CVE-2026-71850
Hono: `memo()` retains SSR output across requests, leading to cross-user data disclosure
Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. From 3.8.0 to 4.12.33, memo() from hono/jsx retains the result of a server side render and reuses it for later renders with comparator equal props, and request scoped values read inside the component take no part in that comparison, so a response can contain HTML rendered for another user's request. Components wrapped with memo() are compared by props alone; values read implicitly during rendering, such as JSX Context through createContext() and useContext(), useRequestContext() from hono/jsx-renderer, and getContext() from hono/context-storage, do not participate, and the retained result lives as long as the wrapped component, so it outlives the request that produced it. A user may receive a response containing HTML rendered for another user when both render the same memoized component with comparator equal props on the same warm instance, which may disclose another user's account or profile data, disclose request scoped secrets embedded in HTML such as CSRF tokens, or expose role specific content to users who should not receive it. This issue is fixed in version 4.12.34.
Attack profile
How easy it is to exploit
- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- High
- Privileges needed
- Low
- User interaction
- Required
What an attacker can affect
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
Exploit likelihood
What each source reports
CVE List Score used
4.8
Hono: `memo()` retains SSR output across requests, leading to cross-user data disclosure
Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. From 3.8.0 to 4.12.33, memo() from hono/jsx retains the result of a server side render and reuses it for later renders with comparator equal props, and request scoped values read inside the component take no part in that comparison, so a response can contain HTML rendered for another user's request. Components wrapped with memo() are compared by props alone; values read implicitly during rendering, such as JSX Context through createContext() and useContext(), useRequestContext() from hono/jsx-renderer, and getContext() from hono/context-storage, do not participate, and the retained result lives as long as the wrapped component, so it outlives the request that produced it. A user may receive a response containing HTML rendered for another user when both render the same memoized component with comparator equal props on the same warm instance, which may disclose another user's account or profile data, disclose request scoped secrets embedded in HTML such as CSRF tokens, or expose role specific content to users who should not receive it. This issue is fixed in version 4.12.34.
- Record
CVE-2026-71850- CVSS 3.1
- 4.8 Medium
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N - Weakness
- CWE-488
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
EUVDEUVD-2026-54580
4.8
Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. From 3.8.0 to 4.12.33, memo() from hono/jsx retains the result of a server side render and reuses it for later renders with comparator equal props, and request scoped values read inside the component take no part in that comparison, so a response can contain HTML rendered for another user's request. Components wrapped with memo() are compared by props alone; values read implicitly during rendering, such as JSX Context through createContext() and useContext(), useRequestContext() from hono/jsx-renderer, and getContext() from hono/context-storage, do not participate, and the retained result lives as long as the wrapped component, so it outlives the request that produced it. A user may receive a response containing HTML rendered for another user when both render the same memoized component with comparator equal props on the same warm instance, which may disclose another user's account or profile data, disclose request scoped secrets embedded in HTML such as CSRF tokens, or expose role specific content to users who should not receive it. This issue is fixed in version 4.12.34.
- Record
EUVD-2026-54580- CVSS 3.1
- 4.8 Medium
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N - Updated
- 2026-11-02
GitHub AdvisoriesGHSA-f23p-vx2j-j53r
4.8
Hono: `memo()` retains SSR output across requests, leading to cross-user data disclosure
Summary
memo() from hono/jsx retains the result of a server-side render and reuses it for later renders with comparator-equal props. Request-scoped values read inside the component take no part in that comparison, so a response can contain HTML rendered for another user's request.
Details
Components wrapped with memo() are compared by props alone. Values read implicitly during rendering do not participate: JSX Context through createContext() and useContext(), useRequestContext() from hono/jsx-renderer, and getContext() from hono/context-storage. The retained result lives as long as the wrapped component, so it outlives the request that produced it.
Per-request context isolation is not what fails: the current request's values are established correctly, but the memoized component is skipped before anything reads them.
This issue arises when a component wrapped in memo() obtains user- or request-specific data from an ambient context instead of through props.
Impact
A user may receive a response containing HTML rendered for another user, when both render the same memoized component with comparator-equal props on the same warm instance.
This may lead to:
- Disclosure of another user's account or profile data
- Disclosure of request-scoped secrets embedded in HTML, such as CSRF tokens
- Exposure of role-specific content to users who should not receive it
Exploitation depends on the order in which renders populate the retained value and on both requests reaching the same warm instance.
This issue affects applications that render with hono/jsx on the server and wrap a component reading ambient request state in memo(). Applications that pass all request-specific values through props, or that do not use memo(), are unaffected. Client-side rendering is unaffected.
- Record
GHSA-f23p-vx2j-j53r- CVSS 3.1
- 4.8 Medium
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N - Weakness
- CWE-488
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
NVD
4.8
Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. From 3.8.0 to 4.12.33, memo() from hono/jsx retains the result of a server side render and reuses it for later renders with comparator equal props, and request scoped values read inside the component take no part in that comparison, so a response can contain HTML rendered for another user's request. Components wrapped with memo() are compared by props alone; values read implicitly during rendering, such as JSX Context through createContext() and useContext(), useRequestContext() from hono/jsx-renderer, and getContext() from hono/context-storage, do not participate, and the retained result lives as long as the wrapped component, so it outlives the request that produced it. A user may receive a response containing HTML rendered for another user when both render the same memoized component with comparator equal props on the same warm instance, which may disclose another user's account or profile data, disclose request scoped secrets embedded in HTML such as CSRF tokens, or expose role specific content to users who should not receive it. This issue is fixed in version 4.12.34.
- Record
CVE-2026-71850- CVSS 3.1
- 4.8 Medium
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N - Weakness
- CWE-488
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSV
4.8
Hono: `memo()` retains SSR output across requests, leading to cross-user data disclosure
Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. From 3.8.0 to 4.12.33, memo() from hono/jsx retains the result of a server side render and reuses it for later renders with comparator equal props, and request scoped values read inside the component take no part in that comparison, so a response can contain HTML rendered for another user's request. Components wrapped with memo() are compared by props alone; values read implicitly during rendering, such as JSX Context through createContext() and useContext(), useRequestContext() from hono/jsx-renderer, and getContext() from hono/context-storage, do not participate, and the retained result lives as long as the wrapped component, so it outlives the request that produced it. A user may receive a response containing HTML rendered for another user when both render the same memoized component with comparator equal props on the same warm instance, which may disclose another user's account or profile data, disclose request scoped secrets embedded in HTML such as CSRF tokens, or expose role specific content to users who should not receive it. This issue is fixed in version 4.12.34.
- Record
CVE-2026-71850- CVSS 3.1
- 4.8 Medium
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N - Weakness
- CWE-488
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVGHSA-f23p-vx2j-j53r
4.8
Hono: `memo()` retains SSR output across requests, leading to cross-user data disclosure
Summary
memo() from hono/jsx retains the result of a server-side render and reuses it for later renders with comparator-equal props. Request-scoped values read inside the component take no part in that comparison, so a response can contain HTML rendered for another user's request.
Details
Components wrapped with memo() are compared by props alone. Values read implicitly during rendering do not participate: JSX Context through createContext() and useContext(), useRequestContext() from hono/jsx-renderer, and getContext() from hono/context-storage. The retained result lives as long as the wrapped component, so it outlives the request that produced it.
Per-request context isolation is not what fails: the current request's values are established correctly, but the memoized component is skipped before anything reads them.
This issue arises when a component wrapped in memo() obtains user- or request-specific data from an ambient context instead of through props.
Impact
A user may receive a response containing HTML rendered for another user, when both render the same memoized component with comparator-equal props on the same warm instance.
This may lead to:
- Disclosure of another user's account or profile data
- Disclosure of request-scoped secrets embedded in HTML, such as CSRF tokens
- Exposure of role-specific content to users who should not receive it
Exploitation depends on the order in which renders populate the retained value and on both requests reaching the same warm instance.
This issue affects applications that render with hono/jsx on the server and wrap a component reading ambient request state in memo(). Applications that pass all request-specific values through props, or that do not use memo(), are unaffected. Client-side rendering is unaffected.
- Record
GHSA-f23p-vx2j-j53r- CVSS 3.1
- 4.8 Medium
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N - Weakness
- CWE-488
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVCLSA-2026-1790413170 No score
TuxCare security update for hono (15 CVEs)
TuxCare rebuilt hono to address 15 CVEs. Fixed in 3.12.12-tuxcare.1.
- Record
CLSA-2026-1790413170- Updated
- 2026-11-02
Affected products
Affected packages
History
| Recorded | Changed | Sources |
|---|---|---|
| affected, facts | ||
| first indexed | CVE List, EUVD, GitHub Advisories, NVD, OSV |
Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.
In short
CVE-2026-71850 is a medium vulnerability (CVSS 4.8) in Honojs Hono, published August 7, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.27%, the 18th percentile. Fixed in hono 4.12.34.
References
github.com/honojs/hono/security/advisories/GHSA-f23p-vx2j-j53r
github.com/honojs/hono/commit/0c45036d6b0ddf42ab2fa44639dc8710825d5c0f
github.com/honojs/hono/releases/tag/v4.12.34
github.com/advisories/GHSA-f23p-vx2j-j53r
github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/71xxx/CVE-2026-71850.json
nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-71850
github.com/honojs/hono