CVE-2026-99239

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: L2CAP: refuse __l2cap_chan_add if chan already has conn l2cap_chan may be linked to l2cap_conn at most once. This is assumed in several places, eg l2cap_chan_del cleanup. There is a TOCTOU race where the invariant is violated: [Task 1] [Task 2] l2cap_chan_connect l2cap_sock_bind l2cap_chan_lock lock_sock l2cap_state_change if (sk->sk_state != BT_OPEN) chan->state = BT_CONNECT l2cap_sock_state_change_cb chan->state = BT_BOUND sk->sk_state = BT_BOUND lock_sock <------------------ release_sock sk->sk_state = BT_CONNECT l2cap_sock_connect() does not check sk->sk_state, so since chan->state is now BT_BOUND, subsequent connect() ends up with second __l2cap_chan_add. Explicitly document and check the invariant in __l2cap_chan_add with WARN_ON_ONCE. The only callsite where it could be hit is l2cap_chan_connect, so add pre-check there to avoid relying on chan->state. chan->state read/write is not properly guarded currently so there can be other TOCTOUC problems. Add l2cap_lock_chan in l2cap_sock_bind() to guard chan->state write.

The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.

Security Fix(es):

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

wifi: brcmsmac: Fix dma_free_coherent() size

dma_alloc_consistent() may change the size to align it. The new size is saved in alloced.

Change the free size to match the allocation size.(CVE-2026-31661)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/amd/display: Validate GPIO pin LUT table size before iterating

[Why&How] The GPIO pin table parsers in get_gpio_i2c_info() and bios_parser_get_gpio_pin_info() derive an element count from the VBIOS table_header.structuresize field, then iterate over gpio_pin[] entries. However, GET_IMAGE() only validates that the table header itself fits within the BIOS image. If the VBIOS reports a structuresize larger than the actual mapped data, the loop reads past the end of the BIOS image, causing an out-of-bounds read.

Fix this by calling bios_get_image() to validate that the full claimed structuresize is accessible within the BIOS image before entering the loop in both functions.

(cherry picked from commit ba5e95b43b773ae1bf1f66ee6b31eb774e65afe3)(CVE-2026-64097)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

usbip: vudc: fix NULL deref in vep_dequeue()

vep_alloc_request() wasn't initializing vrequest->udc, so cancellations on the FunctionFS AIO path were arriving in vep_dequeue without a valid UDC reference.

Since vrequest->udc is never actually properly used anywhere, we opt to remove it, and update vep_dequeue to obtain a reference to the udc with ep_to_vudc(), consistent with the other vep_ ops.

AFAICT this bug has existed for ~10 years. Seems that nobody has really stressed the FunctionFS AIO path on usbip's vudc.

I tested this fix in a QEMU aarch64 guest driving FunctionFS endpoints via AIO. Before the fix, running usbip attach from the host would cause the guest to oops with the following backtrace:

Call trace: vep_dequeue+0x1c/0xe4 (P) usb_ep_dequeue+0x14/0x20 ffs_aio_cancel+0x24/0x34 __arm64_sys_io_cancel+0xb0/0x124 do_el0_svc+0x68/0x100 el0_svc+0x18/0x5c el0t_64_sync_handler+0x98/0xdc el0t_64_sync+0x154/0x158(CVE-2026-64331)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Bluetooth: bnep: pin L2CAP connection during netdev registration

bnep_add_connection() reads the L2CAP connection without holding the channel lock, then passes its HCI device to register_netdev(). Controller teardown can clear and release that connection concurrently, leaving the network device registration path to dereference a freed parent device.

Take a reference to the L2CAP connection while holding the channel lock. Retain it until register_netdev() has taken the parent device reference.(CVE-2026-64408)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/amd/display: set new_stream to NULL after release

In dm_update_crtc_state(), the skip_modeset path releases new_stream via dc_stream_release() but does not set the pointer to NULL.

If a later error (e.g., color management failure) triggers the fail label, the error path calls dc_stream_release() again on the same dangling pointer, causing a double release and potential use-after-free.

Fix this by setting new_stream to NULL after the initial release.

(cherry picked from commit 99f3af19073b3ddbfd96e789124cce12c4277b28)(CVE-2026-68236)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ipv6: fix Route Information option length validation

rt6_route_rcv() validates the Route Information option (RFC 4191) length against the prefix length, but both checks are off by one.

rinfo->length is the ND option length in units of 8 octets and it includes the 8-byte option header, so an option carrying N bytes of prefix has length == 1 + N/8. RFC 4191 section 2.3 requires length 3 when Prefix Length is greater than 64, and 2 or 3 when it is greater than 0. The code…

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: L2CAP: refuse __l2cap_chan_add if chan already has conn l2cap_chan may be linked to l2cap_conn at most once. This is assumed in several places, eg l2cap_chan_del cleanup. There is a TOCTOU race where the invariant is violated: [Task 1] [Task 2] l2cap_chan_connect l2cap_sock_bind l2cap_chan_lock lock_sock l2cap_state_change if (sk->sk_state != BT_OPEN) chan->state = BT_CONNECT l2cap_sock_state_change_cb chan->state = BT_BOUND sk->sk_state = BT_BOUND lock_sock <------------------ release_sock sk->sk_state = BT_CONNECT l2cap_sock_connect() does not check sk->sk_state, so since chan->state is now BT_BOUND, subsequent connect() ends up with second __l2cap_chan_add. Explicitly document and check the invariant in __l2cap_chan_add with WARN_ON_ONCE. The only callsite where it could be hit is l2cap_chan_connect, so add pre-check there to avoid relying on chan->state. chan->state read/write is not properly guarded currently so there can be other TOCTOUC problems. Add l2cap_lock_chan in l2cap_sock_bind() to guard chan->state write.

These are all security issues fixed in the kernel-devel-7.3.3-1.1 package on the GA media of openSUSE Tumbleweed.