GHSA-763v-5pjm-fx36
Strands Agents: Default FileSessionManager storage is world-readable on shared systems
There is a local confidentiality issue in the default FileSessionManager storage behavior. By default it writes session data under /tmp/strands/sessions and relies on the process umask for directory and file permissions. On systems using the common umask 022, the session directories are 0755 and JSON files are 0644, so other local users can read persisted agent session data.
This matters on shared developer machines, CI hosts, notebooks, jump boxes, and multi-user GPU servers. Session storage is intended to persist conversation/history/state, so it can contain prompts, model output, tool inputs/outputs, intermediate state, and secrets that pass through the agent.
Relevant code:
strands-py/src/strands/session/file_session_manager.py:58: default storage path isos.path.join(tempfile.gettempdir(), "strands/sessions").strands-py/src/strands/session/file_session_manager.py:118: creates parent directories without a private mode.strands-py/src/strands/session/file_session_manager.py:121: writes JSON files via normalopen(..., "w").strands-py/src/strands/session/file_session_manager.py:131: creates session directories without a private mode.
Local reproduction with umask 022:
default_storage_dir= /tmp/strands/sessions
0o755 /tmp/strands/sessions
0o755 /tmp/strands/sessions/session_codex_perm_poc
0o644 /tmp/strands/sessions/session_codex_perm_poc/session.json
file_contains_secret= True
The fixture wrote a fake secret into the session dict to show that sensitive session fields are readable through the resulting file.
Suggested fixes:
- Use a private per-user data directory by default rather than
/tmp, or create/tmp/strandsand descendants with0700. - Write session JSON atomically with
0600permissions. - Consider refusing to use an existing default storage directory if it is not owned by the current user or is group/world accessible.
- Document that callers should set
storage_direxplicitly when they need shared storage.
This was reproduced on commit dd7b41de38cb.
Attack profile
How easy it is to exploit
- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges needed
- Low
- User interaction
- None
What an attacker can affect
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
What each source reports
GitHub Advisories Score used 5.7
Strands Agents: Default FileSessionManager storage is world-readable on shared systems
There is a local confidentiality issue in the default FileSessionManager storage behavior. By default it writes session data under /tmp/strands/sessions and relies on the process umask for directory and file permissions. On systems using the common umask 022, the session directories are 0755 and JSON files are 0644, so other local users can read persisted agent session data.
This matters on shared developer machines, CI hosts, notebooks, jump boxes, and multi-user GPU servers. Session storage is intended to persist conversation/history/state, so it can contain prompts, model output, tool inputs/outputs, intermediate state, and secrets that pass through the agent.
Relevant code:
strands-py/src/strands/session/file_session_manager.py:58: default storage path isos.path.join(tempfile.gettempdir(), "strands/sessions").strands-py/src/strands/session/file_session_manager.py:118: creates parent directories without a private mode.strands-py/src/strands/session/file_session_manager.py:121: writes JSON files via normalopen(..., "w").strands-py/src/strands/session/file_session_manager.py:131: creates session directories without a private mode.
Local reproduction with umask 022:
default_storage_dir= /tmp/strands/sessions
0o755 /tmp/strands/sessions
0o755 /tmp/strands/sessions/session_codex_perm_poc
0o644 /tmp/strands/sessions/session_codex_perm_poc/session.json
file_contains_secret= True
The fixture wrote a fake secret into the session dict to show that sensitive session fields are readable through the resulting file.
Suggested fixes:
- Use a private per-user data directory by default rather than
/tmp, or create/tmp/strandsand descendants with0700. - Write session JSON atomically with
0600permissions. - Consider refusing to use an existing default storage directory if it is not owned by the current user or is group/world accessible.
- Document that callers should set
storage_direxplicitly when they need shared storage.
This was reproduced on commit dd7b41de38cb.
- Record
GHSA-763v-5pjm-fx36- CVSS 4.0
- 5.7 Medium
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N - Weakness
- CWE-276
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSV 5.7
Strands Agents: Default FileSessionManager storage is world-readable on shared systems
There is a local confidentiality issue in the default FileSessionManager storage behavior. By default it writes session data under /tmp/strands/sessions and relies on the process umask for directory and file permissions. On systems using the common umask 022, the session directories are 0755 and JSON files are 0644, so other local users can read persisted agent session data.
This matters on shared developer machines, CI hosts, notebooks, jump boxes, and multi-user GPU servers. Session storage is intended to persist conversation/history/state, so it can contain prompts, model output, tool inputs/outputs, intermediate state, and secrets that pass through the agent.
Relevant code:
strands-py/src/strands/session/file_session_manager.py:58: default storage path isos.path.join(tempfile.gettempdir(), "strands/sessions").strands-py/src/strands/session/file_session_manager.py:118: creates parent directories without a private mode.strands-py/src/strands/session/file_session_manager.py:121: writes JSON files via normalopen(..., "w").strands-py/src/strands/session/file_session_manager.py:131: creates session directories without a private mode.
Local reproduction with umask 022:
default_storage_dir= /tmp/strands/sessions
0o755 /tmp/strands/sessions
0o755 /tmp/strands/sessions/session_codex_perm_poc
0o644 /tmp/strands/sessions/session_codex_perm_poc/session.json
file_contains_secret= True
The fixture wrote a fake secret into the session dict to show that sensitive session fields are readable through the resulting file.
Suggested fixes:
- Use a private per-user data directory by default rather than
/tmp, or create/tmp/strandsand descendants with0700. - Write session JSON atomically with
0600permissions. - Consider refusing to use an existing default storage directory if it is not owned by the current user or is group/world accessible.
- Document that callers should set
storage_direxplicitly when they need shared storage.
This was reproduced on commit dd7b41de38cb.
- Record
GHSA-763v-5pjm-fx36- CVSS 4.0
- 5.7 Medium
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N - Weakness
- CWE-276
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
Affected packages
| Package | Affected | Fixed |
|---|---|---|
strands-agentsPyPI | before 1.48.0 | 1.48.0 |
strands-agentsPyPI | before 1.48.0, plus listed versions 0.0.10.1.00.1.10.1.20.1.3 Show 45 moreShow less0.1.40.1.50.1.60.1.70.1.80.1.90.2.00.2.10.3.01.0.01.0.11.1.01.10.01.11.01.12.01.13.01.14.01.15.01.16.01.17.01.18.01.19.01.2.01.20.01.21.01.22.01.23.01.24.01.25.01.26.01.27.01.28.01.29.01.3.01.30.01.31.01.32.01.33.01.34.01.34.11.35.01.36.01.37.01.38.01.39.0 | 1.48.0 |
History
| Recorded | Changed | Sources |
|---|---|---|
| first indexed | GitHub Advisories, OSV |
Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.
In short
GHSA-763v-5pjm-fx36 is a medium vulnerability (CVSS 5.7) in strands-agents, published October 27, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. Fixed in strands-agents 1.48.0.
References
github.com/strands-agents/harness-sdk/security/advisories/GHSA-763v-5pjm-fx36
github.com/strands-agents/harness-sdk/pull/2937
github.com/strands-agents/harness-sdk/commit/8658b9e0d57427b77b69343262184d76d8e63e8f
github.com/strands-agents/harness-sdk/releases/tag/python/v1.48.0
github.com/advisories/GHSA-763v-5pjm-fx36
github.com/strands-agents/harness-sdk
Left out here: 16 versions. The JSON record has them.