CVE-2023-53047

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

tee: amdtee: fix race condition in amdtee_open_session

There is a potential race condition in amdtee_open_session that may lead to use-after-free. For instance, in amdtee_open_session() after sess->sess_mask is set, and before setting:

sess->session_info[i] = session_info;

if amdtee_close_session() closes this same session, then 'sess' data structure will be released, causing kernel panic when 'sess' is accessed within amdtee_open_session().

The solution is to set the bit sess->sess_mask as the last step in amdtee_open_session().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

tee: amdtee: fix race condition in amdtee_open_session

There is a potential race condition in amdtee_open_session that may lead to use-after-free. For instance, in amdtee_open_session() after sess->sess_mask is set, and before setting:

sess->session_info[i] = session_info;

if amdtee_close_session() closes this same session, then 'sess' data structure will be released, causing kernel panic when 'sess' is accessed within amdtee_open_session().

The solution is to set the bit sess->sess_mask as the last step in amdtee_open_session().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

tee: amdtee: fix race condition in amdtee_open_session

There is a potential race condition in amdtee_open_session that may lead to use-after-free. For instance, in amdtee_open_session() after sess->sess_mask is set, and before setting:

sess->session_info[i] = session_info;

if amdtee_close_session() closes this same session, then 'sess' data structure will be released, causing kernel panic when 'sess' is accessed within amdtee_open_session().

The solution is to set the bit sess->sess_mask as the last step in amdtee_open_session().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

tee: amdtee: fix race condition in amdtee_open_session

There is a potential race condition in amdtee_open_session that may lead to use-after-free. For instance, in amdtee_open_session() after sess->sess_mask is set, and before setting:

sess->session_info[i] = session_info;

if amdtee_close_session() closes this same session, then 'sess' data structure will be released, causing kernel panic when 'sess' is accessed within amdtee_open_session().

The solution is to set the bit sess->sess_mask as the last step in amdtee_open_session().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

tee: amdtee: fix race condition in amdtee_open_session

There is a potential race condition in amdtee_open_session that may lead to use-after-free. For instance, in amdtee_open_session() after sess->sess_mask is set, and before setting:

sess->session_info[i] = session_info;

if amdtee_close_session() closes this same session, then 'sess' data structure will be released, causing kernel panic when 'sess' is accessed within amdtee_open_session().

The solution is to set the bit sess->sess_mask as the last step in amdtee_open_session().