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CVE-2026-71850

Hono: `memo()` retains SSR output across requests, leading to cross-user data disclosure

4.8 MediumFix available

Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. From 3.8.0 to 4.12.33, memo() from hono/jsx retains the result of a server side render and reuses it for later renders with comparator equal props, and request scoped values read inside the component take no part in that comparison, so a response can contain HTML rendered for another user's request. Components wrapped with memo() are compared by props alone; values read implicitly during rendering, such as JSX Context through createContext() and useContext(), useRequestContext() from hono/jsx-renderer, and getContext() from hono/context-storage, do not participate, and the retained result lives as long as the wrapped component, so it outlives the request that produced it. A user may receive a response containing HTML rendered for another user when both render the same memoized component with comparator equal props on the same warm instance, which may disclose another user's account or profile data, disclose request scoped secrets embedded in HTML such as CSRF tokens, or expose role specific content to users who should not receive it. This issue is fixed in version 4.12.34.

Attack profile

How easy it is to exploit

Attack vector
Network
Complexity
High
Privileges needed
Low
User interaction
Required

What an attacker can affect

Confidentiality
High
Integrity
None
Availability
None

Exploit likelihood

0.27%Up 0.1 points since Aug 8, 2026
90%50%10%1%

What each source reports

CVE List Score used 4.8

Hono: `memo()` retains SSR output across requests, leading to cross-user data disclosure

Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. From 3.8.0 to 4.12.33, memo() from hono/jsx retains the result of a server side render and reuses it for later renders with comparator equal props, and request scoped values read inside the component take no part in that comparison, so a response can contain HTML rendered for another user's request. Components wrapped with memo() are compared by props alone; values read implicitly during rendering, such as JSX Context through createContext() and useContext(), useRequestContext() from hono/jsx-renderer, and getContext() from hono/context-storage, do not participate, and the retained result lives as long as the wrapped component, so it outlives the request that produced it. A user may receive a response containing HTML rendered for another user when both render the same memoized component with comparator equal props on the same warm instance, which may disclose another user's account or profile data, disclose request scoped secrets embedded in HTML such as CSRF tokens, or expose role specific content to users who should not receive it. This issue is fixed in version 4.12.34.

Record
CVE-2026-71850
CVSS 3.1
4.8 MediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Weakness
CWE-488
Updated
2026-11-02
EUVDEUVD-2026-54580 4.8

Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. From 3.8.0 to 4.12.33, memo() from hono/jsx retains the result of a server side render and reuses it for later renders with comparator equal props, and request scoped values read inside the component take no part in that comparison, so a response can contain HTML rendered for another user's request. Components wrapped with memo() are compared by props alone; values read implicitly during rendering, such as JSX Context through createContext() and useContext(), useRequestContext() from hono/jsx-renderer, and getContext() from hono/context-storage, do not participate, and the retained result lives as long as the wrapped component, so it outlives the request that produced it. A user may receive a response containing HTML rendered for another user when both render the same memoized component with comparator equal props on the same warm instance, which may disclose another user's account or profile data, disclose request scoped secrets embedded in HTML such as CSRF tokens, or expose role specific content to users who should not receive it. This issue is fixed in version 4.12.34.

Record
EUVD-2026-54580
CVSS 3.1
4.8 MediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Updated
2026-11-02
GitHub AdvisoriesGHSA-f23p-vx2j-j53r 4.8

Hono: `memo()` retains SSR output across requests, leading to cross-user data disclosure

Summary

memo() from hono/jsx retains the result of a server-side render and reuses it for later renders with comparator-equal props. Request-scoped values read inside the component take no part in that comparison, so a response can contain HTML rendered for another user's request.

Details

Components wrapped with memo() are compared by props alone. Values read implicitly during rendering do not participate: JSX Context through createContext() and useContext(), useRequestContext() from hono/jsx-renderer, and getContext() from hono/context-storage. The retained result lives as long as the wrapped component, so it outlives the request that produced it.

Per-request context isolation is not what fails: the current request's values are established correctly, but the memoized component is skipped before anything reads them.

This issue arises when a component wrapped in memo() obtains user- or request-specific data from an ambient context instead of through props.

Impact

A user may receive a response containing HTML rendered for another user, when both render the same memoized component with comparator-equal props on the same warm instance.

This may lead to:

  • Disclosure of another user's account or profile data
  • Disclosure of request-scoped secrets embedded in HTML, such as CSRF tokens
  • Exposure of role-specific content to users who should not receive it

Exploitation depends on the order in which renders populate the retained value and on both requests reaching the same warm instance.

This issue affects applications that render with hono/jsx on the server and wrap a component reading ambient request state in memo(). Applications that pass all request-specific values through props, or that do not use memo(), are unaffected. Client-side rendering is unaffected.

Record
GHSA-f23p-vx2j-j53r
CVSS 3.1
4.8 MediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Weakness
CWE-488
Updated
2026-11-02
NVD 4.8

Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. From 3.8.0 to 4.12.33, memo() from hono/jsx retains the result of a server side render and reuses it for later renders with comparator equal props, and request scoped values read inside the component take no part in that comparison, so a response can contain HTML rendered for another user's request. Components wrapped with memo() are compared by props alone; values read implicitly during rendering, such as JSX Context through createContext() and useContext(), useRequestContext() from hono/jsx-renderer, and getContext() from hono/context-storage, do not participate, and the retained result lives as long as the wrapped component, so it outlives the request that produced it. A user may receive a response containing HTML rendered for another user when both render the same memoized component with comparator equal props on the same warm instance, which may disclose another user's account or profile data, disclose request scoped secrets embedded in HTML such as CSRF tokens, or expose role specific content to users who should not receive it. This issue is fixed in version 4.12.34.

Record
CVE-2026-71850
CVSS 3.1
4.8 MediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Weakness
CWE-488
Updated
2026-11-02
OSV 4.8

Hono: `memo()` retains SSR output across requests, leading to cross-user data disclosure

Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. From 3.8.0 to 4.12.33, memo() from hono/jsx retains the result of a server side render and reuses it for later renders with comparator equal props, and request scoped values read inside the component take no part in that comparison, so a response can contain HTML rendered for another user's request. Components wrapped with memo() are compared by props alone; values read implicitly during rendering, such as JSX Context through createContext() and useContext(), useRequestContext() from hono/jsx-renderer, and getContext() from hono/context-storage, do not participate, and the retained result lives as long as the wrapped component, so it outlives the request that produced it. A user may receive a response containing HTML rendered for another user when both render the same memoized component with comparator equal props on the same warm instance, which may disclose another user's account or profile data, disclose request scoped secrets embedded in HTML such as CSRF tokens, or expose role specific content to users who should not receive it. This issue is fixed in version 4.12.34.

Record
CVE-2026-71850
CVSS 3.1
4.8 MediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Weakness
CWE-488
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVGHSA-f23p-vx2j-j53r 4.8

Hono: `memo()` retains SSR output across requests, leading to cross-user data disclosure

Summary

memo() from hono/jsx retains the result of a server-side render and reuses it for later renders with comparator-equal props. Request-scoped values read inside the component take no part in that comparison, so a response can contain HTML rendered for another user's request.

Details

Components wrapped with memo() are compared by props alone. Values read implicitly during rendering do not participate: JSX Context through createContext() and useContext(), useRequestContext() from hono/jsx-renderer, and getContext() from hono/context-storage. The retained result lives as long as the wrapped component, so it outlives the request that produced it.

Per-request context isolation is not what fails: the current request's values are established correctly, but the memoized component is skipped before anything reads them.

This issue arises when a component wrapped in memo() obtains user- or request-specific data from an ambient context instead of through props.

Impact

A user may receive a response containing HTML rendered for another user, when both render the same memoized component with comparator-equal props on the same warm instance.

This may lead to:

  • Disclosure of another user's account or profile data
  • Disclosure of request-scoped secrets embedded in HTML, such as CSRF tokens
  • Exposure of role-specific content to users who should not receive it

Exploitation depends on the order in which renders populate the retained value and on both requests reaching the same warm instance.

This issue affects applications that render with hono/jsx on the server and wrap a component reading ambient request state in memo(). Applications that pass all request-specific values through props, or that do not use memo(), are unaffected. Client-side rendering is unaffected.

Record
GHSA-f23p-vx2j-j53r
CVSS 3.1
4.8 MediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Weakness
CWE-488
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVCLSA-2026-1790413170 No score

TuxCare security update for hono (15 CVEs)

TuxCare rebuilt hono to address 15 CVEs. Fixed in 3.12.12-tuxcare.1.

Record
CLSA-2026-1790413170
Updated
2026-11-02

Affected products

Affected packages

Affected packages
PackageAffectedFixed
hono
npm
3.8.0 up to 4.12.34
4.12.34
hono
TuxCare:npm
From an advisory covering 14 CVEs
3.12.12-tuxcare.0 up to 3.12.12-tuxcare.1, plus listed versions
3.12.12
3.12.12-tuxcare.1

History

History
RecordedChangedSources
affected, facts
first indexedCVE List, EUVD, GitHub Advisories, NVD, OSV

Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.

In short

CVE-2026-71850 is a medium vulnerability (CVSS 4.8) in Honojs Hono, published August 7, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.27%, the 18th percentile. Fixed in hono 4.12.34.

References

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