CVE-2023-40610

Improper authorization check and possible privilege escalation on Apache Superset up to but excluding 2.1.2. Using the default examples database connection that allows access to both the examples schema and Apache Superset's metadata database, an attacker using a specially crafted CTE SQL statement could change data on the metadata database. This weakness could result on tampering with the authentication/authorization data.

Improper authorization check and possible privilege escalation on Apache Superset up to but excluding 2.1.2. Using the default examples database connection that allows access to both the examples schema and Apache Superset's metadata database, an attacker using a specially crafted CTE SQL statement could change data on the metadata database. This weakness could result on tampering with the authentication/authorization data.

Overview

An attacker with access to the SQL Lab and the ab_user and ab_user_role tables can elevate his privileges to become administrator.

Details

On a more general level, diverse tables who are supposed to be only readable can be modified using the WITH … AS and RETURNING keywords. Modification of the table key_value can also be done, which could lead to a Remote Code Execution (cf. "V7 - Insecure deserialization leading to remote code execution" report vulnerability).

Proof of Concept

Some tables are supposed to accept only SELECT requests from the SQL tab.

• Attempt to create a new user injected_admin into the ab_user table: PoC_1

But this protection can be bypassed by using the WITH … AS () syntax with RETURNING value after the INSERT / UPDATE / DELETE query. INSERT query accepted by the database due to the use of WITH … AS ( … RETURNING ) syntax: WITH a AS ( INSERT INTO ab_user (id, first_name, last_name, username, email, password) VALUES (2, ‘injected_admin’, ‘injected_admin’, ‘injected_admin’, ‘injected_[email protected]’, ‘{PASSWORD_HASH}’) RETURNING id ) SELECT * FROM a; PoC_2

• injected_admin added to the ab_user table: PoC_3

This method can also be used with UPDATE or DELETE request. A user with access to SELECT on the tables ab_user_role can escalate his privilege to become administrator.

• Locating the ID of the user ‘Auditeur B’, who has no rights and is not an admin. The request is done being ‘Auditeur B’: PoC_4
• Locating the rows that keep the role of the user ‘Auditeur B’. The row 36 stores the value 3, indicating the role ‘Alpha’ for ‘Auditeur B’: PoC_5
• Modification of the row 36 with an UPDATE request embedded in a WITH request: PoC_6
• ‘Auditeur B’ role has been changed to Admin: PoC_7

This technique can also be used to inject or modify values of the table key_value, which can potentially lead to a Remote Code Execution (cf. ...).

Solution

Orange recommendation

To fix this vulnerability, we recommends reenforcing the SELECT filter to spot INSERT / UPDATE / DELETE keywords even in WITH requests.

Security patch

Upgrade to Superset version 2.1.2.

References

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-40610 https://lists.apache.org/thread/jvgxpk4dbxyqtsgtl4pdgbd520rc0rot

Credits

LEXFO for Orange Innovation

Orange CERT-CC at Orange group

Timeline

Date reported: July 27, 2023 Date fixed: November 27, 2023

Improper authorization check and possible privilege escalation on Apache Superset up to but excluding 2.1.2. Using the default examples database connection that allows access to both the examples schema and Apache Superset's metadata database, an attacker using a specially crafted CTE SQL statement could change data on the metadata database. This weakness could result on tampering with the authentication/authorization data.

Improper authorization check and possible privilege escalation on Apache Superset up to but excluding 2.1.2. Using the default examples database connection that allows access to both the examples schema and Apache Superset's metadata database, an attacker using a specially crafted CTE SQL statement could change data on the metadata database. This weakness could result on tampering with the authentication/authorization data.

Overview

An attacker with access to the SQL Lab and the ab_user and ab_user_role tables can elevate his privileges to become administrator.

Details

On a more general level, diverse tables who are supposed to be only readable can be modified using the WITH … AS and RETURNING keywords. Modification of the table key_value can also be done, which could lead to a Remote Code Execution (cf. "V7 - Insecure deserialization leading to remote code execution" report vulnerability).

Proof of Concept

Some tables are supposed to accept only SELECT requests from the SQL tab.

• Attempt to create a new user injected_admin into the ab_user table: PoC_1

But this protection can be bypassed by using the WITH … AS () syntax with RETURNING value after the INSERT / UPDATE / DELETE query. INSERT query accepted by the database due to the use of WITH … AS ( … RETURNING ) syntax: WITH a AS ( INSERT INTO ab_user (id, first_name, last_name, username, email, password) VALUES (2, ‘injected_admin’, ‘injected_admin’, ‘injected_admin’, ‘injected_[email protected]’, ‘{PASSWORD_HASH}’) RETURNING id ) SELECT * FROM a; PoC_2

• injected_admin added to the ab_user table: PoC_3

This method can also be used with UPDATE or DELETE request. A user with access to SELECT on the tables ab_user_role can escalate his privilege to become administrator.

• Locating the ID of the user ‘Auditeur B’, who has no rights and is not an admin. The request is done being ‘Auditeur B’: PoC_4
• Locating the rows that keep the role of the user ‘Auditeur B’. The row 36 stores the value 3, indicating the role ‘Alpha’ for ‘Auditeur B’: PoC_5
• Modification of the row 36 with an UPDATE request embedded in a WITH request: PoC_6
• ‘Auditeur B’ role has been changed to Admin: PoC_7

This technique can also be used to inject or modify values of the table key_value, which can potentially lead to a Remote Code Execution (cf. ...).

Solution

Orange recommendation

To fix this vulnerability, we recommends reenforcing the SELECT filter to spot INSERT / UPDATE / DELETE keywords even in WITH requests.

Security patch

Upgrade to Superset version 2.1.2.

References

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-40610 https://lists.apache.org/thread/jvgxpk4dbxyqtsgtl4pdgbd520rc0rot

Credits

LEXFO for Orange Innovation

Orange CERT-CC at Orange group

Timeline

Date reported: July 27, 2023 Date fixed: November 27, 2023

Overview

An attacker with access to the SQL Lab and the ab_user and ab_user_role tables can elevate his privileges to become administrator.

Details

On a more general level, diverse tables who are supposed to be only readable can be modified using the WITH … AS and RETURNING keywords. Modification of the table key_value can also be done, which could lead to a Remote Code Execution (cf. "V7 - Insecure deserialization leading to remote code execution" report vulnerability).

Proof of Concept

Some tables are supposed to accept only SELECT requests from the SQL tab.

• Attempt to create a new user injected_admin into the ab_user table: PoC_1

But this protection can be bypassed by using the WITH … AS () syntax with RETURNING value after the INSERT / UPDATE / DELETE query. INSERT query accepted by the database due to the use of WITH … AS ( … RETURNING ) syntax: WITH a AS ( INSERT INTO ab_user (id, first_name, last_name, username, email, password) VALUES (2, ‘injected_admin’, ‘injected_admin’, ‘injected_admin’, ‘injected_[email protected]’, ‘{PASSWORD_HASH}’) RETURNING id ) SELECT * FROM a; PoC_2

• injected_admin added to the ab_user table: PoC_3

This method can also be used with UPDATE or DELETE request. A user with access to SELECT on the tables ab_user_role can escalate his privilege to become administrator.

• Locating the ID of the user ‘Auditeur B’, who has no rights and is not an admin. The request is done being ‘Auditeur B’: PoC_4
• Locating the rows that keep the role of the user ‘Auditeur B’. The row 36 stores the value 3, indicating the role ‘Alpha’ for ‘Auditeur B’: PoC_5
• Modification of the row 36 with an UPDATE request embedded in a WITH request: PoC_6
• ‘Auditeur B’ role has been changed to Admin: PoC_7

This technique can also be used to inject or modify values of the table key_value, which can potentially lead to a Remote Code Execution (cf. ...).

Solution

Orange recommendation

To fix this vulnerability, we recommends reenforcing the SELECT filter to spot INSERT / UPDATE / DELETE keywords even in WITH requests.

Security patch

Upgrade to Superset version 2.1.2.

References

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-40610 https://lists.apache.org/thread/jvgxpk4dbxyqtsgtl4pdgbd520rc0rot

Credits

LEXFO for Orange Innovation

Orange CERT-CC at Orange group

Timeline

Date reported: July 27, 2023 Date fixed: November 27, 2023

Improper authorization check and possible privilege escalation on Apache Superset up to but excluding 2.1.2. Using the default examples database connection that allows access to both the examples schema and Apache Superset's metadata database, an attacker using a specially crafted CTE SQL statement could change data on the metadata database. This weakness could result on tampering with the authentication/authorization data.