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GHSA-r4xh-jqrq-34v2

smol-toml: Quadratic-time parse() from parseKey rescanning to end of document on each key line

5.3 MediumFix available

GHSA-r4xh-jqrq-34v2 is a medium vulnerability (CVSS 5.3) in smol-toml, published October 5, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. Fixed in smol-toml 1.9.0.

What does this mean?
Severity
5.3 MediumCVSS 3.1, GitHub Advisories
Exploit chance
UnscoredNo EPSS score yet
Exploitation
None knownNot on CISA’s or ENISA’s lists
Fixed in
1.9.0smol-toml +2 more

Description

Summary

parse() has a quadratic-time path in parseKey, reachable on default options with ordinary valid input. For every key line and table-header line, parseKey (dist/struct.js, lines 58 and 86) finds the dotted-key separator with ctx.s.indexOf('.', ctx.p), where ctx.s is the whole document. When a key has no . ahead of it, that search runs all the way to the end of the input, and the result is then clamped back to the line terminator endPtr - so everything scanned past the current line is wasted. parseKey runs once per line, so a document of N dot-free keys costs O(n^2).

The most ordinary TOML shape triggers it: a flat list of key = value lines, or a repeated [[a]] table. No dotted keys, no special options, valid input throughout.

Proof of concept

import { parse } from 'smol-toml'

let doc = ''
for (let i = 0; i < 256000; i++) doc += 'k' + i + ' = 1\n'

console.time('parse')
parse(doc) // ~2.8 MB of valid TOML, default options
console.timeEnd('parse')

Doubling the line count roughly quadruples the time:

| lines | size | parse() | |---|---|---| | 32k | 0.3 MB | 0.3 s | | 64k | 0.7 MB | 1.0 s | | 128k | 1.4 MB | 3.5 s | | 256k | 2.8 MB | 14 s |

Impact

Any service that runs parse() on attacker-supplied TOML can be stalled. The work is synchronous, so it blocks the whole event loop, and the quadratic is unbounded: a ~7 MB body pins a core for about a minute, larger bodies for several.

Patches

Version 1.9.0 uses a different implementation for parsing keys which is strictly linear.

Workarounds

Limit the maximum document size accepted when parsing arbitrary documents.

Attack profile

How easy it is to exploit

Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges needed
None
User interaction
None

What an attacker can affect

Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
Low

Affected packages

Affected packages
PackageAffectedFixed
smol-toml
npm
through 1.8.0
1.9.0
smol-toml
TuxCare:npm
1.5.2-tuxcare.0 up to 1.5.2-tuxcare.2, plus listed versions
1.5.21.5.2-tuxcare.1
1.5.2-tuxcare.2
smol-toml
npm
before 1.9.0
1.9.0

What each source reports

GitHub Advisories Score used5.3

smol-toml: Quadratic-time parse() from parseKey rescanning to end of document on each key line

Summary

parse() has a quadratic-time path in parseKey, reachable on default options with ordinary valid input. For every key line and table-header line, parseKey (dist/struct.js, lines 58 and 86) finds the dotted-key separator with ctx.s.indexOf('.', ctx.p), where ctx.s is the whole document. When a key has no . ahead of it, that search runs all the way to the end of the input, and the result is then clamped back to the line terminator endPtr - so everything scanned past the current line is wasted. parseKey runs once per line, so a document of N dot-free keys costs O(n^2).

The most ordinary TOML shape triggers it: a flat list of key = value lines, or a repeated [[a]] table. No dotted keys, no special options, valid input throughout.

Proof of concept

import { parse } from 'smol-toml'

let doc = ''
for (let i = 0; i < 256000; i++) doc += 'k' + i + ' = 1\n'

console.time('parse')
parse(doc) // ~2.8 MB of valid TOML, default options
console.timeEnd('parse')

Doubling the line count roughly quadruples the time:

| lines | size | parse() | |---|---|---| | 32k | 0.3 MB | 0.3 s | | 64k | 0.7 MB | 1.0 s | | 128k | 1.4 MB | 3.5 s | | 256k | 2.8 MB | 14 s |

Impact

Any service that runs parse() on attacker-supplied TOML can be stalled. The work is synchronous, so it blocks the whole event loop, and the quadratic is unbounded: a ~7 MB body pins a core for about a minute, larger bodies for several.

Patches

Version 1.9.0 uses a different implementation for parsing keys which is strictly linear.

Workarounds

Limit the maximum document size accepted when parsing arbitrary documents.

Record
GHSA-r4xh-jqrq-34v2
CVSS 3.1
5.3 MediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
Weakness
CWE-407
Updated
2026-11-02
OSV5.3

smol-toml: Quadratic-time parse() from parseKey rescanning to end of document on each key line

Summary

parse() has a quadratic-time path in parseKey, reachable on default options with ordinary valid input. For every key line and table-header line, parseKey (dist/struct.js, lines 58 and 86) finds the dotted-key separator with ctx.s.indexOf('.', ctx.p), where ctx.s is the whole document. When a key has no . ahead of it, that search runs all the way to the end of the input, and the result is then clamped back to the line terminator endPtr - so everything scanned past the current line is wasted. parseKey runs once per line, so a document of N dot-free keys costs O(n^2).

The most ordinary TOML shape triggers it: a flat list of key = value lines, or a repeated [[a]] table. No dotted keys, no special options, valid input throughout.

Proof of concept

import { parse } from 'smol-toml'

let doc = ''
for (let i = 0; i < 256000; i++) doc += 'k' + i + ' = 1\n'

console.time('parse')
parse(doc) // ~2.8 MB of valid TOML, default options
console.timeEnd('parse')

Doubling the line count roughly quadruples the time:

| lines | size | parse() | |---|---|---| | 32k | 0.3 MB | 0.3 s | | 64k | 0.7 MB | 1.0 s | | 128k | 1.4 MB | 3.5 s | | 256k | 2.8 MB | 14 s |

Impact

Any service that runs parse() on attacker-supplied TOML can be stalled. The work is synchronous, so it blocks the whole event loop, and the quadratic is unbounded: a ~7 MB body pins a core for about a minute, larger bodies for several.

Patches

Version 1.9.0 uses a different implementation for parsing keys which is strictly linear.

Workarounds

Limit the maximum document size accepted when parsing arbitrary documents.

Record
GHSA-r4xh-jqrq-34v2
CVSS 3.1
5.3 MediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
Weakness
CWE-407
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVCLSA-2026-1791282839No score

TuxCare security update for smol-toml (1 CVE)

TuxCare rebuilt smol-toml to address 1 CVE. Fixed in 1.5.2-tuxcare.2.

Record
CLSA-2026-1791282839
Updated
2026-11-02

History

History
RecordedChangedSources
first indexedGitHub Advisories, OSV

Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.

References

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