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GHSA-39mm-4q6x-3vrx

Excluded iPAddress name constraints with an all-zero mask are not applied

7.4 HighFix available

GHSA-39mm-4q6x-3vrx is a high vulnerability (CVSS 7.4) in x509-validator, published September 24, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. Fixed in x509-validator 0.3.1.

Severity
7.4 HighCVSS 3.1, OSV
Exploit chance
UnscoredNo EPSS score yet
Exploitation
None knownNot on CISA’s or ENISA’s lists
Fixed in
0.3.1x509-validator

Description

An excluded_subtrees iPAddress name constraint with an all-zero mask (0.0.0.0/0 or ::/0) does not restrict iPAddress SANs in certificates issued beneath it. The mask check treated an all-zero mask as matching nothing, when a /0 prefix matches every address of its family, so the exclusion was silently ignored.

CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements §7.1.2.5.2 require exactly these exclusions on every technically constrained sub-CA that may not issue for IP addresses. As a result, anyone holding (or having compromised) the key of such a sub-CA can issue a certificate for an arbitrary IP address, and Validator with RFC5280Policy and ServerIdentityPolicy accepts it for that address. A permitted_subtrees dNSName entry on the same issuer does not prevent this, because iPAddress SANs are a different name form.

All users of Validator with RFC5280Policy are affected when a chain can contain a name-constrained issuer with an all-zero iPAddress exclusion.

The issue is fixed in x509-validator 0.3.1 (commit da661f8). Users should upgrade to 0.3.1 or later.

Attack profile

How easy it is to exploit

Attack vector
Network
Complexity
High
Privileges needed
None
User interaction
None

What an attacker can affect

Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
None

Affected packages

Affected packages
PackageAffectedFixed
x509-validator
crates.io
0.0.0-0 up to 0.3.1
0.3.1

What each source reports

OSV Score usedRUSTSEC-2026-03127.4

Excluded iPAddress name constraints with an all-zero mask are not applied

An excluded_subtrees iPAddress name constraint with an all-zero mask (0.0.0.0/0 or ::/0) does not restrict iPAddress SANs in certificates issued beneath it. The mask check treated an all-zero mask as matching nothing, when a /0 prefix matches every address of its family, so the exclusion was silently ignored.

CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements §7.1.2.5.2 require exactly these exclusions on every technically constrained sub-CA that may not issue for IP addresses. As a result, anyone holding (or having compromised) the key of such a sub-CA can issue a certificate for an arbitrary IP address, and Validator with RFC5280Policy and ServerIdentityPolicy accepts it for that address. A permitted_subtrees dNSName entry on the same issuer does not prevent this, because iPAddress SANs are a different name form.

All users of Validator with RFC5280Policy are affected when a chain can contain a name-constrained issuer with an all-zero iPAddress exclusion.

The issue is fixed in x509-validator 0.3.1 (commit da661f8). Users should upgrade to 0.3.1 or later.

Record
RUSTSEC-2026-0312
CVSS 3.1
7.4 HighCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Updated
2026-11-02

History

History
RecordedChangedSources
first indexedOSV

Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.

References

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