CVE-2026-99038

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

memstick: rtsx_usb_ms: complete requests after eject instead of dropping them

memstick_check() can pass its host->removing check just before rtsx_usb_ms_drv_remove() sets eject/removing. Its next request is then silently dropped: rtsx_usb_ms_request() skips schedule_work() once eject is set, and drv_remove's cancel_work_sync() can also cancel a queued handle_req before it picks the request up. Nobody completes card->mrq_complete.

Once memstick core waits for requests without a timeout ("memstick: core: wait for request completion before freeing card"), this hangs removal: memstick_check() never returns and memstick_remove_host() blocks in flush_workqueue():

INFO: task kworker/u10:3:65 blocked for more than 20 seconds. Workqueue: kmemstick memstick_check __wait_for_common memstick_check

INFO: task kworker/1:1:33 blocked for more than 20 seconds. Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event __flush_workqueue memstick_remove_host rtsx_usb_ms_drv_remove

Never drop a request. rtsx_usb_ms_request() always schedules handle_req, and handle_req fails requests with -ENOMEDIUM once eject is set, without touching the device. drv_remove flushes handle_req instead of cancelling it, and cancels it only after memstick_remove_host(), when no new request can arrive, so it cannot run on a freed host.

The host_mutex drain in drv_remove is removed: handle_req always leaves host->req NULL when it finishes, so the drain never had anything to do, and it would now race with handle_req.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

memstick: rtsx_usb_ms: complete requests after eject instead of dropping them

memstick_check() can pass its host->removing check just before rtsx_usb_ms_drv_remove() sets eject/removing. Its next request is then silently dropped: rtsx_usb_ms_request() skips schedule_work() once eject is set, and drv_remove's cancel_work_sync() can also cancel a queued handle_req before it picks the request up. Nobody completes card->mrq_complete.

Once memstick core waits for requests without a timeout ("memstick: core: wait for request completion before freeing card"), this hangs removal: memstick_check() never returns and memstick_remove_host() blocks in flush_workqueue():

INFO: task kworker/u10:3:65 blocked for more than 20 seconds. Workqueue: kmemstick memstick_check __wait_for_common memstick_check

INFO: task kworker/1:1:33 blocked for more than 20 seconds. Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event __flush_workqueue memstick_remove_host rtsx_usb_ms_drv_remove

Never drop a request. rtsx_usb_ms_request() always schedules handle_req, and handle_req fails requests with -ENOMEDIUM once eject is set, without touching the device. drv_remove flushes handle_req instead of cancelling it, and cancels it only after memstick_remove_host(), when no new request can arrive, so it cannot run on a freed host.

The host_mutex drain in drv_remove is removed: handle_req always leaves host->req NULL when it finishes, so the drain never had anything to do, and it would now race with handle_req.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

memstick: rtsx_usb_ms: complete requests after eject instead of dropping them

memstick_check() can pass its host->removing check just before rtsx_usb_ms_drv_remove() sets eject/removing. Its next request is then silently dropped: rtsx_usb_ms_request() skips schedule_work() once eject is set, and drv_remove's cancel_work_sync() can also cancel a queued handle_req before it picks the request up. Nobody completes card->mrq_complete.

Once memstick core waits for requests without a timeout ("memstick: core: wait for request completion before freeing card"), this hangs removal: memstick_check() never returns and memstick_remove_host() blocks in flush_workqueue():

INFO: task kworker/u10:3:65 blocked for more than 20 seconds. Workqueue: kmemstick memstick_check __wait_for_common memstick_check

INFO: task kworker/1:1:33 blocked for more than 20 seconds. Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event __flush_workqueue memstick_remove_host rtsx_usb_ms_drv_remove

Never drop a request. rtsx_usb_ms_request() always schedules handle_req, and handle_req fails requests with -ENOMEDIUM once eject is set, without touching the device. drv_remove flushes handle_req instead of cancelling it, and cancels it only after memstick_remove_host(), when no new request can arrive, so it cannot run on a freed host.

The host_mutex drain in drv_remove is removed: handle_req always leaves host->req NULL when it finishes, so the drain never had anything to do, and it would now race with handle_req.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

memstick: rtsx_usb_ms: complete requests after eject instead of dropping them

memstick_check() can pass its host->removing check just before rtsx_usb_ms_drv_remove() sets eject/removing. Its next request is then silently dropped: rtsx_usb_ms_request() skips schedule_work() once eject is set, and drv_remove's cancel_work_sync() can also cancel a queued handle_req before it picks the request up. Nobody completes card->mrq_complete.

Once memstick core waits for requests without a timeout ("memstick: core: wait for request completion before freeing card"), this hangs removal: memstick_check() never returns and memstick_remove_host() blocks in flush_workqueue():

INFO: task kworker/u10:3:65 blocked for more than 20 seconds. Workqueue: kmemstick memstick_check __wait_for_common memstick_check

INFO: task kworker/1:1:33 blocked for more than 20 seconds. Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event __flush_workqueue memstick_remove_host rtsx_usb_ms_drv_remove

Never drop a request. rtsx_usb_ms_request() always schedules handle_req, and handle_req fails requests with -ENOMEDIUM once eject is set, without touching the device. drv_remove flushes handle_req instead of cancelling it, and cancels it only after memstick_remove_host(), when no new request can arrive, so it cannot run on a freed host.

The host_mutex drain in drv_remove is removed: handle_req always leaves host->req NULL when it finishes, so the drain never had anything to do, and it would now race with handle_req.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

memstick: rtsx_usb_ms: complete requests after eject instead of dropping them

memstick_check() can pass its host->removing check just before rtsx_usb_ms_drv_remove() sets eject/removing. Its next request is then silently dropped: rtsx_usb_ms_request() skips schedule_work() once eject is set, and drv_remove's cancel_work_sync() can also cancel a queued handle_req before it picks the request up. Nobody completes card->mrq_complete.

Once memstick core waits for requests without a timeout ("memstick: core: wait for request completion before freeing card"), this hangs removal: memstick_check() never returns and memstick_remove_host() blocks in flush_workqueue():

INFO: task kworker/u10:3:65 blocked for more than 20 seconds. Workqueue: kmemstick memstick_check __wait_for_common memstick_check

INFO: task kworker/1:1:33 blocked for more than 20 seconds. Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event __flush_workqueue memstick_remove_host rtsx_usb_ms_drv_remove

Never drop a request. rtsx_usb_ms_request() always schedules handle_req, and handle_req fails requests with -ENOMEDIUM once eject is set, without touching the device. drv_remove flushes handle_req instead of cancelling it, and cancels it only after memstick_remove_host(), when no new request can arrive, so it cannot run on a freed host.

The host_mutex drain in drv_remove is removed: handle_req always leaves host->req NULL when it finishes, so the drain never had anything to do, and it would now race with handle_req.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

memstick: rtsx_usb_ms: complete requests after eject instead of dropping them

memstick_check() can pass its host->removing check just before rtsx_usb_ms_drv_remove() sets eject/removing. Its next request is then silently dropped: rtsx_usb_ms_request() skips schedule_work() once eject is set, and drv_remove's cancel_work_sync() can also cancel a queued handle_req before it picks the request up. Nobody completes card->mrq_complete.

Once memstick core waits for requests without a timeout ("memstick: core: wait for request completion before freeing card"), this hangs removal: memstick_check() never returns and memstick_remove_host() blocks in flush_workqueue():

INFO: task kworker/u10:3:65 blocked for more than 20 seconds. Workqueue: kmemstick memstick_check __wait_for_common memstick_check

INFO: task kworker/1:1:33 blocked for more than 20 seconds. Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event __flush_workqueue memstick_remove_host rtsx_usb_ms_drv_remove

Never drop a request. rtsx_usb_ms_request() always schedules handle_req, and handle_req fails requests with -ENOMEDIUM once eject is set, without touching the device. drv_remove flushes handle_req instead of cancelling it, and cancels it only after memstick_remove_host(), when no new request can arrive, so it cannot run on a freed host.

The host_mutex drain in drv_remove is removed: handle_req always leaves host->req NULL when it finishes, so the drain never had anything to do, and it would now race with handle_req.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: memstick: rtsx_usb_ms: complete requests after eject instead of dropping them memstick_check() can pass its host->removing check just before rtsx_usb_ms_drv_remove() sets eject/removing. Its next request is then silently dropped: rtsx_usb_ms_request() skips schedule_work() once eject is set, and drv_remove's cancel_work_sync() can also cancel a queued handle_req before it picks the request up. Nobody completes card->mrq_complete. Once memstick core waits for requests without a timeout ("memstick: core: wait for request completion before freeing card"), this hangs removal: memstick_check() never returns and memstick_remove_host() blocks in flush_workqueue(): INFO: task kworker/u10:3:65 blocked for more than 20 seconds. Workqueue: kmemstick memstick_check __wait_for_common memstick_check INFO: task kworker/1:1:33 blocked for more than 20 seconds. Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event __flush_workqueue memstick_remove_host rtsx_usb_ms_drv_remove Never drop a request. rtsx_usb_ms_request() always schedules handle_req, and handle_req fails requests with -ENOMEDIUM once eject is set, without touching the device. drv_remove flushes handle_req instead of cancelling it, and cancels it only after memstick_remove_host(), when no new request can arrive, so it cannot run on a freed host. The host_mutex drain in drv_remove is removed: handle_req always leaves host->req NULL when it finishes, so the drain never had anything to do, and it would now race with handle_req.

The SUSE Linux Enterprise Micro 6.0 and Micro 6.1 kernel was updated to fix various security issues:

The following security issues were fixed:

• CVE-2025-68219: cifs: fix memory leak in smb3_fs_context_parse_param error path (bsc#1255222).
• CVE-2026-31708: smb: client: fix OOB read in smb2_ioctl_query_info QUERY_INFO path (bsc#1264022).
• CVE-2026-31709: smb: client: validate the whole DACL before rewriting it in cifsacl (bsc#1264024).
• CVE-2026-43350: smb: client: require a full NFS mode SID before reading mode bits (bsc#1264985).
• CVE-2026-46155: smb/client: fix out-of-bounds read in smb2_compound_op() (bsc#1267720).
• CVE-2026-64324: udf: validate free block extents against the partition length (bsc#1273970).
• CVE-2026-64370: posix-cpu-timers: Fix pid refcount leak in do_cpu_nanosleep() error path (bsc#1273805).
• CVE-2026-64380: smb: client: harden POSIX SID length parsing (bsc#1273557).
• CVE-2026-64413: netfilter: ebtables: zero chainstack array (bsc#1274082).
• CVE-2026-64435: audit: Fix data races of skb_queue_len() readers on audit_queue (bsc#1274080).
• CVE-2026-68186: binfmt_misc: set have_execfd only once the interpreter is opened (bsc#1274949).
• CVE-2026-68447: drm/amdkfd: clamp v9 CRIU control stack checkpoint copy to BO size (bsc#1276280).
• CVE-2026-72010: cgroup/cpuset: rebind mm mempolicy to effective_mems, not mems_allowed (bsc#1276776).
• CVE-2026-72110: bpf,fork: wipe ->bpf_storage before bailouts that access it (bsc#1277357).
• CVE-2026-72111: bpf: Reset register bounds before narrowing retval range in check_mem_access() (bsc#1277389).
• CVE-2026-72127: netdev-genl: report NAPI thread PID in the caller's pid namespace (bsc#1277542).
• CVE-2026-72250: netfilter: nf_conntrack_reasm: guard mac_header adjustment after IPv6 defrag (bsc#1277663).
• CVE-2026-72253: netfilter: nf_conntrack_sip: validate skb_dst() before accessing it (bsc#1277665).
• CVE-2026-72318: cifs: validate DFS referral string offsets (bsc#1275939).
• CVE-2026-72400: seg6: validate SRH length before reading fixed fields (bsc#1278030).
• CVE-2026-72405: net: udp_tunnel: prevent double queueing in udp_tunnel_nic_device_sync (bsc#1278033).
• CVE-2026-72416: netfilter: nft_compat: ebtables emulation must reject non-bridge targets (bsc#1278041).
• CVE-2026-72428: bpf: Fix stack slot index in nospec checks (bsc#1278050).
• CVE-2026-74368: wifi: ath12k: fix memory leak in ath12k_wifi7_dp_rx_h_verify_tkip_mic() (bsc#1277103).
• CVE-2026-74399: evm: terminate and bound the evm_xattrs read buffer (bsc#1278319).
• CVE-2026-74565: netfilter: nf_tables: make nft_object rhltable per table (bsc#1275568).
• CVE-2026-74613: vsock/virtio: avoid refilling the RX queue after teardown (bsc#1277903).
• CVE-2026-74620: net/sched: act_gact, act_police: range check the fallback control action (bsc#1277044).
• CVE-2026-74624: netfilter: nf_conntrack: defer invalid log until after unlock (bsc#1277599).
• CVE-2026-74715: net: netfilter: Make ct zone opts configurable for bpf ct helpers (bsc#1277890).
• CVE-2026-74720: bpf: Preserve pointer state for commuted arithmetic (bsc#1276574).
• CVE-2026-74746: netfilter: flowtable: publish GC-visible tuple last (bsc#1278101).
• CVE-2026-74748: netfilter: ipset: fix refcount race between list:set GC and swap (bsc#1277578).
• CVE-2026-80572: Input: byd - synchronize timer deletion before freeing private data (bsc#1277338).
• CVE-2026-80602: perf/x86/amd/lbr: Fix kernel address leakage (bsc#1278123).
• CVE-2026-80637: netfilter: synproxy: fix unaligned memory access in timestamp adjustment (bsc#1278343).
• CVE-2026-80684: KVM: s390: pci: Fix NULL dereference on AIBV allocation failure (bsc#1277467).
• CVE-2026-80709: s390/zcrypt: Fix wrong domain value verification with EP11 CPRBs (bsc#1278202).
• CVE-2026-80717: sctp: validate Adaptation Indication parameter length (bsc#1277836).
• CVE-2026-80755: selinux: reject a permission value exceeding the class permission count (bsc#1278415).
• CVE-2026-80757: selinux: reject a…

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: memstick: rtsx_usb_ms: complete requests after eject instead of dropping them memstick_check() can pass its host->removing check just before rtsx_usb_ms_drv_remove() sets eject/removing. Its next request is then silently dropped: rtsx_usb_ms_request() skips schedule_work() once eject is set, and drv_remove's cancel_work_sync() can also cancel a queued handle_req before it picks the request up. Nobody completes card->mrq_complete. Once memstick core waits for requests without a timeout ("memstick: core: wait for request completion before freeing card"), this hangs removal: memstick_check() never returns and memstick_remove_host() blocks in flush_workqueue(): INFO: task kworker/u10:3:65 blocked for more than 20 seconds. Workqueue: kmemstick memstick_check __wait_for_common memstick_check INFO: task kworker/1:1:33 blocked for more than 20 seconds. Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event __flush_workqueue memstick_remove_host rtsx_usb_ms_drv_remove Never drop a request. rtsx_usb_ms_request() always schedules handle_req, and handle_req fails requests with -ENOMEDIUM once eject is set, without touching the device. drv_remove flushes handle_req instead of cancelling it, and cancels it only after memstick_remove_host(), when no new request can arrive, so it cannot run on a freed host. The host_mutex drain in drv_remove is removed: handle_req always leaves host->req NULL when it finishes, so the drain never had anything to do, and it would now race with handle_req.