GHSA-9v4j-7g44-qcqw

Summary

When auto-refresh is enabled, Algernon spins up an SSE handler that streams a data: line for every filesystem event under the watched directory. The handler performs no authentication of any kind — no shared token, no cookie check against the permissions2 userstate, no IP allow-list, no path-prefix permission. Any client that can complete a TCP connection to the listener address receives the stream.

This advisory covers the authentication gap in isolation. The cross-origin browser-reach (advisory #2b) and the network-reach (advisory #2c) amplify the impact, but each is independently fixable; this finding addresses the case where a same-origin or LAN-local client connects directly to the SSE port and reads the stream without proving anything about its identity.

Details

Root cause — the SSE handler does not consult permissions2 or any other auth

// vendor/github.com/xyproto/recwatch/eventserver.go:100-144  (1.17.6)
func GenFileChangeEvents(events TimeEventMap, mut *sync.Mutex, maxAge time.Duration, allowed string) http.HandlerFunc {
    return func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
        w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/event-stream;charset=utf-8")
        w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-cache")
        w.Header().Set("Connection", "keep-alive")
        w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", allowed)
        // ... loop emits one SSE record per filename touched ...
    }
}

Note the handler signature: func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request). The request is discarded — no Cookie, Authorization, query-string, or remote-IP check is performed before the stream begins.

In 1.17.6 the listener was placed on its own http.ServeMux (recwatch/eventserver.go:200-215), wholly outside the perm.Rejected middleware chain that gates Algernon's main HTTP listener. Even an operator who had configured admin/user path prefixes via perm.AddAdminPath, set a cookieSecret, and forced authentication on every URL of the main server had no way to gate this listener — it was unreachable from the mux argument the perm middleware uses.

Why authentication matters for this listener

The stream contents are not public data. They reveal:

• Which files the developer is actively editing, with sub-second timing precision.
• The existence of files inside the watched root (including files the operator may have meant to keep private — .env.local, secrets.lua, in-progress draft files).
• By inference, the directory layout of the project.

A client that can connect to the listener obtains a low-rate continuous information disclosure for the lifetime of the connection. The handler is an infinite for {} loop — there is no natural session boundary or expiry.

Source-level evidence

$ rg -n 'GenFileChangeEvents|EventServer\(' vendor/github.com/xyproto/recwatch/
vendor/github.com/xyproto/recwatch/eventserver.go:101:func GenFileChangeEvents(events TimeEventMap, mut *sync.Mutex, maxAge time.Duration, allowed string) http.HandlerFunc {
vendor/github.com/xyproto/recwatch/eventserver.go:177:func EventServer(path, allowed, eventAddr, eventPath string, refreshDuration time.Duration) {

$ rg -n 'Cookie|Authorization|Token|state\.User' vendor/github.com/xyproto/recwatch/eventserver.go
# zero matches — no authentication primitive is referenced anywhere in the file

PoC (against 1.17.6)

# 1. Operator runs algernon with auto-refresh on a project directory:
algernon -a /path/to/project   # spins up :5553 on Linux/macOS, localhost:5553 on Windows

# 2. Any client that can reach the listener connects without credentials:
curl -sN http://<server>:5553/sse
# => id: 0
#    data: /path/to/project/secret-notes.md
#
#    id: 1
#    data: /path/to/project/.env.local

No Cookie, no Authorization, no X-Token, no preflight, no challenge. The connection succeeds and the stream is…

Summary

When auto-refresh is enabled, Algernon spins up an SSE handler that streams a data: line for every filesystem event under the watched directory. The handler performs no authentication of any kind — no shared token, no cookie check against the permissions2 userstate, no IP allow-list, no path-prefix permission. Any client that can complete a TCP connection to the listener address receives the stream.

This advisory covers the authentication gap in isolation. The cross-origin browser-reach (advisory #2b) and the network-reach (advisory #2c) amplify the impact, but each is independently fixable; this finding addresses the case where a same-origin or LAN-local client connects directly to the SSE port and reads the stream without proving anything about its identity.

Details

Root cause — the SSE handler does not consult permissions2 or any other auth

// vendor/github.com/xyproto/recwatch/eventserver.go:100-144  (1.17.6)
func GenFileChangeEvents(events TimeEventMap, mut *sync.Mutex, maxAge time.Duration, allowed string) http.HandlerFunc {
    return func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
        w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/event-stream;charset=utf-8")
        w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-cache")
        w.Header().Set("Connection", "keep-alive")
        w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", allowed)
        // ... loop emits one SSE record per filename touched ...
    }
}

Note the handler signature: func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request). The request is discarded — no Cookie, Authorization, query-string, or remote-IP check is performed before the stream begins.

In 1.17.6 the listener was placed on its own http.ServeMux (recwatch/eventserver.go:200-215), wholly outside the perm.Rejected middleware chain that gates Algernon's main HTTP listener. Even an operator who had configured admin/user path prefixes via perm.AddAdminPath, set a cookieSecret, and forced authentication on every URL of the main server had no way to gate this listener — it was unreachable from the mux argument the perm middleware uses.

Why authentication matters for this listener

The stream contents are not public data. They reveal:

• Which files the developer is actively editing, with sub-second timing precision.
• The existence of files inside the watched root (including files the operator may have meant to keep private — .env.local, secrets.lua, in-progress draft files).
• By inference, the directory layout of the project.

A client that can connect to the listener obtains a low-rate continuous information disclosure for the lifetime of the connection. The handler is an infinite for {} loop — there is no natural session boundary or expiry.

Source-level evidence

$ rg -n 'GenFileChangeEvents|EventServer\(' vendor/github.com/xyproto/recwatch/
vendor/github.com/xyproto/recwatch/eventserver.go:101:func GenFileChangeEvents(events TimeEventMap, mut *sync.Mutex, maxAge time.Duration, allowed string) http.HandlerFunc {
vendor/github.com/xyproto/recwatch/eventserver.go:177:func EventServer(path, allowed, eventAddr, eventPath string, refreshDuration time.Duration) {

$ rg -n 'Cookie|Authorization|Token|state\.User' vendor/github.com/xyproto/recwatch/eventserver.go
# zero matches — no authentication primitive is referenced anywhere in the file

PoC (against 1.17.6)

# 1. Operator runs algernon with auto-refresh on a project directory:
algernon -a /path/to/project   # spins up :5553 on Linux/macOS, localhost:5553 on Windows

# 2. Any client that can reach the listener connects without credentials:
curl -sN http://<server>:5553/sse
# => id: 0
#    data: /path/to/project/secret-notes.md
#
#    id: 1
#    data: /path/to/project/.env.local

No Cookie, no Authorization, no X-Token, no preflight, no challenge. The connection succeeds and the stream is…

Algernon: Auto-refresh SSE event server binds to all interfaces with Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * and no authentication in github.com/xyproto/algernon