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GHSA-9h64-2846-7x7f

Axonflow fixed bugs by implementing multi-tenant isolation and access-control hardening

9.1 CriticalFix available

Summary

Eight independently-filed bug fixes in the v7.1.3 → v7.5.0 release window collectively close a set of multi-tenant isolation, access-control, and policy-enforcement defects in the AxonFlow platform. They are filed as a single consolidated advisory because the recommended remediation is a single platform upgrade.

Affected versions

< 7.5.0. Specific items affect different earlier minors; see Impact below.

Patched versions

>= 7.5.0.

Impact

| # | Item | Affected | Patched | CWE | |---|---|---|---|---| | 1 | MAP execution multi-tenant isolation. A body-supplied org_id could override the Basic-auth-derived org for both execution recording and policy evaluation. In multi-tenant deployments with shared agents, this could record one tenant's request under another tenant's audit log and evaluate it under the wrong tenant's policy set. | < 7.4.5 | >= 7.4.5 | CWE-863 | | 2 | Cross-tenant audit-log leak via evidence/explain handlers. The handlers behind /api/v1/evidence/* and /api/v1/decisions/*/explain failed open when the tenant context was missing, returning data scoped to a different tenant or returning data without scope. | < 7.2.0 | >= 7.2.0 | CWE-200, CWE-863 | | 3 | License-validation bypass on onboard-customer. The portal customer-onboard endpoint lacked authentication and license-key validation, allowing unauthenticated callers to invoke the onboard flow. | < 7.2.0 | >= 7.2.0 | CWE-862 | | 4 | Tenant-scope fail-open on evidence/explain. Distinct from item 2: when tenant headers were absent, the handler defaulted to a permissive read scope rather than refusing the request. | < 7.2.0 | >= 7.2.0 | CWE-862 | | 5 | Internal-service auth fallback bypass in non-Community modes. Evaluation/Enterprise builds carried an auth fallback path that, under specific request shapes, could be exploited to bypass apiAuthMiddleware. | < 7.2.0 | >= 7.2.0 | CWE-863 | | 6 | Login timing / org-existence disclosure on the portal. The login handler returned different timing and response bodies for invalid-org vs invalid-password, allowing org enumeration. | < 7.1.3 | >= 7.1.3 | CWE-208 | | 7 | Portal DoS via unbounded request body. The portal accepted unbounded request bodies, allowing memory-exhaustion attacks. Capped at 1 MiB. | < 7.1.5 | >= 7.1.5 | CWE-770 | | 8 | SQL-injection enforcement regression on try.getaxonflow.com. The Community SaaS hosted endpoint inherited the warn SQLi default introduced in v6.2.0, allowing SQL-injection-shaped requests to pass governance to the LLM. Self-hosted deployments were unaffected unless they manually changed the default. | < 7.5.0 (try.getaxonflow.com only) | >= 7.5.0 | CWE-89 |

Remediation

Upgrade to AxonFlow platform v7.5.0 or later. No configuration changes required — the platform is purely additive and existing API/SDK callers continue to work.

For users who can't upgrade immediately, item-specific mitigations:

  • Items 1–5: ensure the agent middleware sets X-Org-ID / X-Tenant-ID from authenticated identity at the ingress, never accepting body-supplied identity.
  • Item 8 (Community SaaS): SQLI_ACTION=block can be set explicitly via the agent task definition; v7.5.0 makes this the default.

Resources

Credit

Identified by AxonFlow internal security review during the April 2026 quality-freeze epic.

Attack profile

How easy it is to exploit

Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges needed
Low
User interaction
None

What an attacker can affect

Confidentiality
High
Integrity
Low
Availability
Low

What each source reports

GitHub Advisories Score used9.1

Axonflow fixed bugs by implementing multi-tenant isolation and access-control hardening

Summary

Eight independently-filed bug fixes in the v7.1.3 → v7.5.0 release window collectively close a set of multi-tenant isolation, access-control, and policy-enforcement defects in the AxonFlow platform. They are filed as a single consolidated advisory because the recommended remediation is a single platform upgrade.

Affected versions

< 7.5.0. Specific items affect different earlier minors; see Impact below.

Patched versions

>= 7.5.0.

Impact

| # | Item | Affected | Patched | CWE | |---|---|---|---|---| | 1 | MAP execution multi-tenant isolation. A body-supplied org_id could override the Basic-auth-derived org for both execution recording and policy evaluation. In multi-tenant deployments with shared agents, this could record one tenant's request under another tenant's audit log and evaluate it under the wrong tenant's policy set. | < 7.4.5 | >= 7.4.5 | CWE-863 | | 2 | Cross-tenant audit-log leak via evidence/explain handlers. The handlers behind /api/v1/evidence/* and /api/v1/decisions/*/explain failed open when the tenant context was missing, returning data scoped to a different tenant or returning data without scope. | < 7.2.0 | >= 7.2.0 | CWE-200, CWE-863 | | 3 | License-validation bypass on onboard-customer. The portal customer-onboard endpoint lacked authentication and license-key validation, allowing unauthenticated callers to invoke the onboard flow. | < 7.2.0 | >= 7.2.0 | CWE-862 | | 4 | Tenant-scope fail-open on evidence/explain. Distinct from item 2: when tenant headers were absent, the handler defaulted to a permissive read scope rather than refusing the request. | < 7.2.0 | >= 7.2.0 | CWE-862 | | 5 | Internal-service auth fallback bypass in non-Community modes. Evaluation/Enterprise builds carried an auth fallback path that, under specific request shapes, could be exploited to bypass apiAuthMiddleware. | < 7.2.0 | >= 7.2.0 | CWE-863 | | 6 | Login timing / org-existence disclosure on the portal. The login handler returned different timing and response bodies for invalid-org vs invalid-password, allowing org enumeration. | < 7.1.3 | >= 7.1.3 | CWE-208 | | 7 | Portal DoS via unbounded request body. The portal accepted unbounded request bodies, allowing memory-exhaustion attacks. Capped at 1 MiB. | < 7.1.5 | >= 7.1.5 | CWE-770 | | 8 | SQL-injection enforcement regression on try.getaxonflow.com. The Community SaaS hosted endpoint inherited the warn SQLi default introduced in v6.2.0, allowing SQL-injection-shaped requests to pass governance to the LLM. Self-hosted deployments were unaffected unless they manually changed the default. | < 7.5.0 (try.getaxonflow.com only) | >= 7.5.0 | CWE-89 |

Remediation

Upgrade to AxonFlow platform v7.5.0 or later. No configuration changes required — the platform is purely additive and existing API/SDK callers continue to work.

For users who can't upgrade immediately, item-specific mitigations:

  • Items 1–5: ensure the agent middleware sets X-Org-ID / X-Tenant-ID from authenticated identity at the ingress, never accepting body-supplied identity.
  • Item 8 (Community SaaS): SQLI_ACTION=block can be set explicitly via the agent task definition; v7.5.0 makes this the default.

Resources

Credit

Identified by AxonFlow internal security review during the April 2026 quality-freeze epic.

Record
GHSA-9h64-2846-7x7f
CVSS 3.1
9.1 CriticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:L
Weakness
CWE-89, CWE-200, CWE-208, CWE-770, CWE-862, CWE-863
Updated
2026-11-02
OSV9.1

Axonflow fixed bugs by implementing multi-tenant isolation and access-control hardening

Summary

Eight independently-filed bug fixes in the v7.1.3 → v7.5.0 release window collectively close a set of multi-tenant isolation, access-control, and policy-enforcement defects in the AxonFlow platform. They are filed as a single consolidated advisory because the recommended remediation is a single platform upgrade.

Affected versions

< 7.5.0. Specific items affect different earlier minors; see Impact below.

Patched versions

>= 7.5.0.

Impact

| # | Item | Affected | Patched | CWE | |---|---|---|---|---| | 1 | MAP execution multi-tenant isolation. A body-supplied org_id could override the Basic-auth-derived org for both execution recording and policy evaluation. In multi-tenant deployments with shared agents, this could record one tenant's request under another tenant's audit log and evaluate it under the wrong tenant's policy set. | < 7.4.5 | >= 7.4.5 | CWE-863 | | 2 | Cross-tenant audit-log leak via evidence/explain handlers. The handlers behind /api/v1/evidence/* and /api/v1/decisions/*/explain failed open when the tenant context was missing, returning data scoped to a different tenant or returning data without scope. | < 7.2.0 | >= 7.2.0 | CWE-200, CWE-863 | | 3 | License-validation bypass on onboard-customer. The portal customer-onboard endpoint lacked authentication and license-key validation, allowing unauthenticated callers to invoke the onboard flow. | < 7.2.0 | >= 7.2.0 | CWE-862 | | 4 | Tenant-scope fail-open on evidence/explain. Distinct from item 2: when tenant headers were absent, the handler defaulted to a permissive read scope rather than refusing the request. | < 7.2.0 | >= 7.2.0 | CWE-862 | | 5 | Internal-service auth fallback bypass in non-Community modes. Evaluation/Enterprise builds carried an auth fallback path that, under specific request shapes, could be exploited to bypass apiAuthMiddleware. | < 7.2.0 | >= 7.2.0 | CWE-863 | | 6 | Login timing / org-existence disclosure on the portal. The login handler returned different timing and response bodies for invalid-org vs invalid-password, allowing org enumeration. | < 7.1.3 | >= 7.1.3 | CWE-208 | | 7 | Portal DoS via unbounded request body. The portal accepted unbounded request bodies, allowing memory-exhaustion attacks. Capped at 1 MiB. | < 7.1.5 | >= 7.1.5 | CWE-770 | | 8 | SQL-injection enforcement regression on try.getaxonflow.com. The Community SaaS hosted endpoint inherited the warn SQLi default introduced in v6.2.0, allowing SQL-injection-shaped requests to pass governance to the LLM. Self-hosted deployments were unaffected unless they manually changed the default. | < 7.5.0 (try.getaxonflow.com only) | >= 7.5.0 | CWE-89 |

Remediation

Upgrade to AxonFlow platform v7.5.0 or later. No configuration changes required — the platform is purely additive and existing API/SDK callers continue to work.

For users who can't upgrade immediately, item-specific mitigations:

  • Items 1–5: ensure the agent middleware sets X-Org-ID / X-Tenant-ID from authenticated identity at the ingress, never accepting body-supplied identity.
  • Item 8 (Community SaaS): SQLI_ACTION=block can be set explicitly via the agent task definition; v7.5.0 makes this the default.

Resources

Credit

Identified by AxonFlow internal security review during the April 2026 quality-freeze epic.

Record
GHSA-9h64-2846-7x7f
CVSS 3.1
9.1 CriticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:L
Weakness
CWE-200, CWE-208, CWE-770, CWE-862, CWE-863, CWE-89
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVGO-2026-5290No score

Axonflow fixed bugs by implementing multi-tenant isolation and access-control hardening in github.com/getaxonflow/axonflow

Axonflow fixed bugs by implementing multi-tenant isolation and access-control hardening in github.com/getaxonflow/axonflow

Record
GO-2026-5290
Updated
2026-11-02

Affected packages

Affected packages
PackageAffectedFixed
github.com/getaxonflow/axonflow
Go
before 7.5.0
7.5.0
github.com/getaxonflow/axonflow
Go
before 7.5.0+incompatible
7.5.0+incompatible

History

History
RecordedChangedSources
first indexedGitHub Advisories, OSV

Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.

In short

GHSA-9h64-2846-7x7f is a critical vulnerability (CVSS 9.1) in github.com/getaxonflow/axonflow, published May 6, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. Fixed in github.com/getaxonflow/axonflow 7.5.0.

References

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