DHI-tlm7-3425-nvoh-xtct
A crafted `.zst` input under 128 KB can force `ruzstd` to allocate several gigabytes at once, crashing the process with…
DHI-tlm7-3425-nvoh-xtct is a high vulnerability (CVSS 7.5) in rust, published October 11, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. Fixed in ruzstd 0.9.1.
- Severity
- 7.5 HighCVSS 3.1, OSV
- Exploit chance
- UnscoredNo EPSS score yet
- Exploitation
- None knownNot on CISA’s or ENISA’s lists
- Fixed in
0.9.1ruzstd +2 more
Description
A crafted .zst input under 128 KB can force ruzstd to allocate several gigabytes at once, crashing the process with an out-of-memory condition. Since ruzstd is a decoder for untrusted input, a single small file is enough to take down anything decoding it.
The compressed size of a block was capped at 128 KB, but a compressed block's decompressed size was never checked against Block_Maximum_Size = min(Window_Size, 128 KiB) (RFC 8878). In execute_sequences the output was built with no running bound and no flush between blocks, so one block could expand to gigabytes — bypassing both the configured window-size limit and the block-by-block streaming that would otherwise release memory. (A related u32 counter overflow on such a block caused an additional panic.)
This is a denial of service only; memory access stays in bounds (no corruption, no RCE).
ruzstd is also built as a dependency of the Rust standard library via rustc-dep-of-std; in the toolchain it is used only to load zstd-compressed debug symbols, so the toolchain-side impact is limited.
Fixed in 0.9.1 (commit d3907c9), which enforces the per-block output bound. Upgrade to ruzstd >= 0.9.1.
Attack profile
How easy it is to exploit
- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges needed
- None
- User interaction
- None
What an attacker can affect
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- High
Affected packages
| Package | Affected | Fixed |
|---|---|---|
rustDocker Hardened Images:Alpine:3.23 | Listed versions 1.91.1-r01.91.1-r21.91.1-r31.91.1-r41.93.1-r0 Show 13 moreShow less1.93.1-r11.94.0-r01.94.0-r11.94.1-r01.94.1-r11.95.0-r01.96.0-r01.96.1-r01.97.0-r01.97.0-r11.98.1-r01.99.0-r21.99.1-r0 | None known |
qdrantDocker Hardened Images:Debian:13 | Listed versions 1.18.3-01.18.3-11.18.3-21.19.0-01.19.0-1 Show 23 moreShow less1.19.0-21.19.0-31.19.0-41.19.0-51.19.0-61.19.1-11.19.1-21.19.1-31.19.1-41.19.1-51.19.1-61.19.1-71.19.2-01.19.2-11.19.2-21.20.0-01.20.0-11.20.0-21.20.0-31.20.0-41.20.0-61.20.0-71.20.0-8 | None known |
ruzstdcrates.io | 0.0.0-0 up to 0.9.1 | 0.9.1 |
What each source reports
OSV Score used 7.5
A crafted `.zst` input under 128 KB can force `ruzstd` to allocate several gigabytes at once, crashing the process with…
A crafted .zst input under 128 KB can force ruzstd to allocate several gigabytes at once, crashing the process with an out-of-memory condition. Since ruzstd is a decoder for untrusted input, a single small file is enough to take down anything decoding it.
The compressed size of a block was capped at 128 KB, but a compressed block's decompressed size was never checked against Block_Maximum_Size = min(Window_Size, 128 KiB) (RFC 8878). In execute_sequences the output was built with no running bound and no flush between blocks, so one block could expand to gigabytes — bypassing both the configured window-size limit and the block-by-block streaming that would otherwise release memory. (A related u32 counter overflow on such a block caused an additional panic.)
This is a denial of service only; memory access stays in bounds (no corruption, no RCE).
ruzstd is also built as a dependency of the Rust standard library via rustc-dep-of-std; in the toolchain it is used only to load zstd-compressed debug symbols, so the toolchain-side impact is limited.
Fixed in 0.9.1 (commit d3907c9), which enforces the per-block output bound. Upgrade to ruzstd >= 0.9.1.
- Record
DHI-tlm7-3425-nvoh-xtct- CVSS 3.1
- 7.5 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H - Updated
- 2026-11-16
OSV Score usedRUSTSEC-2026-0344 7.5
Decompression bomb in `ruzstd`: a tiny input can exhaust memory (OOM)
A crafted .zst input under 128 KB can force ruzstd to allocate several gigabytes at once, crashing the process with an out-of-memory condition. Since ruzstd is a decoder for untrusted input, a single small file is enough to take down anything decoding it.
The compressed size of a block was capped at 128 KB, but a compressed block's decompressed size was never checked against Block_Maximum_Size = min(Window_Size, 128 KiB) (RFC 8878). In execute_sequences the output was built with no running bound and no flush between blocks, so one block could expand to gigabytes — bypassing both the configured window-size limit and the block-by-block streaming that would otherwise release memory. (A related u32 counter overflow on such a block caused an additional panic.)
This is a denial of service only; memory access stays in bounds (no corruption, no RCE).
ruzstd is also built as a dependency of the Rust standard library via rustc-dep-of-std; in the toolchain it is used only to load zstd-compressed debug symbols, so the toolchain-side impact is limited.
Fixed in 0.9.1 (commit d3907c9), which enforces the per-block output bound. Upgrade to ruzstd >= 0.9.1.
- Record
RUSTSEC-2026-0344- CVSS 3.1
- 7.5 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H - Updated
- 2026-11-02
History
| Recorded | Changed | Sources |
|---|---|---|
| affected, aliases, facts, id, references, title | OSV | |
| first indexed | OSV |
Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.