GHSA-fm76-w8jw-xf8m
@saltcorn/plugins-loader unsanitized plugin name leads to a remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability when creating plugins using git source
GHSA-fm76-w8jw-xf8m is a high vulnerability (CVSS 7.3) in @saltcorn/plugins-loader, published October 3, 2024. No source lists public exploit code. Fixed in @saltcorn/plugins-loader 1.0.0-beta.14.
- Severity
- 7.3 HighCVSS 4.0, GitHub Advisories
- Exploit chance
- UnscoredNo EPSS score yet
- Exploitation
- None knownNot on CISA’s or ENISA’s lists
- Fixed in
1.0.0-beta.14@saltcorn/plugins-loader +1 more
Description
Summary
When creating a new plugin using the git source, the user-controlled value req.body.name is used to build the plugin directory where the location will be cloned. The API used to execute the git clone command with the user-controlled data is child_process.execSync. Since the user-controlled data is not validated, a user with admin permission can add escaping characters and execute arbitrary commands, leading to a command injection vulnerability.
Details
Relevant code from source (req.body) to sink (child_process.execSync).
- file: https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.13/packages/server/routes/plugins.js#L1400
router.post(
"/",
isAdmin,
error_catcher(async (req, res) => {
const plugin = new Plugin(req.body); // [1]
[...]
try {
await load_plugins.loadAndSaveNewPlugin( // [3]
plugin,
schema === db.connectObj.default_schema || plugin.source === "github"
);
[...]
}
})
);
- file: https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.13/packages/saltcorn-data/models/plugin.ts#L44
class Plugin {
[...]
constructor(o: PluginCfg | PluginPack | Plugin) {
[...]
this.name = o.name; // [2]
[...]
}
- file: https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.13/packages/server/load_plugins.js#L64-L65
const loadAndSaveNewPlugin = async (plugin, force, noSignalOrDB) => {
[...]
const loader = new PluginInstaller(plugin); // [4]
const res = await loader.install(force); // [7]
[...]
};
class PluginInstaller {
constructor(plugin, opts = {}) {
[...]
const tokens =
plugin.source === "npm"
? plugin.location.split("/")
: plugin.name.split("/"); // [5]
[...]
this.tempDir = join(this.tempRootFolder, "temp_install", ...tokens); // [6]
[...]
}
async install(force) {
[...]
if (await this.prepPluginsFolder(force, pckJSON)) { // [8]
[...]
}
async prepPluginsFolder(force, pckJSON) {
[...]
switch (this.plugin.source) {
[...]
case "git":
if (force || !(await pathExists(this.pluginDir))) {
await gitPullOrClone(this.plugin, this.tempDir); // [9]
[...]
}
const gitPullOrClone = async (plugin, pluginDir) => {
[...]
if (fs.existsSync(pluginDir)) {
execSync(`git ${setKey} -C ${pluginDir} pull`);
} else {
execSync(`git ${setKey} clone ${plugin.location} ${pluginDir}`); // [10]
}
[...]
};
PoC
- check that the file will be created by the command
echo "hello">/tmp/HACKEDdoes not exists:
cat /tmp/HACKED
cat: /tmp/HACKED: No such file or directory
- login with an admin account
- visit
http://localhost:3000/plugins/new - enter the following fields:
- Name:
;echo "hello">/tmp/HACKED - Source:
git - other fields blank
- Name:
- click
Create - you will get an error saying
ENOENT: no such file or directory, ....but the commandtouch /tmp/HACKEDwill be executed - to verify:
cat /tmp/HACKED
hello
Impact
Remote code execution
Recommended Mitigation
Sanitize the pluginDir value before passing to execSync. Alternatively, use child_process. execFileSync API (docs: https://nodejs.org/api/child_process.html#child_processexecfilesyncfile-args-options)
Attack profile
How easy it is to exploit
- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges needed
- High
- User interaction
- None
What an attacker can affect
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
Affected packages
| Package | Affected | Fixed |
|---|---|---|
@saltcorn/plugins-loadernpm | through 1.0.0-beta.13 | 1.0.0-beta.14 |
@saltcorn/plugins-loadernpm | before 1.0.0-beta.14 | 1.0.0-beta.14 |
What each source reports
GitHub Advisories Score used 7.3
@saltcorn/plugins-loader unsanitized plugin name leads to a remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability when creating plugins using git source
Summary
When creating a new plugin using the git source, the user-controlled value req.body.name is used to build the plugin directory where the location will be cloned. The API used to execute the git clone command with the user-controlled data is child_process.execSync. Since the user-controlled data is not validated, a user with admin permission can add escaping characters and execute arbitrary commands, leading to a command injection vulnerability.
Details
Relevant code from source (req.body) to sink (child_process.execSync).
- file: https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.13/packages/server/routes/plugins.js#L1400
router.post(
"/",
isAdmin,
error_catcher(async (req, res) => {
const plugin = new Plugin(req.body); // [1]
[...]
try {
await load_plugins.loadAndSaveNewPlugin( // [3]
plugin,
schema === db.connectObj.default_schema || plugin.source === "github"
);
[...]
}
})
);
- file: https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.13/packages/saltcorn-data/models/plugin.ts#L44
class Plugin {
[...]
constructor(o: PluginCfg | PluginPack | Plugin) {
[...]
this.name = o.name; // [2]
[...]
}
- file: https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.13/packages/server/load_plugins.js#L64-L65
const loadAndSaveNewPlugin = async (plugin, force, noSignalOrDB) => {
[...]
const loader = new PluginInstaller(plugin); // [4]
const res = await loader.install(force); // [7]
[...]
};
class PluginInstaller {
constructor(plugin, opts = {}) {
[...]
const tokens =
plugin.source === "npm"
? plugin.location.split("/")
: plugin.name.split("/"); // [5]
[...]
this.tempDir = join(this.tempRootFolder, "temp_install", ...tokens); // [6]
[...]
}
async install(force) {
[...]
if (await this.prepPluginsFolder(force, pckJSON)) { // [8]
[...]
}
async prepPluginsFolder(force, pckJSON) {
[...]
switch (this.plugin.source) {
[...]
case "git":
if (force || !(await pathExists(this.pluginDir))) {
await gitPullOrClone(this.plugin, this.tempDir); // [9]
[...]
}
const gitPullOrClone = async (plugin, pluginDir) => {
[...]
if (fs.existsSync(pluginDir)) {
execSync(`git ${setKey} -C ${pluginDir} pull`);
} else {
execSync(`git ${setKey} clone ${plugin.location} ${pluginDir}`); // [10]
}
[...]
};
PoC
- check that the file will be created by the command
echo "hello">/tmp/HACKEDdoes not exists:
cat /tmp/HACKED
cat: /tmp/HACKED: No such file or directory
- login with an admin account
- visit
http://localhost:3000/plugins/new - enter the following fields:
- Name:
;echo "hello">/tmp/HACKED - Source:
git - other fields blank
- Name:
- click
Create - you will get an error saying
ENOENT: no such file or directory, ....but the commandtouch /tmp/HACKEDwill be executed - to verify:
cat /tmp/HACKED
hello
Impact
Remote code execution
Recommended Mitigation
Sanitize the pluginDir value before passing to execSync. Alternatively, use child_process. execFileSync API (docs: https://nodejs.org/api/child_process.html#child_processexecfilesyncfile-args-options)
- Record
GHSA-fm76-w8jw-xf8m- CVSS 4.0
- 7.3 High
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P - CVSS 3.1
- 7.2 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-78
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSV 7.3
@saltcorn/plugins-loader unsanitized plugin name leads to a remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability when creating plugins using git source
Summary
When creating a new plugin using the git source, the user-controlled value req.body.name is used to build the plugin directory where the location will be cloned. The API used to execute the git clone command with the user-controlled data is child_process.execSync. Since the user-controlled data is not validated, a user with admin permission can add escaping characters and execute arbitrary commands, leading to a command injection vulnerability.
Details
Relevant code from source (req.body) to sink (child_process.execSync).
- file: https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.13/packages/server/routes/plugins.js#L1400
router.post(
"/",
isAdmin,
error_catcher(async (req, res) => {
const plugin = new Plugin(req.body); // [1]
[...]
try {
await load_plugins.loadAndSaveNewPlugin( // [3]
plugin,
schema === db.connectObj.default_schema || plugin.source === "github"
);
[...]
}
})
);
- file: https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.13/packages/saltcorn-data/models/plugin.ts#L44
class Plugin {
[...]
constructor(o: PluginCfg | PluginPack | Plugin) {
[...]
this.name = o.name; // [2]
[...]
}
- file: https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.13/packages/server/load_plugins.js#L64-L65
const loadAndSaveNewPlugin = async (plugin, force, noSignalOrDB) => {
[...]
const loader = new PluginInstaller(plugin); // [4]
const res = await loader.install(force); // [7]
[...]
};
class PluginInstaller {
constructor(plugin, opts = {}) {
[...]
const tokens =
plugin.source === "npm"
? plugin.location.split("/")
: plugin.name.split("/"); // [5]
[...]
this.tempDir = join(this.tempRootFolder, "temp_install", ...tokens); // [6]
[...]
}
async install(force) {
[...]
if (await this.prepPluginsFolder(force, pckJSON)) { // [8]
[...]
}
async prepPluginsFolder(force, pckJSON) {
[...]
switch (this.plugin.source) {
[...]
case "git":
if (force || !(await pathExists(this.pluginDir))) {
await gitPullOrClone(this.plugin, this.tempDir); // [9]
[...]
}
const gitPullOrClone = async (plugin, pluginDir) => {
[...]
if (fs.existsSync(pluginDir)) {
execSync(`git ${setKey} -C ${pluginDir} pull`);
} else {
execSync(`git ${setKey} clone ${plugin.location} ${pluginDir}`); // [10]
}
[...]
};
PoC
- check that the file will be created by the command
echo "hello">/tmp/HACKEDdoes not exists:
cat /tmp/HACKED
cat: /tmp/HACKED: No such file or directory
- login with an admin account
- visit
http://localhost:3000/plugins/new - enter the following fields:
- Name:
;echo "hello">/tmp/HACKED - Source:
git - other fields blank
- Name:
- click
Create - you will get an error saying
ENOENT: no such file or directory, ....but the commandtouch /tmp/HACKEDwill be executed - to verify:
cat /tmp/HACKED
hello
Impact
Remote code execution
Recommended Mitigation
Sanitize the pluginDir value before passing to execSync. Alternatively, use child_process. execFileSync API (docs: https://nodejs.org/api/child_process.html#child_processexecfilesyncfile-args-options)
- Record
GHSA-fm76-w8jw-xf8m- CVSS 4.0
- 7.3 High
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P - CVSS 3.1
- 7.2 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-78
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
History
| Recorded | Changed | Sources |
|---|---|---|
| first indexed | GitHub Advisories, OSV |
Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.
References
github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/security/advisories/GHSA-fm76-w8jw-xf8m
github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/commit/024f19a7e079913f62f4a2335ab04116ddb68192
github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.13/packages/plugins-loader/download_utils.js
github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.13/packages/plugins-loader/plugin_installer.js
github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.13/packages/saltcorn-data/models/plugin.ts
github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.13/packages/server/load_plugins.js
github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.13/packages/server/routes/plugins.js
github.com/advisories/GHSA-fm76-w8jw-xf8m
github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn