GHSA-8f6j-263m-g72x
Apple App Store Server Python Library: SignedDataVerifier accepts stale OCSP GOOD responses and can bypass certificate revocation checks
Summary
SignedDataVerifier attempts to perform online revocation checking when enable_online_checks=True, but its OCSP validation logic accepts stale GOOD responses as valid indefinitely. In appstoreserverlibrary/signed_data_verifier.py, _ChainVerifier.check_ocsp_status() verifies the OCSP response signature and CertID match, but never validates the freshness window carried by producedAt, thisUpdate, or nextUpdate.
As a result, a previously valid signed OCSP GOOD response can be replayed after it is expired, and the library will still treat the certificate as good. If an App Store signing certificate or intermediate is ever revoked, applications using this library with online checks enabled can continue accepting JWS objects signed with the revoked key as long as a stale signed OCSP response is replayed.
Attack profile
How easy it is to exploit
- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges needed
- None
- User interaction
- None
What an attacker can affect
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- None
What each source reports
GitHub Advisories Score used
Apple App Store Server Python Library: SignedDataVerifier accepts stale OCSP GOOD responses and can bypass certificate revocation checks
Summary
SignedDataVerifier attempts to perform online revocation checking when enable_online_checks=True, but its OCSP validation logic accepts stale GOOD responses as valid indefinitely. In appstoreserverlibrary/signed_data_verifier.py, _ChainVerifier.check_ocsp_status() verifies the OCSP response signature and CertID match, but never validates the freshness window carried by producedAt, thisUpdate, or nextUpdate.
As a result, a previously valid signed OCSP GOOD response can be replayed after it is expired, and the library will still treat the certificate as good. If an App Store signing certificate or intermediate is ever revoked, applications using this library with online checks enabled can continue accepting JWS objects signed with the revoked key as long as a stale signed OCSP response is replayed.
- Record
GHSA-8f6j-263m-g72x- CVSS 4.0
- 6.9 Medium
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N - Weakness
- CWE-295, CWE-299
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSV
Apple App Store Server Python Library: SignedDataVerifier accepts stale OCSP GOOD responses and can bypass certificate revocation checks
Summary
SignedDataVerifier attempts to perform online revocation checking when enable_online_checks=True, but its OCSP validation logic accepts stale GOOD responses as valid indefinitely. In appstoreserverlibrary/signed_data_verifier.py, _ChainVerifier.check_ocsp_status() verifies the OCSP response signature and CertID match, but never validates the freshness window carried by producedAt, thisUpdate, or nextUpdate.
As a result, a previously valid signed OCSP GOOD response can be replayed after it is expired, and the library will still treat the certificate as good. If an App Store signing certificate or intermediate is ever revoked, applications using this library with online checks enabled can continue accepting JWS objects signed with the revoked key as long as a stale signed OCSP response is replayed.
- Record
GHSA-8f6j-263m-g72x- CVSS 4.0
- 6.9 Medium
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N - Weakness
- CWE-295, CWE-299
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
Affected packages
| Package | Affected | Fixed |
|---|---|---|
app-store-server-libraryPyPI | 0.2.0 to 3.1.1 | 3.1.2 |
app-store-server-libraryPyPI | 0.2.0 up to 3.1.2, plus listed versions 0.2.11.0.01.1.01.2.01.2.1 Show 11 moreShow less1.3.01.4.01.5.01.6.01.7.01.8.01.9.02.0.03.0.03.1.03.1.1 | 3.1.2 |
History
| Recorded | Changed | Sources |
|---|---|---|
| first indexed | GitHub Advisories, OSV |
Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.
In short
GHSA-8f6j-263m-g72x is a medium vulnerability (CVSS 6.9) in app-store-server-library, published July 13, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. Fixed in app-store-server-library 3.1.2.