CVE-2026-63377

TAKO AI Agent for Okta is a local-first AI agent that helps Okta administrators query tenant data using natural language. Prior to 3.0.1-beta, POST /api/auth/setup in src/api/routers/auth.py allows an unauthenticated network attacker to create the first administrator account before the legitimate owner completes initial setup. The initial_setup function checks only the is_setup completion flag and requires no authentication, one-time bootstrap token, or network restriction. The default docker-compose.yml publishes port 8001 on all interfaces, the Dockerfile starts the listener on 0.0.0.0, and src/api/main.py mounts the authentication router without a global authentication guard. The endpoint invokes create_auth_user with UserRole.ADMIN and set_auth_cookie, issuing a valid fctr_session JWT cookie. Localhost-only CORS rules do not restrict non-browser HTTP clients, and the setup operation does not require access to a real Okta tenant. The attacker becomes the sole administrator and prevents legitimate first-run setup, can read Okta-synced user data, API tokens, chat history, and application configuration, modify users and Okta integration credentials, and lock out administrators or disable the service. Already completed setup is rejected. This issue is fixed in version 3.0.1-beta.

TAKO AI Agent for Okta is a local-first AI agent that helps Okta administrators query tenant data using natural language. Prior to 3.0.1-beta, POST /api/auth/setup in src/api/routers/auth.py allows an unauthenticated network attacker to create the first administrator account before the legitimate owner completes initial setup. The initial_setup function checks only the is_setup completion flag and requires no authentication, one-time bootstrap token, or network restriction. The default docker-compose.yml publishes port 8001 on all interfaces, the Dockerfile starts the listener on 0.0.0.0, and src/api/main.py mounts the authentication router without a global authentication guard. The endpoint invokes create_auth_user with UserRole.ADMIN and set_auth_cookie, issuing a valid fctr_session JWT cookie. Localhost-only CORS rules do not restrict non-browser HTTP clients, and the setup operation does not require access to a real Okta tenant. The attacker becomes the sole administrator and prevents legitimate first-run setup, can read Okta-synced user data, API tokens, chat history, and application configuration, modify users and Okta integration credentials, and lock out administrators or disable the service. Already completed setup is rejected. This issue is fixed in version 3.0.1-beta.

TAKO AI Agent for Okta is a local-first AI agent that helps Okta administrators query tenant data using natural language. Prior to 3.0.1-beta, POST /api/auth/setup in src/api/routers/auth.py allows an unauthenticated network attacker to create the first administrator account before the legitimate owner completes initial setup. The initial_setup function checks only the is_setup completion flag and requires no authentication, one-time bootstrap token, or network restriction. The default docker-compose.yml publishes port 8001 on all interfaces, the Dockerfile starts the listener on 0.0.0.0, and src/api/main.py mounts the authentication router without a global authentication guard. The endpoint invokes create_auth_user with UserRole.ADMIN and set_auth_cookie, issuing a valid fctr_session JWT cookie. Localhost-only CORS rules do not restrict non-browser HTTP clients, and the setup operation does not require access to a real Okta tenant. The attacker becomes the sole administrator and prevents legitimate first-run setup, can read Okta-synced user data, API tokens, chat history, and application configuration, modify users and Okta integration credentials, and lock out administrators or disable the service. Already completed setup is rejected. This issue is fixed in version 3.0.1-beta.

TAKO AI Agent for Okta is a local-first AI agent that helps Okta administrators query tenant data using natural language. Prior to 3.0.1-beta, POST /api/auth/setup in src/api/routers/auth.py allows an unauthenticated network attacker to create the first administrator account before the legitimate owner completes initial setup. The initial_setup function checks only the is_setup completion flag and requires no authentication, one-time bootstrap token, or network restriction. The default docker-compose.yml publishes port 8001 on all interfaces, the Dockerfile starts the listener on 0.0.0.0, and src/api/main.py mounts the authentication router without a global authentication guard. The endpoint invokes create_auth_user with UserRole.ADMIN and set_auth_cookie, issuing a valid fctr_session JWT cookie. Localhost-only CORS rules do not restrict non-browser HTTP clients, and the setup operation does not require access to a real Okta tenant. The attacker becomes the sole administrator and prevents legitimate first-run setup, can read Okta-synced user data, API tokens, chat history, and application configuration, modify users and Okta integration credentials, and lock out administrators or disable the service. Already completed setup is rejected. This issue is fixed in version 3.0.1-beta.