RUSTSEC-2026-0194
Quadratic run time when checking a start tag for duplicate attribute names
BytesStart::attributes() returns an Attributes iterator which, by default
(with_checks(true)), rejects a start tag that repeats an attribute name. For
each attribute yielded, the iterator compared the new name against every name
seen so far in the same tag using a linear scan, so a start tag with N
distinct attribute names cost O(N²) byte comparisons. There was no bound on
N other than the size of the buffered start tag.
Impact
Any code that parses untrusted XML and iterates a start tag's attributes with
the default duplicate check enabled can be made to spend CPU time quadratic in
the number of attributes on a single tag. Because the check is pure computation
with no .await/I/O, an I/O-based timeout on the consumer (for example a read
or request timeout) cannot interrupt it while it runs.
Measured cost of a single start tag, release build:
| Attributes on one tag | Time | |---|---| | 80,000 | ~6 s | | 800,000 | ~10 min |
The cost grows with the square of the attribute count, so a start tag of a few tens of megabytes can stall a parsing thread for hours. No memory is exhausted and the parser does not crash; the effect is CPU exhaustion on the thread doing the parsing: a single crafted start tag can pin a CPU core for minutes to hours, denying service to that worker. A deployment that places a wall-clock bound on parsing, or confines it to a non-critical thread, may consider the availability impact lower.
Affected code paths
BytesStart::attributes()/Attributesiterated with checks enabled (the default), andBytesStart::try_get_attribute.NsReader, which resolves namespaces by iterating a tag's attributes and so reaches the same check internally.
Consumers that iterate attributes with .attributes().with_checks(false) and do
not use NsReader are not affected.
This was reported as reachable by a remote, unauthenticated attacker in a
real-world RPKI relying party (NLnet Labs Routinator) via a crafted RRDP
snapshot.xml.
Remediation
Upgrade to quick-xml >= 0.41.0, where the duplicate check keeps the linear
scan for start tags with a small number of attributes and switches to an O(1)
hash pre-filter above a threshold, making the whole tag O(N). The reported
AttrError::Duplicated positions are unchanged.
If upgrading is not possible and duplicate-name detection is not required,
disable it with .attributes().with_checks(false) (this does not help
NsReader consumers, which have no equivalent opt-out before 0.41.0).
Attack profile
How easy it is to exploit
- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges needed
- None
- User interaction
- None
What an attacker can affect
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- High
What each source reports
OSV Score used
7.5
Quadratic run time when checking a start tag for duplicate attribute names
BytesStart::attributes() returns an Attributes iterator which, by default
(with_checks(true)), rejects a start tag that repeats an attribute name. For
each attribute yielded, the iterator compared the new name against every name
seen so far in the same tag using a linear scan, so a start tag with N
distinct attribute names cost O(N²) byte comparisons. There was no bound on
N other than the size of the buffered start tag.
Impact
Any code that parses untrusted XML and iterates a start tag's attributes with
the default duplicate check enabled can be made to spend CPU time quadratic in
the number of attributes on a single tag. Because the check is pure computation
with no .await/I/O, an I/O-based timeout on the consumer (for example a read
or request timeout) cannot interrupt it while it runs.
Measured cost of a single start tag, release build:
| Attributes on one tag | Time | |---|---| | 80,000 | ~6 s | | 800,000 | ~10 min |
The cost grows with the square of the attribute count, so a start tag of a few tens of megabytes can stall a parsing thread for hours. No memory is exhausted and the parser does not crash; the effect is CPU exhaustion on the thread doing the parsing: a single crafted start tag can pin a CPU core for minutes to hours, denying service to that worker. A deployment that places a wall-clock bound on parsing, or confines it to a non-critical thread, may consider the availability impact lower.
Affected code paths
BytesStart::attributes()/Attributesiterated with checks enabled (the default), andBytesStart::try_get_attribute.NsReader, which resolves namespaces by iterating a tag's attributes and so reaches the same check internally.
Consumers that iterate attributes with .attributes().with_checks(false) and do
not use NsReader are not affected.
This was reported as reachable by a remote, unauthenticated attacker in a
real-world RPKI relying party (NLnet Labs Routinator) via a crafted RRDP
snapshot.xml.
Remediation
Upgrade to quick-xml >= 0.41.0, where the duplicate check keeps the linear
scan for start tags with a small number of attributes and switches to an O(1)
hash pre-filter above a threshold, making the whole tag O(N). The reported
AttrError::Duplicated positions are unchanged.
If upgrading is not possible and duplicate-name detection is not required,
disable it with .attributes().with_checks(false) (this does not help
NsReader consumers, which have no equivalent opt-out before 0.41.0).
- Record
RUSTSEC-2026-0194- CVSS 3.1
- 7.5 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H - Updated
- 2026-11-02
Affected packages
| Package | Affected | Fixed |
|---|---|---|
quick-xmlcrates.io |
0.0.0-0 up to 0.41.0 | 0.41.0 |
History
| Recorded | Changed | Sources |
|---|---|---|
| first indexed | OSV |
Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.
In short
RUSTSEC-2026-0194 is a high vulnerability (CVSS 7.5) in quick-xml, published June 29, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. Fixed in quick-xml 0.41.0.