Every CVESearch/Get API key

GHSA-647h-p824-99w7

@grackle-ai/mcp has a workspace authorization bypass in its knowledge_search MCP tool

8.6 HighFix available

Impact

The knowledge_search and knowledge_get_node MCP tools are included in SCOPED_TOOLS (visible to scoped agents) but their handlers do not receive authContext and do not enforce workspace scoping. A scoped agent in Workspace A can supply an arbitrary workspaceId parameter to search or retrieve knowledge graph nodes from Workspace B, bypassing workspace isolation boundaries.

This is a cross-workspace data leakage vulnerability affecting any deployment where multiple workspaces contain sensitive knowledge graph data and scoped agents are used.

Affected code:

  • packages/mcp/src/tools/knowledge.ts:146-169 (knowledge_search handler)
  • packages/mcp/src/tools/knowledge.ts:244-283 (knowledge_get_node handler)
  • packages/mcp/src/tool-scoping.ts:11 (both tools listed in SCOPED_TOOLS)

Contrast with correct implementation: knowledge_create_node (same file, lines 334-357) properly receives authContext and overrides the user-supplied workspaceId for scoped callers.

Design Note

Cross-workspace knowledge sharing is a legitimate future feature — agents working across different repos may need to collaborate and share knowledge. However, this access should be opt-in with explicit grants, not an implicit bypass. The immediate fix locks scoped agents to their own workspace. A future design could introduce:

  • Workspace-level "share knowledge with" settings
  • A cross_workspace scope on scoped tokens
  • Explicit workspaceIds (plural) in the auth context

Patches

Fix: Add authContext parameter to knowledge_search and knowledge_get_node handlers and enforce workspace scoping, matching the pattern in knowledge_create_node:

const resolvedWorkspaceId =
  authContext?.type === "scoped"
    ? authContext.workspaceId ?? ""
    : workspaceId ?? "";

When cross-workspace collaboration is designed, this check can be relaxed intentionally with proper access controls.

Workarounds

Do not use scoped agent tokens in multi-workspace deployments until patched. Alternatively, remove knowledge_search and knowledge_get_node from the SCOPED_TOOLS set in tool-scoping.ts.

References

  • CWE-284: Improper Access Control
  • File: packages/mcp/src/tools/knowledge.ts
  • File: packages/mcp/src/tool-scoping.ts

Attack profile

How easy it is to exploit

Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges needed
Low
User interaction
None

What an attacker can affect

Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
None

What each source reports

GitHub Advisories Score used8.6

@grackle-ai/mcp has a workspace authorization bypass in its knowledge_search MCP tool

Impact

The knowledge_search and knowledge_get_node MCP tools are included in SCOPED_TOOLS (visible to scoped agents) but their handlers do not receive authContext and do not enforce workspace scoping. A scoped agent in Workspace A can supply an arbitrary workspaceId parameter to search or retrieve knowledge graph nodes from Workspace B, bypassing workspace isolation boundaries.

This is a cross-workspace data leakage vulnerability affecting any deployment where multiple workspaces contain sensitive knowledge graph data and scoped agents are used.

Affected code:

  • packages/mcp/src/tools/knowledge.ts:146-169 (knowledge_search handler)
  • packages/mcp/src/tools/knowledge.ts:244-283 (knowledge_get_node handler)
  • packages/mcp/src/tool-scoping.ts:11 (both tools listed in SCOPED_TOOLS)

Contrast with correct implementation: knowledge_create_node (same file, lines 334-357) properly receives authContext and overrides the user-supplied workspaceId for scoped callers.

Design Note

Cross-workspace knowledge sharing is a legitimate future feature — agents working across different repos may need to collaborate and share knowledge. However, this access should be opt-in with explicit grants, not an implicit bypass. The immediate fix locks scoped agents to their own workspace. A future design could introduce:

  • Workspace-level "share knowledge with" settings
  • A cross_workspace scope on scoped tokens
  • Explicit workspaceIds (plural) in the auth context

Patches

Fix: Add authContext parameter to knowledge_search and knowledge_get_node handlers and enforce workspace scoping, matching the pattern in knowledge_create_node:

const resolvedWorkspaceId =
  authContext?.type === "scoped"
    ? authContext.workspaceId ?? ""
    : workspaceId ?? "";

When cross-workspace collaboration is designed, this check can be relaxed intentionally with proper access controls.

Workarounds

Do not use scoped agent tokens in multi-workspace deployments until patched. Alternatively, remove knowledge_search and knowledge_get_node from the SCOPED_TOOLS set in tool-scoping.ts.

References

  • CWE-284: Improper Access Control
  • File: packages/mcp/src/tools/knowledge.ts
  • File: packages/mcp/src/tool-scoping.ts
Record
GHSA-647h-p824-99w7
CVSS 4.0
8.6 HighCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N
Weakness
CWE-284
Updated
2026-11-02
OSV8.6

@grackle-ai/mcp has a workspace authorization bypass in its knowledge_search MCP tool

Impact

The knowledge_search and knowledge_get_node MCP tools are included in SCOPED_TOOLS (visible to scoped agents) but their handlers do not receive authContext and do not enforce workspace scoping. A scoped agent in Workspace A can supply an arbitrary workspaceId parameter to search or retrieve knowledge graph nodes from Workspace B, bypassing workspace isolation boundaries.

This is a cross-workspace data leakage vulnerability affecting any deployment where multiple workspaces contain sensitive knowledge graph data and scoped agents are used.

Affected code:

  • packages/mcp/src/tools/knowledge.ts:146-169 (knowledge_search handler)
  • packages/mcp/src/tools/knowledge.ts:244-283 (knowledge_get_node handler)
  • packages/mcp/src/tool-scoping.ts:11 (both tools listed in SCOPED_TOOLS)

Contrast with correct implementation: knowledge_create_node (same file, lines 334-357) properly receives authContext and overrides the user-supplied workspaceId for scoped callers.

Design Note

Cross-workspace knowledge sharing is a legitimate future feature — agents working across different repos may need to collaborate and share knowledge. However, this access should be opt-in with explicit grants, not an implicit bypass. The immediate fix locks scoped agents to their own workspace. A future design could introduce:

  • Workspace-level "share knowledge with" settings
  • A cross_workspace scope on scoped tokens
  • Explicit workspaceIds (plural) in the auth context

Patches

Fix: Add authContext parameter to knowledge_search and knowledge_get_node handlers and enforce workspace scoping, matching the pattern in knowledge_create_node:

const resolvedWorkspaceId =
  authContext?.type === "scoped"
    ? authContext.workspaceId ?? ""
    : workspaceId ?? "";

When cross-workspace collaboration is designed, this check can be relaxed intentionally with proper access controls.

Workarounds

Do not use scoped agent tokens in multi-workspace deployments until patched. Alternatively, remove knowledge_search and knowledge_get_node from the SCOPED_TOOLS set in tool-scoping.ts.

References

  • CWE-284: Improper Access Control
  • File: packages/mcp/src/tools/knowledge.ts
  • File: packages/mcp/src/tool-scoping.ts
Record
GHSA-647h-p824-99w7
CVSS 4.0
8.6 HighCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N
Weakness
CWE-284
Updated
2026-11-02

Affected packages

Affected packages
PackageAffectedFixed
@grackle-ai/mcp
npm
through 0.70.1
0.70.2
@grackle-ai/mcp
npm
before 0.70.2
0.70.2

History

History
RecordedChangedSources
first indexedGitHub Advisories, OSV

Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.

In short

GHSA-647h-p824-99w7 is a high vulnerability (CVSS 8.6) in @grackle-ai/mcp, published March 25, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. Fixed in @grackle-ai/mcp 0.70.2.

References

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