CVE-2026-98951

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

riscv: ptrace: Zero-initialize regset buffers before copyin

user_regset_copyin() only copies count bytes, so a PTRACE_SETREGSET request with a short iov_len leaves the rest of the stack buffer uninitialized. In riscv_vr_set() that garbage is validated and copied into the target's vstate, and in riscv_cfi_set() it can be stored as the target's shadow stack pointer. Zero both buffers, as the get path already does.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

riscv: ptrace: Zero-initialize regset buffers before copyin

user_regset_copyin() only copies count bytes, so a PTRACE_SETREGSET request with a short iov_len leaves the rest of the stack buffer uninitialized. In riscv_vr_set() that garbage is validated and copied into the target's vstate, and in riscv_cfi_set() it can be stored as the target's shadow stack pointer. Zero both buffers, as the get path already does.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

riscv: ptrace: Zero-initialize regset buffers before copyin

user_regset_copyin() only copies count bytes, so a PTRACE_SETREGSET request with a short iov_len leaves the rest of the stack buffer uninitialized. In riscv_vr_set() that garbage is validated and copied into the target's vstate, and in riscv_cfi_set() it can be stored as the target's shadow stack pointer. Zero both buffers, as the get path already does.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

riscv: ptrace: Zero-initialize regset buffers before copyin

user_regset_copyin() only copies count bytes, so a PTRACE_SETREGSET request with a short iov_len leaves the rest of the stack buffer uninitialized. In riscv_vr_set() that garbage is validated and copied into the target's vstate, and in riscv_cfi_set() it can be stored as the target's shadow stack pointer. Zero both buffers, as the get path already does.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

riscv: ptrace: Zero-initialize regset buffers before copyin

user_regset_copyin() only copies count bytes, so a PTRACE_SETREGSET request with a short iov_len leaves the rest of the stack buffer uninitialized. In riscv_vr_set() that garbage is validated and copied into the target's vstate, and in riscv_cfi_set() it can be stored as the target's shadow stack pointer. Zero both buffers, as the get path already does.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

riscv: ptrace: Zero-initialize regset buffers before copyin

user_regset_copyin() only copies count bytes, so a PTRACE_SETREGSET request with a short iov_len leaves the rest of the stack buffer uninitialized. In riscv_vr_set() that garbage is validated and copied into the target's vstate, and in riscv_cfi_set() it can be stored as the target's shadow stack pointer. Zero both buffers, as the get path already does.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: riscv: ptrace: Zero-initialize regset buffers before copyin user_regset_copyin() only copies count bytes, so a PTRACE_SETREGSET request with a short iov_len leaves the rest of the stack buffer uninitialized. In riscv_vr_set() that garbage is validated and copied into the target's vstate, and in riscv_cfi_set() it can be stored as the target's shadow stack pointer. Zero both buffers, as the get path already does.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: riscv: ptrace: Zero-initialize regset buffers before copyin user_regset_copyin() only copies count bytes, so a PTRACE_SETREGSET request with a short iov_len leaves the rest of the stack buffer uninitialized. In riscv_vr_set() that garbage is validated and copied into the target's vstate, and in riscv_cfi_set() it can be stored as the target's shadow stack pointer. Zero both buffers, as the get path already does.