GHSA-26wg-9xf2-q495
Novu has a XSS sanitization bypass
Summary
XSS sanitization is incomplete, some attributes are missing such as oncontentvisibilityautostatechange=. This allows for the email preview to render HTML that executes arbitrary JavaScript,
Details
Sanitization is implemented here: https://github.com/novuhq/novu/blob/next/libs/application-generic/src/services/sanitize/sanitizer.service.ts
With allowedAttributes: false, all attributes are allowed through sanitize-html. Even dangerous ones like oncontentvisibilityautostatechange=. The DANGEROUS_ATTRIBUTES array tries to handle this by denying more attributes after the fact, but this list is incomplete. I copied all well-known payloads from:
https://portswigger.net/web-security/cross-site-scripting/cheat-sheet
And found that the oncontentvisibilityautostatechange= attribute isn't detected.
PS. there seems to also be another even more lax sanitizer here, but I wasn't able to figure out where it is used: https://github.com/novuhq/novu/blob/next/packages/framework/src/utils/sanitize.utils.ts
PoC
- Create a new workflow and add an Email step
- In the body, write the following HTML code:
<a oncontentvisibilityautostatechange="alert(window.origin)" style="display:block;content-visibility:auto">
- Wait a second and notice the XSS popup showing the current origin:
<img width="1515" height="610" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/7d519a50-3bed-4f04-b78c-9c5938717433" />
Impact
This may look like a Self-XSS similar to https://github.com/novuhq/novu/security/advisories/GHSA-w8vm-jx29-52fr, but it can be more impactful. First of all, if multiple users can access this dashboard, the link above can directly bring the to the email step editor to trigger the XSS. An attacker can also use the Google/GitHub OAuth flows without completing the code callback step, and send that URL to the victim to intentionally log the vicitm into the attacker's account. If the attacker has prepared an XSS payload there, they will now be allowed to view it, so it triggers.
Attack profile
How easy it is to exploit
- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges needed
- None
- User interaction
- Required
What an attacker can affect
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- None
What each source reports
GitHub Advisories Score used 8.1
Novu has a XSS sanitization bypass
Summary
XSS sanitization is incomplete, some attributes are missing such as oncontentvisibilityautostatechange=. This allows for the email preview to render HTML that executes arbitrary JavaScript,
Details
Sanitization is implemented here: https://github.com/novuhq/novu/blob/next/libs/application-generic/src/services/sanitize/sanitizer.service.ts
With allowedAttributes: false, all attributes are allowed through sanitize-html. Even dangerous ones like oncontentvisibilityautostatechange=. The DANGEROUS_ATTRIBUTES array tries to handle this by denying more attributes after the fact, but this list is incomplete. I copied all well-known payloads from:
https://portswigger.net/web-security/cross-site-scripting/cheat-sheet
And found that the oncontentvisibilityautostatechange= attribute isn't detected.
PS. there seems to also be another even more lax sanitizer here, but I wasn't able to figure out where it is used: https://github.com/novuhq/novu/blob/next/packages/framework/src/utils/sanitize.utils.ts
PoC
- Create a new workflow and add an Email step
- In the body, write the following HTML code:
<a oncontentvisibilityautostatechange="alert(window.origin)" style="display:block;content-visibility:auto">
- Wait a second and notice the XSS popup showing the current origin:
<img width="1515" height="610" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/7d519a50-3bed-4f04-b78c-9c5938717433" />
Impact
This may look like a Self-XSS similar to https://github.com/novuhq/novu/security/advisories/GHSA-w8vm-jx29-52fr, but it can be more impactful. First of all, if multiple users can access this dashboard, the link above can directly bring the to the email step editor to trigger the XSS. An attacker can also use the Google/GitHub OAuth flows without completing the code callback step, and send that URL to the victim to intentionally log the vicitm into the attacker's account. If the attacker has prepared an XSS payload there, they will now be allowed to view it, so it triggers.
- Record
GHSA-26wg-9xf2-q495- CVSS 3.1
- 8.1 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N - Weakness
- CWE-79
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSV 8.1
Novu has a XSS sanitization bypass
Summary
XSS sanitization is incomplete, some attributes are missing such as oncontentvisibilityautostatechange=. This allows for the email preview to render HTML that executes arbitrary JavaScript,
Details
Sanitization is implemented here: https://github.com/novuhq/novu/blob/next/libs/application-generic/src/services/sanitize/sanitizer.service.ts
With allowedAttributes: false, all attributes are allowed through sanitize-html. Even dangerous ones like oncontentvisibilityautostatechange=. The DANGEROUS_ATTRIBUTES array tries to handle this by denying more attributes after the fact, but this list is incomplete. I copied all well-known payloads from:
https://portswigger.net/web-security/cross-site-scripting/cheat-sheet
And found that the oncontentvisibilityautostatechange= attribute isn't detected.
PS. there seems to also be another even more lax sanitizer here, but I wasn't able to figure out where it is used: https://github.com/novuhq/novu/blob/next/packages/framework/src/utils/sanitize.utils.ts
PoC
- Create a new workflow and add an Email step
- In the body, write the following HTML code:
<a oncontentvisibilityautostatechange="alert(window.origin)" style="display:block;content-visibility:auto">
- Wait a second and notice the XSS popup showing the current origin:
<img width="1515" height="610" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/7d519a50-3bed-4f04-b78c-9c5938717433" />
Impact
This may look like a Self-XSS similar to https://github.com/novuhq/novu/security/advisories/GHSA-w8vm-jx29-52fr, but it can be more impactful. First of all, if multiple users can access this dashboard, the link above can directly bring the to the email step editor to trigger the XSS. An attacker can also use the Google/GitHub OAuth flows without completing the code callback step, and send that URL to the victim to intentionally log the vicitm into the attacker's account. If the attacker has prepared an XSS payload there, they will now be allowed to view it, so it triggers.
- Record
GHSA-26wg-9xf2-q495- CVSS 3.1
- 8.1 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N - Weakness
- CWE-79
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
Affected packages
| Package | Affected | Fixed |
|---|---|---|
novu/apinpm | before 3.15.0 | 3.15.0 |
History
| Recorded | Changed | Sources |
|---|---|---|
| first indexed | GitHub Advisories, OSV |
Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.
In short
GHSA-26wg-9xf2-q495 is a high vulnerability (CVSS 8.1) in novu/api, published April 14, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. Fixed in novu/api 3.15.0.