GHSA-f96q-5f6p-v7cj
Verification cache poisoning allows forged Nostr events to bypass signature validation
GHSA-f96q-5f6p-v7cj is a high vulnerability (CVSS 7.5) in nostr-relay-pool, published August 1, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. Fixed in nostr-relay-pool 0.44.2.
- Severity
- 7.5 HighCVSS 3.1, OSV
- Exploit chance
- UnscoredNo EPSS score yet
- Exploitation
- None knownNot on CISA’s or ENISA’s lists
- Fixed in
0.44.2nostr-relay-pool
Description
The nostr-relay-pool crate cached the result of event signature verification
before the check was actually performed. Because the entry was inserted
unconditionally, a first delivery whose signature failed was still recorded
in the cache. A subsequent delivery of the same event (identical ID,
but with a forged signature) would then hit the cache, causing signature
verification to be skipped entirely. The forged event was passed on to
NostrDatabase::save_event() as if it had been validated.
Applications that connect to untrusted or compromised Nostr relays and persist received events are vulnerable. An attacker can inject arbitrary events without a valid signature into the application's trusted database, enabling impersonation of any public key or corruption of application state derived from stored events.
The issue does not compromise confidentiality or availability. It solely undermines the integrity of stored event data.
The fix, released in version 0.44.2, moves the cache insertion to occur only after a successful signature verification, so that failed attempts never create a cache entry.
Credit
Discovered and reported by Ali Al-Sorehi
Attack profile
How easy it is to exploit
- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges needed
- None
- User interaction
- None
What an attacker can affect
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- None
Affected packages
| Package | Affected | Fixed |
|---|---|---|
nostr-relay-poolcrates.io | 0.0.0-0 up to 0.44.2 | 0.44.2 |
What each source reports
OSV Score usedRUSTSEC-2026-0224
Verification cache poisoning allows forged Nostr events to bypass signature validation
The nostr-relay-pool crate cached the result of event signature verification
before the check was actually performed. Because the entry was inserted
unconditionally, a first delivery whose signature failed was still recorded
in the cache. A subsequent delivery of the same event (identical ID,
but with a forged signature) would then hit the cache, causing signature
verification to be skipped entirely. The forged event was passed on to
NostrDatabase::save_event() as if it had been validated.
Applications that connect to untrusted or compromised Nostr relays and persist received events are vulnerable. An attacker can inject arbitrary events without a valid signature into the application's trusted database, enabling impersonation of any public key or corruption of application state derived from stored events.
The issue does not compromise confidentiality or availability. It solely undermines the integrity of stored event data.
The fix, released in version 0.44.2, moves the cache insertion to occur only after a successful signature verification, so that failed attempts never create a cache entry.
Credit
Discovered and reported by Ali Al-Sorehi
- Record
RUSTSEC-2026-0224- CVSS 3.1
- 7.5 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N - Updated
- 2026-11-02
History
| Recorded | Changed | Sources |
|---|---|---|
| first indexed | OSV |
Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.