GHSA-q683-8468-r6h6
WebauthnAuthenticator leaks sensitive HTTP headers through INFO-level logs
GHSA-q683-8468-r6h6 is a medium vulnerability (CVSS 6.6) in web-auth/webauthn-symfony-bundle, published June 26, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. Fixed in web-auth/webauthn-symfony-bundle 5.3.4.
- Severity
- 6.6 MediumCVSS 4.0, GitHub Advisories
- Exploit chance
- UnscoredNo EPSS score yet
- Exploitation
- None knownNot on CISA’s or ENISA’s lists
- Fixed in
5.3.4web-auth/webauthn-symfony-bundle +1 more
Description
Impact
Webauthn\Bundle\Security\Http\Authenticator\WebauthnAuthenticator logs the full Symfony\Component\HttpFoundation\Request object inside the log context of both onAuthenticationSuccess() and onAuthenticationFailure() at INFO level:
$this->logger->info('User has been authenticated successfully with Webauthn.', [
'request' => $request,
'firewallName' => $firewallName,
'identifier' => $token->getUserIdentifier(),
]);
$this->logger->info('Webauthn authentication request failed.', [
'request' => $request,
'exception' => $exception,
]);
Request::__toString() returns the raw HTTP message, including every request header. As soon as the configured logger normalises or stringifies the context (default behaviour for LineFormatter, JsonFormatter via NormalizerFormatter, etc.), sensitive headers such as Cookie (session identifier), Authorization and any custom auth header are written to the log stream in clear text.
Applications that forward logs to centralised platforms (ELK, Splunk, Datadog and similar) are particularly exposed: log access is typically broader than application access, which can allow log readers to hijack authenticated sessions.
Affected versions
Every release prior to 5.3.4 is affected.
Patches
The fix removes the full Request object from the log context and keeps only non-sensitive fields (request path, method, firewall name, user identifier). It is shipped in 5.3.4. Older branches will not receive a backport; users on those branches should upgrade to 5.3.4+ or apply one of the workarounds below.
Workarounds
Until the upgrade is applied, projects can:
- Raise the minimum log level for the WebAuthn authenticator above INFO so these two log records are not emitted in production.
- Configure their Monolog processor/formatter to strip the
requestkey from the context of these records before they are written.
Credit
Reported by Kay Joosten (Dawn Technology), maintainer of Stepup-Webauthn.
Attack profile
How easy it is to exploit
- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges needed
- None
- User interaction
- None
What an attacker can affect
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
Affected packages
| Package | Affected | Fixed |
|---|---|---|
web-auth/webauthn-symfony-bundlePackagist | before 5.3.4 | 5.3.4 |
web-auth/webauthn-symfony-bundlePackagist | before 5.3.4, plus listed versions 4.1.04.1.14.1.24.1.34.1.4 Show 45 moreShow less4.1.54.2.04.2.14.2.24.2.34.3.04.3.14.4.04.4.14.4.24.4.34.5.04.5.14.5.24.6.04.6.14.6.24.6.34.6.44.7.04.7.14.7.24.7.34.7.44.7.54.7.64.7.74.7.84.7.94.8.04.8.14.8.24.8.34.8.44.8.54.8.64.8.74.9.04.9.14.9.24.9.35.0.05.0.15.1.05.1.1 | 5.3.4 |
What each source reports
GitHub Advisories Score used 6.6
WebauthnAuthenticator leaks sensitive HTTP headers through INFO-level logs
Impact
Webauthn\Bundle\Security\Http\Authenticator\WebauthnAuthenticator logs the full Symfony\Component\HttpFoundation\Request object inside the log context of both onAuthenticationSuccess() and onAuthenticationFailure() at INFO level:
$this->logger->info('User has been authenticated successfully with Webauthn.', [
'request' => $request,
'firewallName' => $firewallName,
'identifier' => $token->getUserIdentifier(),
]);
$this->logger->info('Webauthn authentication request failed.', [
'request' => $request,
'exception' => $exception,
]);
Request::__toString() returns the raw HTTP message, including every request header. As soon as the configured logger normalises or stringifies the context (default behaviour for LineFormatter, JsonFormatter via NormalizerFormatter, etc.), sensitive headers such as Cookie (session identifier), Authorization and any custom auth header are written to the log stream in clear text.
Applications that forward logs to centralised platforms (ELK, Splunk, Datadog and similar) are particularly exposed: log access is typically broader than application access, which can allow log readers to hijack authenticated sessions.
Affected versions
Every release prior to 5.3.4 is affected.
Patches
The fix removes the full Request object from the log context and keeps only non-sensitive fields (request path, method, firewall name, user identifier). It is shipped in 5.3.4. Older branches will not receive a backport; users on those branches should upgrade to 5.3.4+ or apply one of the workarounds below.
Workarounds
Until the upgrade is applied, projects can:
- Raise the minimum log level for the WebAuthn authenticator above INFO so these two log records are not emitted in production.
- Configure their Monolog processor/formatter to strip the
requestkey from the context of these records before they are written.
Credit
Reported by Kay Joosten (Dawn Technology), maintainer of Stepup-Webauthn.
- Record
GHSA-q683-8468-r6h6- CVSS 4.0
- 6.6 Medium
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U - Weakness
- CWE-200, CWE-532
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSV 6.6
WebauthnAuthenticator leaks sensitive HTTP headers through INFO-level logs
Impact
Webauthn\Bundle\Security\Http\Authenticator\WebauthnAuthenticator logs the full Symfony\Component\HttpFoundation\Request object inside the log context of both onAuthenticationSuccess() and onAuthenticationFailure() at INFO level:
$this->logger->info('User has been authenticated successfully with Webauthn.', [
'request' => $request,
'firewallName' => $firewallName,
'identifier' => $token->getUserIdentifier(),
]);
$this->logger->info('Webauthn authentication request failed.', [
'request' => $request,
'exception' => $exception,
]);
Request::__toString() returns the raw HTTP message, including every request header. As soon as the configured logger normalises or stringifies the context (default behaviour for LineFormatter, JsonFormatter via NormalizerFormatter, etc.), sensitive headers such as Cookie (session identifier), Authorization and any custom auth header are written to the log stream in clear text.
Applications that forward logs to centralised platforms (ELK, Splunk, Datadog and similar) are particularly exposed: log access is typically broader than application access, which can allow log readers to hijack authenticated sessions.
Affected versions
Every release prior to 5.3.4 is affected.
Patches
The fix removes the full Request object from the log context and keeps only non-sensitive fields (request path, method, firewall name, user identifier). It is shipped in 5.3.4. Older branches will not receive a backport; users on those branches should upgrade to 5.3.4+ or apply one of the workarounds below.
Workarounds
Until the upgrade is applied, projects can:
- Raise the minimum log level for the WebAuthn authenticator above INFO so these two log records are not emitted in production.
- Configure their Monolog processor/formatter to strip the
requestkey from the context of these records before they are written.
Credit
Reported by Kay Joosten (Dawn Technology), maintainer of Stepup-Webauthn.
- Record
GHSA-q683-8468-r6h6- CVSS 4.0
- 6.6 Medium
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U - Weakness
- CWE-200, CWE-532
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
History
| Recorded | Changed | Sources |
|---|---|---|
| first indexed | GitHub Advisories, OSV |
Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.
References
Left out here: 70 versions. The JSON record has them.