GHSA-8v28-3g86-chj5
PanelSwWix4.Sdk .be TEMP folder is vulnerable to DLL redirection attacks that allow the attacker to escalate privileges
Summary
.be TEMP folder is vulnerable to DLL redirection attacks that allow the attacker to escalate privileges.
Details
If the bundle is not run as admin, the user's TEMP folder is used and not the system TEMP folder. A utility is able to monitor the user's TEMP folder for changes and drop its own DLL into the .be/.Local folder immediately when the .be folder is created. When the burn engine elevates, the malicious DLL receives elevated privileges.
PoC
As a standard, non-admin user:
- Monitor the user's TEMP folder for changes using ReadDirectoryChangesW
- On FILE_ACTION_ADDED, check if the folder name is .be
- Create a folder in .be named after the bundle + .Local (e.g. MyInstaller.exe.Local)
- Put the malicious COMCTL32.DLL in the .Local folder following the naming used for the real DLL (e.g. MyInstaller.exe.Local/x86_microsoft.windows.common-controls_.../COMCTL32.dll)
- Do hacker things when the engine escalates and the malicious DLL is loaded
Proper naming for the path can be obtained by using GetModuleHandle("comctl32.dll") and GetModuleFileName.
Impact
DLL redirection utilizing .exe.Local Windows capability. This impacts any installer built with the WiX installer framework.
Attack profile
How easy it is to exploit
- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges needed
- Low
- User interaction
- Required
What an attacker can affect
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
What each source reports
GitHub Advisories Score used
PanelSwWix4.Sdk .be TEMP folder is vulnerable to DLL redirection attacks that allow the attacker to escalate privileges
Summary
.be TEMP folder is vulnerable to DLL redirection attacks that allow the attacker to escalate privileges.
Details
If the bundle is not run as admin, the user's TEMP folder is used and not the system TEMP folder. A utility is able to monitor the user's TEMP folder for changes and drop its own DLL into the .be/.Local folder immediately when the .be folder is created. When the burn engine elevates, the malicious DLL receives elevated privileges.
PoC
As a standard, non-admin user:
- Monitor the user's TEMP folder for changes using ReadDirectoryChangesW
- On FILE_ACTION_ADDED, check if the folder name is .be
- Create a folder in .be named after the bundle + .Local (e.g. MyInstaller.exe.Local)
- Put the malicious COMCTL32.DLL in the .Local folder following the naming used for the real DLL (e.g. MyInstaller.exe.Local/x86_microsoft.windows.common-controls_.../COMCTL32.dll)
- Do hacker things when the engine escalates and the malicious DLL is loaded
Proper naming for the path can be obtained by using GetModuleHandle("comctl32.dll") and GetModuleFileName.
Impact
DLL redirection utilizing .exe.Local Windows capability. This impacts any installer built with the WiX installer framework.
- Record
GHSA-8v28-3g86-chj5- CVSS 3.1
- 8.2 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-426
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSV
PanelSwWix4.Sdk .be TEMP folder is vulnerable to DLL redirection attacks that allow the attacker to escalate privileges
Summary
.be TEMP folder is vulnerable to DLL redirection attacks that allow the attacker to escalate privileges.
Details
If the bundle is not run as admin, the user's TEMP folder is used and not the system TEMP folder. A utility is able to monitor the user's TEMP folder for changes and drop its own DLL into the .be/.Local folder immediately when the .be folder is created. When the burn engine elevates, the malicious DLL receives elevated privileges.
PoC
As a standard, non-admin user:
- Monitor the user's TEMP folder for changes using ReadDirectoryChangesW
- On FILE_ACTION_ADDED, check if the folder name is .be
- Create a folder in .be named after the bundle + .Local (e.g. MyInstaller.exe.Local)
- Put the malicious COMCTL32.DLL in the .Local folder following the naming used for the real DLL (e.g. MyInstaller.exe.Local/x86_microsoft.windows.common-controls_.../COMCTL32.dll)
- Do hacker things when the engine escalates and the malicious DLL is loaded
Proper naming for the path can be obtained by using GetModuleHandle("comctl32.dll") and GetModuleFileName.
Impact
DLL redirection utilizing .exe.Local Windows capability. This impacts any installer built with the WiX installer framework.
- Record
GHSA-8v28-3g86-chj5- CVSS 3.1
- 8.2 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-426
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
Affected packages
| Package | Affected | Fixed |
|---|---|---|
PanelSwWix4.SdkNuGet | before 5.0.0-psw-wix.0251-40 | 5.0.0-psw-wix.0251-40 |
History
| Recorded | Changed | Sources |
|---|---|---|
| first indexed | GitHub Advisories, OSV |
Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.
In short
GHSA-8v28-3g86-chj5 is a high vulnerability (CVSS 8.2) in PanelSwWix4.Sdk, published February 8, 2024. No source lists public exploit code. Fixed in PanelSwWix4.Sdk 5.0.0-psw-wix.0251-40.