_clear_young() call in damon_ptep_mkold(), which is the only place DAMON can reach contpte_test_and_clear_young_ptes() from. Nothing else sees the aligned address, and r->sampling_addr itself is left as is, so the sampling and region bookkeeping semantics are unchanged.

Several security issues were discovered in the Linux kernel. An attacker could possibly use these to compromise the system. This update corrects flaws in the following subsystems:

• USB Gadget drivers;
• Memory management;
• Multiple devices driver;
• ARM64 architecture;
• EROFS file system;
• Networking core;
• eXpress Data Path;
• ARM32 architecture;
• M68K architecture;
• MIPS architecture;
• OpenRISC architecture;
• PA-RISC architecture;
• PowerPC architecture;
• RISC-V architecture;
• S390 architecture;
• User-Mode Linux (UML);
• x86 architecture;
• Block layer subsystem;
• Cryptographic API;
• Compute Acceleration Framework;
• Intel NPU Driver;
• Speakup Console Speech Driver;
• ACPI drivers;
• Serial ATA and Parallel ATA drivers;
• Auxiliary display drivers;
• Drivers core;
• Micron PCIe SSD driver;
• Null block device driver;
• Ublk userspace block driver;
• Compressed RAM block device driver;
• Bluetooth drivers;
• Bus devices;
• AMD CDX bus driver;
• Hardware random number generator core;
• Character device driver;
• TPM device driver;
• Clock framework and drivers;
• Clocksource drivers;
• CPU frequency scaling framework;
• CPU idle management framework;
• Hardware crypto device drivers;
• CXL (Compute Express Link) drivers;
• DAX dirext access to differentiated memory framework;
• DIBS (Direct Internal Buffer Sharing) drivers;
• Buffer Sharing and Synchronization framework;
• DMA engine subsystem;
• EDAC drivers;
• FireWire subsystem;
• ARM SCMI message protocol;
• ARM SCPI message protocol;
• Google firmware drivers;
• Qualcomm firmware drivers;
• FPGA Framework;
• GPIO subsystem;
• GPU drivers;
• HID subsystem;
• HSI subsystem;
• Microsoft Hyper-V drivers;
• Hardware monitoring drivers;
• CoreSight HW tracing drivers;
• I2C subsystem;
• I3C subsystem;
• IIO subsystem;
• InfiniBand drivers;
• Input Device core drivers;
• Input Device (Miscellaneous) drivers;
• Input Device (Mouse) drivers;
• On-Chip Interconnect management framework;
• IOMMU subsystem;
• Industry Pack bus drivers;
• IRQ chip drivers;
• Mailbox framework;
• Media drivers;
• MemoryStick subsystem;
• Multifunction device drivers;
• Analog Devices digital potentiometer driver;
• Broadcom VK accelerator driver;
• Fastrpc Driver;
• Amazon Nitro Secure Module driver;
• SGI GRU driver;
• MMC subsystem;
• MTD block device drivers;
• Network drivers;
• Ethernet bonding driver;
• Mellanox network drivers;
• Microsoft Azure Network Adapter (MANA) driver;
• STMicroelectronics network drivers;
• Texas Instruments network drivers;
• MediaTek network drivers;
• Near Field Communication (NFC) drivers;
• NTB driver;
• NVDIMM (Non-Volatile Memory Device) drivers;
• NVME drivers;
• Device tree and open firmware driver;
• Operating Performance Points (OPP) driver;
• PA-RISC drivers;
• PCI subsystem;
• Performance monitor drivers;
• PHY drivers;
• Pin controllers subsystem;
• Chrome hardware platform drivers;
• Mellanox platform drivers;
• Microsoft Surface platform drivers;
• x86 platform drivers;
• MediaTek PM domains;
• Power sequencing drivers;
• Power supply drivers;
• Powercap sysfs driver;
• PTP clock framework;
• PWM drivers;
• RapidIO drivers;
• Voltage and Current Regulator drivers;
• Remote Processor subsystem;
• MPAM driver;
• RPMSG subsystem;
• Real Time Clock drivers;
• S/390 drivers;
• SCSI subsystem;
• ASPEED SoC drivers;
• Samsung SoC drivers;
• SPI subsystem;
• small TFT LCD display modules;
• Greybus lights staging drivers;
• Media staging drivers;
• Realtek RTL8723BS SDIO drivers;
• TCM subsystem;
• Trusted Execution Environment drivers;
• Thermal drivers;
• Thunderbolt and USB4 drivers;
• TTY drivers;
• UFS subsystem;
• Userspace I/O drivers;
• USB DSL drivers;
• Cypress C67X00 USB…

Several security issues were discovered in the Linux kernel. An attacker could possibly use these to compromise the system. This update corrects flaws in the following subsystems:

• USB Gadget drivers;
• Memory management;
• Multiple devices driver;
• ARM64 architecture;
• EROFS file system;
• Networking core;
• eXpress Data Path;
• ARM32 architecture;
• M68K architecture;
• MIPS architecture;
• OpenRISC architecture;
• PA-RISC architecture;
• PowerPC architecture;
• RISC-V architecture;
• S390 architecture;
• User-Mode Linux (UML);
• x86 architecture;
• Block layer subsystem;
• Cryptographic API;
• Compute Acceleration Framework;
• Intel NPU Driver;
• Speakup Console Speech Driver;
• ACPI drivers;
• Serial ATA and Parallel ATA drivers;
• Auxiliary display drivers;
• Drivers core;
• Micron PCIe SSD driver;
• Null block device driver;
• Ublk userspace block driver;
• Compressed RAM block device driver;
• Bluetooth drivers;
• Bus devices;
• AMD CDX bus driver;
• Hardware random number generator core;
• Character device driver;
• TPM device driver;
• Clock framework and drivers;
• Clocksource drivers;
• CPU frequency scaling framework;
• CPU idle management framework;
• Hardware crypto device drivers;
• CXL (Compute Express Link) drivers;
• DAX dirext access to differentiated memory framework;
• DIBS (Direct Internal Buffer Sharing) drivers;
• Buffer Sharing and Synchronization framework;
• DMA engine subsystem;
• EDAC drivers;
• FireWire subsystem;
• ARM SCMI message protocol;
• ARM SCPI message protocol;
• Google firmware drivers;
• Qualcomm firmware drivers;
• FPGA Framework;
• GPIO subsystem;
• GPU drivers;
• HID subsystem;
• HSI subsystem;
• Microsoft Hyper-V drivers;
• Hardware monitoring drivers;
• CoreSight HW tracing drivers;
• I2C subsystem;
• I3C subsystem;
• IIO subsystem;
• InfiniBand drivers;
• Input Device core drivers;
• Input Device (Miscellaneous) drivers;
• Input Device (Mouse) drivers;
• On-Chip Interconnect management framework;
• IOMMU subsystem;
• Industry Pack bus drivers;
• IRQ chip drivers;
• Mailbox framework;
• Media drivers;
• MemoryStick subsystem;
• Multifunction device drivers;
• Analog Devices digital potentiometer driver;
• Broadcom VK accelerator driver;
• Fastrpc Driver;
• Amazon Nitro Secure Module driver;
• SGI GRU driver;
• MMC subsystem;
• MTD block device drivers;
• Network drivers;
• Ethernet bonding driver;
• Mellanox network drivers;
• Microsoft Azure Network Adapter (MANA) driver;
• STMicroelectronics network drivers;
• Texas Instruments network drivers;
• MediaTek network drivers;
• Near Field Communication (NFC) drivers;
• NTB driver;
• NVDIMM (Non-Volatile Memory Device) drivers;
• NVME drivers;
• Device tree and open firmware driver;
• Operating Performance Points (OPP) driver;
• PA-RISC drivers;
• PCI subsystem;
• Performance monitor drivers;
• PHY drivers;
• Pin controllers subsystem;
• Chrome hardware platform drivers;
• Mellanox platform drivers;
• Microsoft Surface platform drivers;
• x86 platform drivers;
• MediaTek PM domains;
• Power sequencing drivers;
• Power supply drivers;
• Powercap sysfs driver;
• PTP clock framework;
• PWM drivers;
• RapidIO drivers;
• Voltage and Current Regulator drivers;
• Remote Processor subsystem;
• MPAM driver;
• RPMSG subsystem;
• Real Time Clock drivers;
• S/390 drivers;
• SCSI subsystem;
• ASPEED SoC drivers;
• Samsung SoC drivers;
• SPI subsystem;
• small TFT LCD display modules;
• Greybus lights staging drivers;
• Media staging drivers;
• Realtek RTL8723BS SDIO drivers;
• TCM subsystem;
• Trusted Execution Environment drivers;
• Thermal drivers;
• Thunderbolt and USB4 drivers;
• TTY drivers;
• UFS subsystem;
• Userspace I/O drivers;
• USB DSL drivers;
• Cypress C67X00 USB…