GHSA-2858-xg23-26fp

Summary

OpenClaw accepted camera.snap / camera.clip node payload url fields and downloaded them on the gateway/agent host without binding downloads to the resolved node host.

In OpenClaw's documented trust model, paired nodes are in the same operator trust boundary, so this is scoped as medium-severity hardening. A malicious or compromised paired node could still steer gateway-host fetches during camera URL retrieval.

Affected Packages / Versions

• Package: openclaw (npm)
• Affected versions: >= 2026.2.13 <= 2026.3.1
• Latest vulnerable published version at time of update: 2026.3.1
• Patched versions: >= 2026.3.2 (released)

Technical Details

Vulnerable flows accepted URL payloads and downloaded directly from the provided URL:

• src/cli/nodes-camera.ts (writeUrlToFile) fetched URL payloads without node-host binding.
• src/cli/nodes-cli/register.camera.ts passed camera.snap / camera.clip payload URLs into that downloader.
• src/agents/tools/nodes-tool.ts did the same for camera_snap / camera_clip tool actions.

Impact

A malicious/compromised paired node could cause gateway-host URL fetches to off-node destinations reachable from the host network. This could be used for internal network probing/fetch pivots in deployments where paired nodes are not fully trusted.

Remediation

The fix introduces fail-closed node-host binding and guarded fetch for camera URL payload downloads:

• Require resolved node host metadata for URL payload downloads.
• Enforce hostname match between payload URL and resolved node host.
• Use SSRF-guarded fetch with redirect host/protocol checks.
• Apply the same enforcement across CLI and agent tool camera paths.

Fix Commit(s)

• 3bf19d6f40a0aaa55818b96eede3d05130c02533