CVE-2026-65901

DOMPurify through 3.4.6 contains a cross-site scripting vulnerability in IN_PLACE mode that trusts attacker-controlled nodeName on live non-form nodes. Attackers can supply hostile live DOM objects with real script children whose observable nodeName is clobbered to appear as allowed elements, causing scripts to execute when the sanitized tree is inserted into a live document.

TuxCare rebuilt dompurify to address 7 CVEs. Fixed in 3.0.3-tuxcare.2.

TuxCare rebuilt dompurify to address 1 CVE. Fixed in 2.5.8-tuxcare.5.

TuxCare rebuilt dompurify to address 1 CVE. Fixed in 2.4.7-tuxcare.3.

TuxCare rebuilt dompurify to address 8 CVEs. Fixed in 3.2.3-tuxcare.2.

TuxCare rebuilt dompurify to address 1 CVE. Fixed in 2.4.3-tuxcare.5.

TuxCare rebuilt dompurify to address 1 CVE. Fixed in 2.4.0-tuxcare.3.

TuxCare rebuilt dompurify to address 1 CVE. Fixed in 2.3.0-tuxcare.4.

TuxCare rebuilt dompurify to address 16 CVEs. Fixed in 2.4.0-tuxcare.1.

TuxCare rebuilt dompurify to address 11 CVEs. Fixed in 2.4.3-tuxcare.1.

TuxCare rebuilt dompurify to address 10 CVEs. Fixed in 3.2.3-tuxcare.3.

TuxCare rebuilt dompurify to address 10 CVEs. Fixed in 3.2.7-tuxcare.1.

TuxCare rebuilt dompurify to address 9 CVEs. Fixed in 2.4.0-tuxcare.5.

TuxCare rebuilt dompurify to address 12 CVEs. Fixed in 2.4.3-tuxcare.8.

TuxCare rebuilt dompurify to address 13 CVEs. Fixed in 3.1.0-tuxcare.2.

TuxCare rebuilt dompurify to address 5 CVEs. Fixed in 3.4.6-tuxcare.2.

TuxCare rebuilt dompurify to address 10 CVEs. Fixed in 2.0.8-tuxcare.3.

TuxCare rebuilt dompurify to address 12 CVEs. Fixed in 2.3.3-tuxcare.3.

TuxCare rebuilt dompurify to address 9 CVEs. Fixed in 3.3.3-tuxcare.3.

TuxCare rebuilt dompurify to address 9 CVEs. Fixed in 3.2.6-tuxcare.3.

TuxCare rebuilt dompurify to address 13 CVEs. Fixed in 2.3.10-tuxcare.3.

TuxCare rebuilt dompurify to address 10 CVEs. Fixed in 3.0.1-tuxcare.3.

TuxCare rebuilt dompurify to address 4 CVEs. Fixed in 3.4.5-tuxcare.3.

TuxCare rebuilt dompurify to address 10 CVEs. Fixed in 3.0.2-tuxcare.3.

TuxCare rebuilt dompurify to address 8 CVEs. Fixed in 3.0.8-tuxcare.3.

TuxCare rebuilt dompurify to address 9 CVEs. Fixed in 3.0.9-tuxcare.3.

TuxCare rebuilt dompurify to address 7 CVEs. Fixed in 3.0.11-tuxcare.3.

TuxCare rebuilt dompurify to address 8 CVEs. Fixed in 3.1.3-tuxcare.3.

TuxCare rebuilt dompurify to address 10 CVEs. Fixed in 3.1.2-tuxcare.3.

TuxCare rebuilt dompurify to address 11 CVEs. Fixed in 3.1.1-tuxcare.3.

TuxCare rebuilt dompurify to address 8 CVEs. Fixed in 3.1.4-tuxcare.3.

TuxCare rebuilt dompurify to address 7 CVEs. Fixed in 3.0.6-tuxcare.5.

TuxCare rebuilt dompurify to address 12 CVEs. Fixed in 3.4.0-tuxcare.1.

TuxCare rebuilt dompurify to address 11 CVEs. Fixed in 3.0.5-tuxcare.4.

TuxCare rebuilt dompurify to address 11 CVEs. Fixed in 3.0.4-tuxcare.4.

Summary

When DOMPurify.sanitize(root, { IN_PLACE: true }) is called on an attacker-supplied live DOM node, DOMPurify still trusts currentNode.nodeName for non-form nodes in the main _sanitizeElements pipeline. A real <script> child node whose observable nodeName is attacker-controlled can therefore be misclassified as an allowed element and retained. When the sanitized tree is inserted into a live document, the script executes.

This affects current 3.4.6. The recent IN_PLACE hardening work covers clobbered form handling and foreign-realm shadow/template traversal, but does not harden the main per-node element decision for hostile non-form live nodes.

Affected

• DOMPurify 3.4.6
• Any caller that does DOMPurify.sanitize(node, { IN_PLACE: true }) on attacker-supplied live DOM nodes
• Verified attacker-controlled node sources:
  • same-origin iframe → live node passed by reference
  • same-origin window.open() popup → live node passed by reference
  • same-origin foreign node adopted into the host document via document.adoptNode(node) and then sanitized in-place

Not affected:

• String-input DOMPurify.sanitize(dirtyString)

Vulnerability details

Code paths

[A] — _sanitizeElements uses the instance-visible nodeName for the allow/forbid decision:

const _sanitizeElements = function (currentNode: any): boolean {
  ...
  if (_isClobbered(currentNode)) {
    _forceRemove(currentNode);
    return true;
  }

  const tagName = transformCaseFunc(currentNode.nodeName);
  ...
  if (
    FORBID_TAGS[tagName] ||
    (!(...) && !ALLOWED_TAGS[tagName])
  ) {
    ...
    _forceRemove(currentNode);
    return true;
  }
  ...
};

For non-form nodes, _isClobbered(currentNode) returns false early. The subsequent element decision therefore trusts currentNode.nodeName directly.

[B] — _isClobbered is form-specific:

const _isClobbered = function (element: Element): boolean {
  const realTagName = getNodeName ? getNodeName(element) : null;
  if (typeof realTagName !== 'string') {
    return false;
  }

  if (transformCaseFunc(realTagName) !== 'form') {
    return false;
  }

  return (...);
};

The hardening is intentionally scoped to form. Non-form nodes are not checked for divergence between the instance-visible property view and the trusted prototype getter view.

Why the bypass works

The attack does not depend on string HTML parsing. It depends on a hostile live DOM object crossing a trust boundary into DOMPurify's IN_PLACE pipeline.

If the attacker controls a same-origin subcontext (iframe or popup), they can prepare a real DOM subtree there and then pass the live node object by reference to a host page that trusts DOMPurify.sanitize(node, { IN_PLACE: true }) as its final sanitization step.

For the verified primitive below:

• the real child node is <script>
• its script text is attacker-controlled
• the observable nodeName is attacker-controlled and made to appear as "DIV"
• _sanitizeElements therefore classifies the real <script> child as an allowed element
• the real <script> survives in the sanitized tree and executes on insertion

This primitive survives:

• direct reference passing
• document.adoptNode(node) followed by IN_PLACE

It does not survive:

• importNode
• cloneNode

because those paths materialize a fresh node and discard the hostile object semantics.

Proof of concept

(1) Minimal — runnable in a single browser context

<!doctype html>
<html><body>
<script src="dist/purify.js"></script>
<script>
  const foreign = window.open('about:blank', '_blank', 'noopener=no');

  const host = foreign.document.createElement('div');
  const script = foreign.document.createElement('script');
  script.textContent = 'window.__pwned = 1';
  Object.defineProperty(script, 'nodeName', {
    value: 'DIV',
    configurable: true,
  });
  host.appendChild(script);

  DOMPurify.sanitize(host, {…