RUSTSEC-2026-0199
Panic in `bcrypt::verify` on non-ASCII hash input
bcrypt::verify(password, hash) and HashParts::from_str(hash) panic in
str::slice_error_fail when given a 60-byte &str containing a multi-byte
UTF-8 character at certain byte positions.
Impact
Any Rust code that calls bcrypt::verify (or HashParts::from_str) with an
attacker-controlled hash string will panic. The bcrypt crate is
#![forbid(unsafe_code)], so this is limited to a denial-of-service and
cannot lead to memory corruption.
Realistic attack contexts include:
- Rust authentication services reading hashes from a database that was previously compromised via, e.g., SQL injection. The attacker can then crash the service on every login attempt against the tampered account.
- CLI tools accepting hashes from stdin or command-line arguments.
- Password managers or vault services loading hashes from untrusted configuration sources.
Root cause
split_hash performed five &str slicing operations on the input hash:
&hash[1..3], &hash[4..6], &hash[7..], &salt_and_hash[..22], and
&salt_and_hash[22..]. None of these were char-boundary-checked. Any input
where a multi-byte UTF-8 character spanned one of those byte positions
caused a panic.
This is a regression of the fix originally shipped in 2021 for issue #62
(commit 0833509). The regression was introduced in the parser rewrite in
PR #95 (commit e9a8394, released as 0.19.0).
The pre-existing regression test does_no_error_on_char_boundary_splitting
was not removed, but was silently rendered ineffective by the new
bytes[0] != b'$' guard, which rejected its input earlier and prevented
it from reaching the buggy slices — leaving CI green through the regression.
Fix
split_hash now rejects any hash string containing non-ASCII bytes up
front. A valid bcrypt hash is always exactly 60 ASCII bytes, so this
closes the entire class of byte-boundary panics rather than guarding each
slice individually.
The fix was merged in PR #103 and released as bcrypt 0.19.2 on 2026-06-20.
Downstream impact
pyca/bcrypt (which depended on bcrypt 0.19.1) is not affected. Its
Python-side wrapper performs its own byte-level salt parsing before
invoking bcrypt::hash_with_salt, and never reaches the buggy code path
in split_hash or verify.
Attack profile
How easy it is to exploit
- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges needed
- None
- User interaction
- None
What an attacker can affect
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- Low
What each source reports
OSV Score used
5.3
Panic in `bcrypt::verify` on non-ASCII hash input
bcrypt::verify(password, hash) and HashParts::from_str(hash) panic in
str::slice_error_fail when given a 60-byte &str containing a multi-byte
UTF-8 character at certain byte positions.
Impact
Any Rust code that calls bcrypt::verify (or HashParts::from_str) with an
attacker-controlled hash string will panic. The bcrypt crate is
#![forbid(unsafe_code)], so this is limited to a denial-of-service and
cannot lead to memory corruption.
Realistic attack contexts include:
- Rust authentication services reading hashes from a database that was previously compromised via, e.g., SQL injection. The attacker can then crash the service on every login attempt against the tampered account.
- CLI tools accepting hashes from stdin or command-line arguments.
- Password managers or vault services loading hashes from untrusted configuration sources.
Root cause
split_hash performed five &str slicing operations on the input hash:
&hash[1..3], &hash[4..6], &hash[7..], &salt_and_hash[..22], and
&salt_and_hash[22..]. None of these were char-boundary-checked. Any input
where a multi-byte UTF-8 character spanned one of those byte positions
caused a panic.
This is a regression of the fix originally shipped in 2021 for issue #62
(commit 0833509). The regression was introduced in the parser rewrite in
PR #95 (commit e9a8394, released as 0.19.0).
The pre-existing regression test does_no_error_on_char_boundary_splitting
was not removed, but was silently rendered ineffective by the new
bytes[0] != b'$' guard, which rejected its input earlier and prevented
it from reaching the buggy slices — leaving CI green through the regression.
Fix
split_hash now rejects any hash string containing non-ASCII bytes up
front. A valid bcrypt hash is always exactly 60 ASCII bytes, so this
closes the entire class of byte-boundary panics rather than guarding each
slice individually.
The fix was merged in PR #103 and released as bcrypt 0.19.2 on 2026-06-20.
Downstream impact
pyca/bcrypt (which depended on bcrypt 0.19.1) is not affected. Its
Python-side wrapper performs its own byte-level salt parsing before
invoking bcrypt::hash_with_salt, and never reaches the buggy code path
in split_hash or verify.
- Record
RUSTSEC-2026-0199- CVSS 3.1
- 5.3 Medium
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L - Updated
- 2026-11-02
Affected packages
| Package | Affected | Fixed |
|---|---|---|
bcryptcrates.io |
0.19.0 up to 0.19.2 | 0.19.2 |
History
| Recorded | Changed | Sources |
|---|---|---|
| first indexed | OSV |
Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.
In short
RUSTSEC-2026-0199 is a medium vulnerability (CVSS 5.3) in bcrypt, published June 20, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. Fixed in bcrypt 0.19.2.