CVE-2026-99056

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

strparser: make sure __strp_recv isn't running before tearing down the parser

The comment above strp_done() claims that if strp is stopped, strp_recv will no longer be called. That's only true if the caller has a mechanism (eg locking) to guarantee that strp_recv() calls that started before strp_stop() have completed by the time we call strp_done().

This adds a dummy lock_sock/release_sock pair to guarantee that any in-flight strp_recv() (which runs under either bh_lock_sock or lock_sock, depending if it's called from ->sk_data_ready or strp_work) has completed.

Only espintcp can be affected by this race condition, but this patch makes sure no future user of strp can have the bug.

This could crash on strp->sk ("general mode" of strp), but this mode has been here for 9 years and has never been used. It'll be gone soon, no point worrying about it.

Switch the stopped/paused/etc bits to u8's to avoid races between strp_stop() and strp_pause/unpause().

A reproducer has been published and turns the possible UAF into an exploit [1].

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

strparser: make sure __strp_recv isn't running before tearing down the parser

The comment above strp_done() claims that if strp is stopped, strp_recv will no longer be called. That's only true if the caller has a mechanism (eg locking) to guarantee that strp_recv() calls that started before strp_stop() have completed by the time we call strp_done().

This adds a dummy lock_sock/release_sock pair to guarantee that any in-flight strp_recv() (which runs under either bh_lock_sock or lock_sock, depending if it's called from ->sk_data_ready or strp_work) has completed.

Only espintcp can be affected by this race condition, but this patch makes sure no future user of strp can have the bug.

This could crash on strp->sk ("general mode" of strp), but this mode has been here for 9 years and has never been used. It'll be gone soon, no point worrying about it.

Switch the stopped/paused/etc bits to u8's to avoid races between strp_stop() and strp_pause/unpause().

A reproducer has been published and turns the possible UAF into an exploit [1].

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

strparser: make sure __strp_recv isn't running before tearing down the parser

The comment above strp_done() claims that if strp is stopped, strp_recv will no longer be called. That's only true if the caller has a mechanism (eg locking) to guarantee that strp_recv() calls that started before strp_stop() have completed by the time we call strp_done().

This adds a dummy lock_sock/release_sock pair to guarantee that any in-flight strp_recv() (which runs under either bh_lock_sock or lock_sock, depending if it's called from ->sk_data_ready or strp_work) has completed.

Only espintcp can be affected by this race condition, but this patch makes sure no future user of strp can have the bug.

This could crash on strp->sk ("general mode" of strp), but this mode has been here for 9 years and has never been used. It'll be gone soon, no point worrying about it.

Switch the stopped/paused/etc bits to u8's to avoid races between strp_stop() and strp_pause/unpause().

A reproducer has been published and turns the possible UAF into an exploit [1].

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

strparser: make sure __strp_recv isn't running before tearing down the parser

The comment above strp_done() claims that if strp is stopped, strp_recv will no longer be called. That's only true if the caller has a mechanism (eg locking) to guarantee that strp_recv() calls that started before strp_stop() have completed by the time we call strp_done().

This adds a dummy lock_sock/release_sock pair to guarantee that any in-flight strp_recv() (which runs under either bh_lock_sock or lock_sock, depending if it's called from ->sk_data_ready or strp_work) has completed.

Only espintcp can be affected by this race condition, but this patch makes sure no future user of strp can have the bug.

This could crash on strp->sk ("general mode" of strp), but this mode has been here for 9 years and has never been used. It'll be gone soon, no point worrying about it.

Switch the stopped/paused/etc bits to u8's to avoid races between strp_stop() and strp_pause/unpause().

A reproducer has been published and turns the possible UAF into an exploit [1].

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

strparser: make sure __strp_recv isn't running before tearing down the parser

The comment above strp_done() claims that if strp is stopped, strp_recv will no longer be called. That's only true if the caller has a mechanism (eg locking) to guarantee that strp_recv() calls that started before strp_stop() have completed by the time we call strp_done().

This adds a dummy lock_sock/release_sock pair to guarantee that any in-flight strp_recv() (which runs under either bh_lock_sock or lock_sock, depending if it's called from ->sk_data_ready or strp_work) has completed.

Only espintcp can be affected by this race condition, but this patch makes sure no future user of strp can have the bug.

This could crash on strp->sk ("general mode" of strp), but this mode has been here for 9 years and has never been used. It'll be gone soon, no point worrying about it.

Switch the stopped/paused/etc bits to u8's to avoid races between strp_stop() and strp_pause/unpause().

A reproducer has been published and turns the possible UAF into an exploit [1].

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: strparser: make sure __strp_recv isn't running before tearing down the parser The comment above strp_done() claims that if strp is stopped, strp_recv will no longer be called. That's only true if the caller has a mechanism (eg locking) to guarantee that strp_recv() calls that started before strp_stop() have completed by the time we call strp_done(). This adds a dummy lock_sock/release_sock pair to guarantee that any in-flight strp_recv() (which runs under either bh_lock_sock or lock_sock, depending if it's called from ->sk_data_ready or strp_work) has completed. Only espintcp can be affected by this race condition, but this patch makes sure no future user of strp can have the bug. This could crash on strp->sk ("general mode" of strp), but this mode has been here for 9 years and has never been used. It'll be gone soon, no point worrying about it. Switch the stopped/paused/etc bits to u8's to avoid races between strp_stop() and strp_pause/unpause(). A reproducer has been published and turns the possible UAF into an exploit [1].

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: strparser: make sure __strp_recv isn't running before tearing down the parser The comment above strp_done() claims that if strp is stopped, strp_recv will no longer be called. That's only true if the caller has a mechanism (eg locking) to guarantee that strp_recv() calls that started before strp_stop() have completed by the time we call strp_done(). This adds a dummy lock_sock/release_sock pair to guarantee that any in-flight strp_recv() (which runs under either bh_lock_sock or lock_sock, depending if it's called from ->sk_data_ready or strp_work) has completed. Only espintcp can be affected by this race condition, but this patch makes sure no future user of strp can have the bug. This could crash on strp->sk ("general mode" of strp), but this mode has been here for 9 years and has never been used. It'll be gone soon, no point worrying about it. Switch the stopped/paused/etc bits to u8's to avoid races between strp_stop() and strp_pause/unpause(). A reproducer has been published and turns the possible UAF into an exploit [1].

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

strparser: make sure __strp_recv isn't running before tearing down the parser

The comment above strp_done() claims that if strp is stopped, strp_recv will no longer be called. That's only true if the caller has a mechanism (eg locking) to guarantee that strp_recv() calls that started before strp_stop() have completed by the time we call strp_done().

This adds a dummy lock_sock/release_sock pair to guarantee that any in-flight strp_recv() (which runs under either bh_lock_sock or lock_sock, depending if it's called from ->sk_data_ready or strp_work) has completed.

Only espintcp can be affected by this race condition, but this patch makes sure no future user of strp can have the bug.

This could crash on strp->sk ("general mode" of strp), but this mode has been here for 9 years and has never been used. It'll be gone soon, no point worrying about it.

Switch the stopped/paused/etc bits to u8's to avoid races between strp_stop() and strp_pause/unpause().

A reproducer has been published and turns the possible UAF into an exploit [1].