GHSA-xm96-gfjx-jcrc
ORAS Java: Path traversal in pullArtifact via attacker-controlled org.opencontainers.image.title annotation
GHSA-xm96-gfjx-jcrc is a high vulnerability (CVSS 8.1) in land.oras:oras-java-sdk, published May 19, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. Fixed in land.oras:oras-java-sdk 0.6.2.
- Severity
- 8.1 HighCVSS 3.1, GitHub Advisories
- Exploit chance
- UnscoredNo EPSS score yet
- Exploitation
- None knownNot on CISA’s or ENISA’s lists
- Fixed in
0.6.2land.oras:oras-java-sdk +1 more
Description
Summary
The pullArtifact methods in Registry and OCILayout use the org.opencontainers.image.title annotation from a pulled manifest as a filename, resolving it against the caller supplied output directory without normalization or a containment check. A manifest publisher can set this annotation to a path that escapes the output directory, causing the SDK to write the layer's blob anywhere the JVM process can write.
Details
Two call sites are affected.
src/main/java/land/oras/Registry.java, pullLayer (reached from Registry.pullArtifact):
Path targetPath = path.resolve(layer.getAnnotations().get(Const.ANNOTATION_TITLE));
...
Files.copy(is, targetPath, StandardCopyOption.REPLACE_EXISTING);
src/main/java/land/oras/OCILayout.java, OCILayout.pullArtifact:
Files.copy(blobPath, path.resolve(layer.getAnnotations().get(Const.ANNOTATION_TITLE)));
The annotation comes from the remote manifest. Path.resolve treats an absolute argument as a full override of the base, and follows .. segments upward, so the annotation controls the destination. REPLACE_EXISTING overwrites files that exist at that destination.
The unpack branch of pullLayer (taken when the layer carries io.deis.oras.content.unpack=true) is not affected, because it dispatches through ArchiveUtils.untar / unzip, which apply outputPath.startsWith(normalizedTarget) after normalization. The non unpack branch and OCILayout.pullArtifact lack the equivalent check.
fetchBlob(ContainerRef, Path) is not affected. The caller passes the destination path and the title annotation is not consulted.
Attack profile
How easy it is to exploit
- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges needed
- None
- User interaction
- Required
What an attacker can affect
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
Affected packages
| Package | Affected | Fixed |
|---|---|---|
land.oras:oras-java-sdkMaven | through 0.6.1 | 0.6.2 |
land.oras:oras-java-sdkMaven | before 0.6.2, plus listed versions 0.2.00.2.10.2.100.2.110.2.12 Show 24 moreShow less0.2.130.2.140.2.150.2.160.2.20.2.30.2.40.2.50.2.60.2.70.2.80.2.90.3.00.3.10.3.20.3.30.4.00.4.10.4.20.5.00.5.10.5.20.6.00.6.1 | 0.6.2 |
What each source reports
GitHub Advisories Score used 8.1
ORAS Java: Path traversal in pullArtifact via attacker-controlled org.opencontainers.image.title annotation
Summary
The pullArtifact methods in Registry and OCILayout use the org.opencontainers.image.title annotation from a pulled manifest as a filename, resolving it against the caller supplied output directory without normalization or a containment check. A manifest publisher can set this annotation to a path that escapes the output directory, causing the SDK to write the layer's blob anywhere the JVM process can write.
Details
Two call sites are affected.
src/main/java/land/oras/Registry.java, pullLayer (reached from Registry.pullArtifact):
Path targetPath = path.resolve(layer.getAnnotations().get(Const.ANNOTATION_TITLE));
...
Files.copy(is, targetPath, StandardCopyOption.REPLACE_EXISTING);
src/main/java/land/oras/OCILayout.java, OCILayout.pullArtifact:
Files.copy(blobPath, path.resolve(layer.getAnnotations().get(Const.ANNOTATION_TITLE)));
The annotation comes from the remote manifest. Path.resolve treats an absolute argument as a full override of the base, and follows .. segments upward, so the annotation controls the destination. REPLACE_EXISTING overwrites files that exist at that destination.
The unpack branch of pullLayer (taken when the layer carries io.deis.oras.content.unpack=true) is not affected, because it dispatches through ArchiveUtils.untar / unzip, which apply outputPath.startsWith(normalizedTarget) after normalization. The non unpack branch and OCILayout.pullArtifact lack the equivalent check.
fetchBlob(ContainerRef, Path) is not affected. The caller passes the destination path and the title annotation is not consulted.
- Record
GHSA-xm96-gfjx-jcrc- CVSS 3.1
- 8.1 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-22
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSV 8.1
ORAS Java: Path traversal in pullArtifact via attacker-controlled org.opencontainers.image.title annotation
Summary
The pullArtifact methods in Registry and OCILayout use the org.opencontainers.image.title annotation from a pulled manifest as a filename, resolving it against the caller supplied output directory without normalization or a containment check. A manifest publisher can set this annotation to a path that escapes the output directory, causing the SDK to write the layer's blob anywhere the JVM process can write.
Details
Two call sites are affected.
src/main/java/land/oras/Registry.java, pullLayer (reached from Registry.pullArtifact):
Path targetPath = path.resolve(layer.getAnnotations().get(Const.ANNOTATION_TITLE));
...
Files.copy(is, targetPath, StandardCopyOption.REPLACE_EXISTING);
src/main/java/land/oras/OCILayout.java, OCILayout.pullArtifact:
Files.copy(blobPath, path.resolve(layer.getAnnotations().get(Const.ANNOTATION_TITLE)));
The annotation comes from the remote manifest. Path.resolve treats an absolute argument as a full override of the base, and follows .. segments upward, so the annotation controls the destination. REPLACE_EXISTING overwrites files that exist at that destination.
The unpack branch of pullLayer (taken when the layer carries io.deis.oras.content.unpack=true) is not affected, because it dispatches through ArchiveUtils.untar / unzip, which apply outputPath.startsWith(normalizedTarget) after normalization. The non unpack branch and OCILayout.pullArtifact lack the equivalent check.
fetchBlob(ContainerRef, Path) is not affected. The caller passes the destination path and the title annotation is not consulted.
- Record
GHSA-xm96-gfjx-jcrc- CVSS 3.1
- 8.1 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H - Weakness
- CWE-22
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
History
| Recorded | Changed | Sources |
|---|---|---|
| first indexed | GitHub Advisories, OSV |
Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.