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GHSA-w5w5-2882-47pc

github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk's x/crisis does not charge ConstantFee

No score

x/crisis does not charge ConstantFee

Impact

If a transaction is sent to the x/crisis module to check an invariant, the ConstantFee parameter of the chain is NOT charged. All versions of the x/crisis module are affected on all versions of the Cosmos SDK.

Details

The x/crisis module is supposed to allow anyone to halt a chain in the event of a violated invariant by sending a MsgVerifyInvariant with the name of the invariant. Processing this message takes extra processing power hence a ConstantFee was introduced on the chain that is charged as extra from the reporter for the extra computational work. This is supposed to avert spammers on the chain making nodes do extra computations using this transaction. By not charging the ConstantFee, the transactions related to invariant checking are relatively cheaper compared to the computational need and other transactions.

That said, the submitter still has to pay the transaction fee to put the transaction on the network, hence using this weakness for spamming is limited by the usual mechanisms.

Synthetic testing showed up to a 20% increase in CPU usage on a validator node that is spammed by hundreds of MsgVerifyInvariant messages which still makes this an expensive operation to carry out on a live blockchain network.

Patches

The ConstantFee charge of the x/crisis module will either be fixed or disabled in an upcoming regular release of the Cosmos SDK.

The x/crisis module was originally intended to allow chains to halt rather than continue with some unknown behavior in the case of an invariant violation (safety over liveness). However, as chains mature, and especially as the potential cost of halting increases, chains should consider carefully what invariants they really want to halt for, and what invariants are just sort of helpful sanity checks.

The SDK team is working on new modules that allow chain developers to fine-tune the chain invariants and the necessary actions.

Hence, the decision was made that the x/crisis module will be deprecated when new modules take over its responsibilities.

Workarounds

There is no workaround posted. Validators are advised to leave some extra computing room on their servers for possible spamming scenarios. (This is a good measure in any case.)

References

SDK developer epic about invariant checking: https://github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/issues/15706

What each source reports

GitHub AdvisoriesNo score

github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk's x/crisis does not charge ConstantFee

x/crisis does not charge ConstantFee

Impact

If a transaction is sent to the x/crisis module to check an invariant, the ConstantFee parameter of the chain is NOT charged. All versions of the x/crisis module are affected on all versions of the Cosmos SDK.

Details

The x/crisis module is supposed to allow anyone to halt a chain in the event of a violated invariant by sending a MsgVerifyInvariant with the name of the invariant. Processing this message takes extra processing power hence a ConstantFee was introduced on the chain that is charged as extra from the reporter for the extra computational work. This is supposed to avert spammers on the chain making nodes do extra computations using this transaction. By not charging the ConstantFee, the transactions related to invariant checking are relatively cheaper compared to the computational need and other transactions.

That said, the submitter still has to pay the transaction fee to put the transaction on the network, hence using this weakness for spamming is limited by the usual mechanisms.

Synthetic testing showed up to a 20% increase in CPU usage on a validator node that is spammed by hundreds of MsgVerifyInvariant messages which still makes this an expensive operation to carry out on a live blockchain network.

Patches

The ConstantFee charge of the x/crisis module will either be fixed or disabled in an upcoming regular release of the Cosmos SDK.

The x/crisis module was originally intended to allow chains to halt rather than continue with some unknown behavior in the case of an invariant violation (safety over liveness). However, as chains mature, and especially as the potential cost of halting increases, chains should consider carefully what invariants they really want to halt for, and what invariants are just sort of helpful sanity checks.

The SDK team is working on new modules that allow chain developers to fine-tune the chain invariants and the necessary actions.

Hence, the decision was made that the x/crisis module will be deprecated when new modules take over its responsibilities.

Workarounds

There is no workaround posted. Validators are advised to leave some extra computing room on their servers for possible spamming scenarios. (This is a good measure in any case.)

References

SDK developer epic about invariant checking: https://github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/issues/15706

Record
GHSA-w5w5-2882-47pc
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVNo score

github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk's x/crisis does not charge ConstantFee

x/crisis does not charge ConstantFee

Impact

If a transaction is sent to the x/crisis module to check an invariant, the ConstantFee parameter of the chain is NOT charged. All versions of the x/crisis module are affected on all versions of the Cosmos SDK.

Details

The x/crisis module is supposed to allow anyone to halt a chain in the event of a violated invariant by sending a MsgVerifyInvariant with the name of the invariant. Processing this message takes extra processing power hence a ConstantFee was introduced on the chain that is charged as extra from the reporter for the extra computational work. This is supposed to avert spammers on the chain making nodes do extra computations using this transaction. By not charging the ConstantFee, the transactions related to invariant checking are relatively cheaper compared to the computational need and other transactions.

That said, the submitter still has to pay the transaction fee to put the transaction on the network, hence using this weakness for spamming is limited by the usual mechanisms.

Synthetic testing showed up to a 20% increase in CPU usage on a validator node that is spammed by hundreds of MsgVerifyInvariant messages which still makes this an expensive operation to carry out on a live blockchain network.

Patches

The ConstantFee charge of the x/crisis module will either be fixed or disabled in an upcoming regular release of the Cosmos SDK.

The x/crisis module was originally intended to allow chains to halt rather than continue with some unknown behavior in the case of an invariant violation (safety over liveness). However, as chains mature, and especially as the potential cost of halting increases, chains should consider carefully what invariants they really want to halt for, and what invariants are just sort of helpful sanity checks.

The SDK team is working on new modules that allow chain developers to fine-tune the chain invariants and the necessary actions.

Hence, the decision was made that the x/crisis module will be deprecated when new modules take over its responsibilities.

Workarounds

There is no workaround posted. Validators are advised to leave some extra computing room on their servers for possible spamming scenarios. (This is a good measure in any case.)

References

SDK developer epic about invariant checking: https://github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk/issues/15706

Record
GHSA-w5w5-2882-47pc
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVGO-2023-1881No score

The x/crisis package does not charge ConstantFee in github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk

If a transaction is sent to the x/crisis module to check an invariant, the ConstantFee parameter of the chain is not charged.

No patch will be released, as the package is planned to be deprecated and replaced.

Record
GO-2023-1881
Updated
2026-11-02

Affected packages

Affected packages
PackageAffectedFixed
github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk
Go
through 0.50.0-alpha.1None known
github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk
Go
All versionsNone known

History

History
RecordedChangedSources
first indexedGitHub Advisories, OSV

Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.

In short

GHSA-w5w5-2882-47pc is a vulnerability with no CVSS score yet in github.com/cosmos/cosmos-sdk, published June 30, 2023. No source lists public exploit code. No source names a fixed version.

References

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