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GHSA-q9m2-fhv9-3jcf

`potato-annotation` has a Project-Boundary Bypass

5.1 MediumFix available

GHSA-q9m2-fhv9-3jcf is a medium vulnerability (CVSS 5.1) in potato-annotation, published May 8, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. Fixed in potato-annotation 2.4.5.

What does this mean?
Severity
5.1 MediumCVSS 3.1, GitHub Advisories
Exploit chance
UnscoredNo EPSS score yet
Exploitation
None knownNot on CISA’s or ENISA’s lists

Description

Summary

validate_path_security uses string-prefix containment (startswith) for boundary checks. This allows paths that are outside the intended project directory but share its prefix string (e.g., /tmp/potato_proj_demo_evil/... vs /tmp/potato_proj_demo) to be accepted.

Details

Affected source location (root cause)

File: potato/server_utils/config_module.py

Snippet (lines 370–373):

real_path = os.path.realpath(normalized_path)
real_base = os.path.realpath(base_dir)
if not real_path.startswith(real_base):
    raise ConfigSecurityError(...)

Snippet (lines 384–389):

real_path = os.path.realpath(normalized_path)
check_dir = project_dir if project_dir else base_dir
real_check_dir = os.path.realpath(check_dir)
if not real_path.startswith(real_check_dir):
    raise ConfigSecurityError(...)

startswith() is string-based, so /tmp/potato_proj_demo_evil/... passes when checked against /tmp/potato_proj_demo.

Confirmed affected call sites

File: potato/server_utils/config_module.py

  1. validate_file_paths task_dir branch (line 2113)
validated_task_dir = validate_path_security(task_dir, project_dir)
  1. validate_file_paths data_files branch (line 2151)
validated_path = validate_path_security(file_path, base_dir, project_dir)
  1. validate_training_config training.data_file branch (line 2286)
validated_path = validate_path_security(data_file, base_dir, project_dir)

PoC

from potato.server_utils.config_module import validate_path_security

base = '/tmp/potato_proj_demo'
vuln = '/tmp/potato_proj_demo_evil/file.txt'

try:
    print('inside=', validate_path_security('/tmp/potato_proj_demo/file.txt', base, base))
except Exception as e:
    print('inside_error=', type(e).__name__, e)

try:
    validate_path_security('/tmp/other_demo/file.txt', base, base)
except Exception as e:
    print('baseline=', type(e).__name__, e)

print('trigger=', validate_path_security(vuln, base, base))

Impact

  • Can allow unauthorized sibling-prefix file access outside intended project boundary.
  • Can affect read paths (data_files, training.data_file, base_css, header_logo) and output/path placement depending on configuration.

Attack profile

How easy it is to exploit

Attack vector
Local
Complexity
Low
Privileges needed
None
User interaction
None

What an attacker can affect

Confidentiality
Low
Integrity
Low
Availability
None

Affected packages

Affected packages
PackageAffectedFixed
potato-annotation
PyPI
2.0.0 up to 2.4.5
2.4.5
potato-annotation
PyPI
2.0.0 up to 2.4.5, plus listed versions
2.0.12.0.22.1.02.2.02.3.0
Show 4 moreShow less
2.4.02.4.12.4.32.4.4
2.4.5

What each source reports

GitHub Advisories Score used5.1

`potato-annotation` has a Project-Boundary Bypass

Summary

validate_path_security uses string-prefix containment (startswith) for boundary checks. This allows paths that are outside the intended project directory but share its prefix string (e.g., /tmp/potato_proj_demo_evil/... vs /tmp/potato_proj_demo) to be accepted.

Details

Affected source location (root cause)

File: potato/server_utils/config_module.py

Snippet (lines 370–373):

real_path = os.path.realpath(normalized_path)
real_base = os.path.realpath(base_dir)
if not real_path.startswith(real_base):
    raise ConfigSecurityError(...)

Snippet (lines 384–389):

real_path = os.path.realpath(normalized_path)
check_dir = project_dir if project_dir else base_dir
real_check_dir = os.path.realpath(check_dir)
if not real_path.startswith(real_check_dir):
    raise ConfigSecurityError(...)

startswith() is string-based, so /tmp/potato_proj_demo_evil/... passes when checked against /tmp/potato_proj_demo.

Confirmed affected call sites

File: potato/server_utils/config_module.py

  1. validate_file_paths task_dir branch (line 2113)
validated_task_dir = validate_path_security(task_dir, project_dir)
  1. validate_file_paths data_files branch (line 2151)
validated_path = validate_path_security(file_path, base_dir, project_dir)
  1. validate_training_config training.data_file branch (line 2286)
validated_path = validate_path_security(data_file, base_dir, project_dir)

PoC

from potato.server_utils.config_module import validate_path_security

base = '/tmp/potato_proj_demo'
vuln = '/tmp/potato_proj_demo_evil/file.txt'

try:
    print('inside=', validate_path_security('/tmp/potato_proj_demo/file.txt', base, base))
except Exception as e:
    print('inside_error=', type(e).__name__, e)

try:
    validate_path_security('/tmp/other_demo/file.txt', base, base)
except Exception as e:
    print('baseline=', type(e).__name__, e)

print('trigger=', validate_path_security(vuln, base, base))

Impact

  • Can allow unauthorized sibling-prefix file access outside intended project boundary.
  • Can affect read paths (data_files, training.data_file, base_css, header_logo) and output/path placement depending on configuration.
Record
GHSA-q9m2-fhv9-3jcf
CVSS 3.1
5.1 MediumCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
Weakness
CWE-22
Updated
2026-11-02
OSV5.1

`potato-annotation` has a Project-Boundary Bypass

Summary

validate_path_security uses string-prefix containment (startswith) for boundary checks. This allows paths that are outside the intended project directory but share its prefix string (e.g., /tmp/potato_proj_demo_evil/... vs /tmp/potato_proj_demo) to be accepted.

Details

Affected source location (root cause)

File: potato/server_utils/config_module.py

Snippet (lines 370–373):

real_path = os.path.realpath(normalized_path)
real_base = os.path.realpath(base_dir)
if not real_path.startswith(real_base):
    raise ConfigSecurityError(...)

Snippet (lines 384–389):

real_path = os.path.realpath(normalized_path)
check_dir = project_dir if project_dir else base_dir
real_check_dir = os.path.realpath(check_dir)
if not real_path.startswith(real_check_dir):
    raise ConfigSecurityError(...)

startswith() is string-based, so /tmp/potato_proj_demo_evil/... passes when checked against /tmp/potato_proj_demo.

Confirmed affected call sites

File: potato/server_utils/config_module.py

  1. validate_file_paths task_dir branch (line 2113)
validated_task_dir = validate_path_security(task_dir, project_dir)
  1. validate_file_paths data_files branch (line 2151)
validated_path = validate_path_security(file_path, base_dir, project_dir)
  1. validate_training_config training.data_file branch (line 2286)
validated_path = validate_path_security(data_file, base_dir, project_dir)

PoC

from potato.server_utils.config_module import validate_path_security

base = '/tmp/potato_proj_demo'
vuln = '/tmp/potato_proj_demo_evil/file.txt'

try:
    print('inside=', validate_path_security('/tmp/potato_proj_demo/file.txt', base, base))
except Exception as e:
    print('inside_error=', type(e).__name__, e)

try:
    validate_path_security('/tmp/other_demo/file.txt', base, base)
except Exception as e:
    print('baseline=', type(e).__name__, e)

print('trigger=', validate_path_security(vuln, base, base))

Impact

  • Can allow unauthorized sibling-prefix file access outside intended project boundary.
  • Can affect read paths (data_files, training.data_file, base_css, header_logo) and output/path placement depending on configuration.
Record
GHSA-q9m2-fhv9-3jcf
CVSS 3.1
5.1 MediumCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
Weakness
CWE-22
Updated
2026-11-02

History

History
RecordedChangedSources
first indexedGitHub Advisories, OSV

Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.

References

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