GHSA-w5w5-2882-47pc
github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk's x/crisis does not charge ConstantFee
x/crisis does not charge ConstantFee
Impact
If a transaction is sent to the x/crisis module to check an invariant, the ConstantFee parameter of the chain is NOT charged. All versions of the x/crisis module are affected on all versions of the Cosmos SDK.
Details
The x/crisis module is supposed to allow anyone to halt a chain in the event of a violated invariant by sending a MsgVerifyInvariant with the name of the invariant. Processing this message takes extra processing power hence a ConstantFee was introduced on the chain that is charged as extra from the reporter for the extra computational work. This is supposed to avert spammers on the chain making nodes do extra computations using this transaction. By not charging the ConstantFee, the transactions related to invariant checking are relatively cheaper compared to the computational need and other transactions.
That said, the submitter still has to pay the transaction fee to put the transaction on the network, hence using this weakness for spamming is limited by the usual mechanisms.
Synthetic testing showed up to a 20% increase in CPU usage on a validator node that is spammed by hundreds of MsgVerifyInvariant messages which still makes this an expensive operation to carry out on a live blockchain network.
Patches
The ConstantFee charge of the x/crisis module will either be fixed or disabled in an upcoming regular release of the Cosmos SDK.
The x/crisis module was originally intended to allow chains to halt rather than continue with some unknown behavior in the case of an invariant violation (safety over liveness). However, as chains mature, and especially as the potential cost of halting increases, chains should consider carefully what invariants they really want to halt for, and what invariants are just sort of helpful sanity checks.
The SDK team is working on new modules that allow chain developers to fine-tune the chain invariants and the necessary actions.
Hence, the decision was made that the x/crisis module will be deprecated when new modules take over its responsibilities.
Workarounds
There is no workaround posted. Validators are advised to leave some extra computing room on their servers for possible spamming scenarios. (This is a good measure in any case.)
References
SDK developer epic about invariant checking: https://github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/issues/15706
What each source reports
GitHub AdvisoriesNo score
github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk's x/crisis does not charge ConstantFee
x/crisis does not charge ConstantFee
Impact
If a transaction is sent to the x/crisis module to check an invariant, the ConstantFee parameter of the chain is NOT charged. All versions of the x/crisis module are affected on all versions of the Cosmos SDK.
Details
The x/crisis module is supposed to allow anyone to halt a chain in the event of a violated invariant by sending a MsgVerifyInvariant with the name of the invariant. Processing this message takes extra processing power hence a ConstantFee was introduced on the chain that is charged as extra from the reporter for the extra computational work. This is supposed to avert spammers on the chain making nodes do extra computations using this transaction. By not charging the ConstantFee, the transactions related to invariant checking are relatively cheaper compared to the computational need and other transactions.
That said, the submitter still has to pay the transaction fee to put the transaction on the network, hence using this weakness for spamming is limited by the usual mechanisms.
Synthetic testing showed up to a 20% increase in CPU usage on a validator node that is spammed by hundreds of MsgVerifyInvariant messages which still makes this an expensive operation to carry out on a live blockchain network.
Patches
The ConstantFee charge of the x/crisis module will either be fixed or disabled in an upcoming regular release of the Cosmos SDK.
The x/crisis module was originally intended to allow chains to halt rather than continue with some unknown behavior in the case of an invariant violation (safety over liveness). However, as chains mature, and especially as the potential cost of halting increases, chains should consider carefully what invariants they really want to halt for, and what invariants are just sort of helpful sanity checks.
The SDK team is working on new modules that allow chain developers to fine-tune the chain invariants and the necessary actions.
Hence, the decision was made that the x/crisis module will be deprecated when new modules take over its responsibilities.
Workarounds
There is no workaround posted. Validators are advised to leave some extra computing room on their servers for possible spamming scenarios. (This is a good measure in any case.)
References
SDK developer epic about invariant checking: https://github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/issues/15706
- Record
GHSA-w5w5-2882-47pc- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVNo score
github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk's x/crisis does not charge ConstantFee
x/crisis does not charge ConstantFee
Impact
If a transaction is sent to the x/crisis module to check an invariant, the ConstantFee parameter of the chain is NOT charged. All versions of the x/crisis module are affected on all versions of the Cosmos SDK.
Details
The x/crisis module is supposed to allow anyone to halt a chain in the event of a violated invariant by sending a MsgVerifyInvariant with the name of the invariant. Processing this message takes extra processing power hence a ConstantFee was introduced on the chain that is charged as extra from the reporter for the extra computational work. This is supposed to avert spammers on the chain making nodes do extra computations using this transaction. By not charging the ConstantFee, the transactions related to invariant checking are relatively cheaper compared to the computational need and other transactions.
That said, the submitter still has to pay the transaction fee to put the transaction on the network, hence using this weakness for spamming is limited by the usual mechanisms.
Synthetic testing showed up to a 20% increase in CPU usage on a validator node that is spammed by hundreds of MsgVerifyInvariant messages which still makes this an expensive operation to carry out on a live blockchain network.
Patches
The ConstantFee charge of the x/crisis module will either be fixed or disabled in an upcoming regular release of the Cosmos SDK.
The x/crisis module was originally intended to allow chains to halt rather than continue with some unknown behavior in the case of an invariant violation (safety over liveness). However, as chains mature, and especially as the potential cost of halting increases, chains should consider carefully what invariants they really want to halt for, and what invariants are just sort of helpful sanity checks.
The SDK team is working on new modules that allow chain developers to fine-tune the chain invariants and the necessary actions.
Hence, the decision was made that the x/crisis module will be deprecated when new modules take over its responsibilities.
Workarounds
There is no workaround posted. Validators are advised to leave some extra computing room on their servers for possible spamming scenarios. (This is a good measure in any case.)
References
SDK developer epic about invariant checking: https://github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/issues/15706
- Record
GHSA-w5w5-2882-47pc- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVGO-2023-1881No score
The x/crisis package does not charge ConstantFee in github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk
If a transaction is sent to the x/crisis module to check an invariant, the ConstantFee parameter of the chain is not charged.
No patch will be released, as the package is planned to be deprecated and replaced.
- Record
GO-2023-1881- Updated
- 2026-11-02
Affected packages
| Package | Affected | Fixed |
|---|---|---|
github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdkGo | through 0.50.0-alpha.1 | None known |
github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdkGo | All versions | None known |
History
| Recorded | Changed | Sources |
|---|---|---|
| first indexed | GitHub Advisories, OSV |
Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.
In short
GHSA-w5w5-2882-47pc is a vulnerability with no CVSS score yet in github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk, published June 30, 2023. No source lists public exploit code. No source names a fixed version.