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GHSA-qfc5-6r3j-jj22

Go package github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk module x/crisis does NOT cause chain halt

No score

GHSA-qfc5-6r3j-jj22 is a vulnerability with no CVSS score yet in github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk, published June 2, 2023. No source lists public exploit code. No source names a fixed version.

What does this mean?
Severity
UnratedNo CVSS score yet
Exploit chance
UnscoredNo EPSS score yet
Exploitation
None knownNot on CISA’s or ENISA’s lists
Fixed in
No fix listedNo source names one

Description

x/crisis does NOT cause chain halt

Impact

If an invariant check fails on a Cosmos SDK network and a transaction is sent to the x/crisis module to halt the chain, the chain does not halt. All versions of the x/crisis module is affected on all versions of the Cosmos SDK.

Details

The x/crisis module is supposed to allow anyone to halt a chain in the event of a violated invariant by sending a MsgVerifyInvariant with the name of the invariant. Processing this message is supposed to cause the nodes to panic. However, because the panic is within a transaction, it is caught by the SDK’s built-in panic-recovery machinery and just treated as a normal “invalid” transaction (ie. it returns a non-zero abci Code). Thus the x/crisis transactions don’t actually cause chains to halt. If there is an invariant violation, it can be confirmed with an x/crisis transaction, but it won’t cause any nodes to halt, they will just continue processing blocks.

That said, any node running with start --inv-check-period X will actually panic when it runs the periodic check (though it will still not panic just by processing an x/crisis transaction). Since this panic is located in EndBlock, it is not caught by the panic-recovery machinery and does actually crash the node. Presumably few if any nodes actually run with this in production because of how long the invariant checks take, and this runs all of them every X blocks.

Patches

No patches will be released.

The x/crisis module was originally intended to allow chains to halt rather than continue with some unknown behaviour in the case of an invariant violation (safety over liveness). However, as chains mature, and especially as the potential cost of halting increases, chains should consider carefully what invariants they really want to halt for, and what invariants are just sort of helpful sanity checks, but may not be worth halting for.

In some cases, chains have already broken the invariant calculations but have dealt with the consequences off-chain or during development. Halting these chains would be counter-productive.

The SDK team is working on new modules that allow chain developers to fine-tune the chain invariants and the necessary actions.

Hence, the decision was made that the x/crisis module will not be patched for chain halts. The module will be deprecated when new modules take over its responsibilities.

Workarounds

In case of a valid invariant check failure that requires a chain halt, the network validators are encouraged to coordinate off-chain for network halts. This has been an already established process for security patches.

References

SDK developer epic about invariant checking: https://github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/issues/15706 Public report: https://github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/issues/15325

Affected packages

Affected packages
PackageAffectedFixed
github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk
Go
through 0.47.2None known
github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk
Go
All versionsNone known

What each source reports

GitHub AdvisoriesNo score

Go package github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk module x/crisis does NOT cause chain halt

x/crisis does NOT cause chain halt

Impact

If an invariant check fails on a Cosmos SDK network and a transaction is sent to the x/crisis module to halt the chain, the chain does not halt. All versions of the x/crisis module is affected on all versions of the Cosmos SDK.

Details

The x/crisis module is supposed to allow anyone to halt a chain in the event of a violated invariant by sending a MsgVerifyInvariant with the name of the invariant. Processing this message is supposed to cause the nodes to panic. However, because the panic is within a transaction, it is caught by the SDK’s built-in panic-recovery machinery and just treated as a normal “invalid” transaction (ie. it returns a non-zero abci Code). Thus the x/crisis transactions don’t actually cause chains to halt. If there is an invariant violation, it can be confirmed with an x/crisis transaction, but it won’t cause any nodes to halt, they will just continue processing blocks.

That said, any node running with start --inv-check-period X will actually panic when it runs the periodic check (though it will still not panic just by processing an x/crisis transaction). Since this panic is located in EndBlock, it is not caught by the panic-recovery machinery and does actually crash the node. Presumably few if any nodes actually run with this in production because of how long the invariant checks take, and this runs all of them every X blocks.

Patches

No patches will be released.

The x/crisis module was originally intended to allow chains to halt rather than continue with some unknown behaviour in the case of an invariant violation (safety over liveness). However, as chains mature, and especially as the potential cost of halting increases, chains should consider carefully what invariants they really want to halt for, and what invariants are just sort of helpful sanity checks, but may not be worth halting for.

In some cases, chains have already broken the invariant calculations but have dealt with the consequences off-chain or during development. Halting these chains would be counter-productive.

The SDK team is working on new modules that allow chain developers to fine-tune the chain invariants and the necessary actions.

Hence, the decision was made that the x/crisis module will not be patched for chain halts. The module will be deprecated when new modules take over its responsibilities.

Workarounds

In case of a valid invariant check failure that requires a chain halt, the network validators are encouraged to coordinate off-chain for network halts. This has been an already established process for security patches.

References

SDK developer epic about invariant checking: https://github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/issues/15706 Public report: https://github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/issues/15325

Record
GHSA-qfc5-6r3j-jj22
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVNo score

Go package github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk module x/crisis does NOT cause chain halt

x/crisis does NOT cause chain halt

Impact

If an invariant check fails on a Cosmos SDK network and a transaction is sent to the x/crisis module to halt the chain, the chain does not halt. All versions of the x/crisis module is affected on all versions of the Cosmos SDK.

Details

The x/crisis module is supposed to allow anyone to halt a chain in the event of a violated invariant by sending a MsgVerifyInvariant with the name of the invariant. Processing this message is supposed to cause the nodes to panic. However, because the panic is within a transaction, it is caught by the SDK’s built-in panic-recovery machinery and just treated as a normal “invalid” transaction (ie. it returns a non-zero abci Code). Thus the x/crisis transactions don’t actually cause chains to halt. If there is an invariant violation, it can be confirmed with an x/crisis transaction, but it won’t cause any nodes to halt, they will just continue processing blocks.

That said, any node running with start --inv-check-period X will actually panic when it runs the periodic check (though it will still not panic just by processing an x/crisis transaction). Since this panic is located in EndBlock, it is not caught by the panic-recovery machinery and does actually crash the node. Presumably few if any nodes actually run with this in production because of how long the invariant checks take, and this runs all of them every X blocks.

Patches

No patches will be released.

The x/crisis module was originally intended to allow chains to halt rather than continue with some unknown behaviour in the case of an invariant violation (safety over liveness). However, as chains mature, and especially as the potential cost of halting increases, chains should consider carefully what invariants they really want to halt for, and what invariants are just sort of helpful sanity checks, but may not be worth halting for.

In some cases, chains have already broken the invariant calculations but have dealt with the consequences off-chain or during development. Halting these chains would be counter-productive.

The SDK team is working on new modules that allow chain developers to fine-tune the chain invariants and the necessary actions.

Hence, the decision was made that the x/crisis module will not be patched for chain halts. The module will be deprecated when new modules take over its responsibilities.

Workarounds

In case of a valid invariant check failure that requires a chain halt, the network validators are encouraged to coordinate off-chain for network halts. This has been an already established process for security patches.

References

SDK developer epic about invariant checking: https://github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/issues/15706 Public report: https://github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/issues/15325

Record
GHSA-qfc5-6r3j-jj22
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVGO-2023-1821No score

The x/crisis package does not cause chain halt in github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk

If an invariant check fails on a Cosmos SDK network, and a transaction is sent to the x/crisis package to halt the chain, the chain does not halt as originally intended.

No patch will be released, as the package is planned to be deprecated and replaced.

Record
GO-2023-1821
Updated
2026-11-02

History

History
RecordedChangedSources
first indexedGitHub Advisories, OSV

Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.

References

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