GHSA-r4xh-jqrq-34v2
smol-toml: Quadratic-time parse() from parseKey rescanning to end of document on each key line
GHSA-r4xh-jqrq-34v2 is a medium vulnerability (CVSS 5.3) in smol-toml, published October 5, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. Fixed in smol-toml 1.9.0.
- Severity
- 5.3 MediumCVSS 3.1, GitHub Advisories
- Exploit chance
- UnscoredNo EPSS score yet
- Exploitation
- None knownNot on CISA’s or ENISA’s lists
- Fixed in
1.9.0smol-toml +2 more
Description
Summary
parse() has a quadratic-time path in parseKey, reachable on default options with ordinary valid input. For every key line and table-header line, parseKey (dist/struct.js, lines 58 and 86) finds the dotted-key separator with ctx.s.indexOf('.', ctx.p), where ctx.s is the whole document. When a key has no . ahead of it, that search runs all the way to the end of the input, and the result is then clamped back to the line terminator endPtr - so everything scanned past the current line is wasted. parseKey runs once per line, so a document of N dot-free keys costs O(n^2).
The most ordinary TOML shape triggers it: a flat list of key = value lines, or a repeated [[a]] table. No dotted keys, no special options, valid input throughout.
Proof of concept
import { parse } from 'smol-toml'
let doc = ''
for (let i = 0; i < 256000; i++) doc += 'k' + i + ' = 1\n'
console.time('parse')
parse(doc) // ~2.8 MB of valid TOML, default options
console.timeEnd('parse')
Doubling the line count roughly quadruples the time:
| lines | size | parse() | |---|---|---| | 32k | 0.3 MB | 0.3 s | | 64k | 0.7 MB | 1.0 s | | 128k | 1.4 MB | 3.5 s | | 256k | 2.8 MB | 14 s |
Impact
Any service that runs parse() on attacker-supplied TOML can be stalled. The work is synchronous, so it blocks the whole event loop, and the quadratic is unbounded: a ~7 MB body pins a core for about a minute, larger bodies for several.
Patches
Version 1.9.0 uses a different implementation for parsing keys which is strictly linear.
Workarounds
Limit the maximum document size accepted when parsing arbitrary documents.
Attack profile
How easy it is to exploit
- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges needed
- None
- User interaction
- None
What an attacker can affect
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- Low
Affected packages
What each source reports
GitHub Advisories Score used 5.3
smol-toml: Quadratic-time parse() from parseKey rescanning to end of document on each key line
Summary
parse() has a quadratic-time path in parseKey, reachable on default options with ordinary valid input. For every key line and table-header line, parseKey (dist/struct.js, lines 58 and 86) finds the dotted-key separator with ctx.s.indexOf('.', ctx.p), where ctx.s is the whole document. When a key has no . ahead of it, that search runs all the way to the end of the input, and the result is then clamped back to the line terminator endPtr - so everything scanned past the current line is wasted. parseKey runs once per line, so a document of N dot-free keys costs O(n^2).
The most ordinary TOML shape triggers it: a flat list of key = value lines, or a repeated [[a]] table. No dotted keys, no special options, valid input throughout.
Proof of concept
import { parse } from 'smol-toml'
let doc = ''
for (let i = 0; i < 256000; i++) doc += 'k' + i + ' = 1\n'
console.time('parse')
parse(doc) // ~2.8 MB of valid TOML, default options
console.timeEnd('parse')
Doubling the line count roughly quadruples the time:
| lines | size | parse() | |---|---|---| | 32k | 0.3 MB | 0.3 s | | 64k | 0.7 MB | 1.0 s | | 128k | 1.4 MB | 3.5 s | | 256k | 2.8 MB | 14 s |
Impact
Any service that runs parse() on attacker-supplied TOML can be stalled. The work is synchronous, so it blocks the whole event loop, and the quadratic is unbounded: a ~7 MB body pins a core for about a minute, larger bodies for several.
Patches
Version 1.9.0 uses a different implementation for parsing keys which is strictly linear.
Workarounds
Limit the maximum document size accepted when parsing arbitrary documents.
- Record
GHSA-r4xh-jqrq-34v2- CVSS 3.1
- 5.3 Medium
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L - Weakness
- CWE-407
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSV 5.3
smol-toml: Quadratic-time parse() from parseKey rescanning to end of document on each key line
Summary
parse() has a quadratic-time path in parseKey, reachable on default options with ordinary valid input. For every key line and table-header line, parseKey (dist/struct.js, lines 58 and 86) finds the dotted-key separator with ctx.s.indexOf('.', ctx.p), where ctx.s is the whole document. When a key has no . ahead of it, that search runs all the way to the end of the input, and the result is then clamped back to the line terminator endPtr - so everything scanned past the current line is wasted. parseKey runs once per line, so a document of N dot-free keys costs O(n^2).
The most ordinary TOML shape triggers it: a flat list of key = value lines, or a repeated [[a]] table. No dotted keys, no special options, valid input throughout.
Proof of concept
import { parse } from 'smol-toml'
let doc = ''
for (let i = 0; i < 256000; i++) doc += 'k' + i + ' = 1\n'
console.time('parse')
parse(doc) // ~2.8 MB of valid TOML, default options
console.timeEnd('parse')
Doubling the line count roughly quadruples the time:
| lines | size | parse() | |---|---|---| | 32k | 0.3 MB | 0.3 s | | 64k | 0.7 MB | 1.0 s | | 128k | 1.4 MB | 3.5 s | | 256k | 2.8 MB | 14 s |
Impact
Any service that runs parse() on attacker-supplied TOML can be stalled. The work is synchronous, so it blocks the whole event loop, and the quadratic is unbounded: a ~7 MB body pins a core for about a minute, larger bodies for several.
Patches
Version 1.9.0 uses a different implementation for parsing keys which is strictly linear.
Workarounds
Limit the maximum document size accepted when parsing arbitrary documents.
- Record
GHSA-r4xh-jqrq-34v2- CVSS 3.1
- 5.3 Medium
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L - Weakness
- CWE-407
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVCLSA-2026-1791282839No score
TuxCare security update for smol-toml (1 CVE)
TuxCare rebuilt smol-toml to address 1 CVE. Fixed in 1.5.2-tuxcare.2.
- Record
CLSA-2026-1791282839- Updated
- 2026-11-02
History
| Recorded | Changed | Sources |
|---|---|---|
| first indexed | GitHub Advisories, OSV |
Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.