CVE-2026-32887
Effect Bug: `AsyncLocalStorage` context lost/contaminated inside Effect fibers under concurrent load with RPC
Effect is a TypeScript framework that consists of several packages that work together to help build TypeScript applications. Prior to version 3.20.0, when using RpcServer.toWebHandler (or HttpApp.toWebHandlerRuntime) inside a Next.js App Router route handler, any Node.js AsyncLocalStorage-dependent API called from within an Effect fiber can read another concurrent request's context — or no context at all. Under production traffic, auth() from @clerk/nextjs/server returns a different user's session. Version 3.20.0 contains a fix for the issue.
Attack profile
How easy it is to exploit
- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- High
- Privileges needed
- None
- User interaction
- None
What an attacker can affect
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- None
Exploit likelihood
What each source reports
CVE List Score used
7.4
Effect Bug: `AsyncLocalStorage` context lost/contaminated inside Effect fibers under concurrent load with RPC
Effect is a TypeScript framework that consists of several packages that work together to help build TypeScript applications. Prior to version 3.20.0, when using RpcServer.toWebHandler (or HttpApp.toWebHandlerRuntime) inside a Next.js App Router route handler, any Node.js AsyncLocalStorage-dependent API called from within an Effect fiber can read another concurrent request's context — or no context at all. Under production traffic, auth() from @clerk/nextjs/server returns a different user's session. Version 3.20.0 contains a fix for the issue.
- Record
CVE-2026-32887- CVSS 3.1
- 7.4 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N - Weakness
- CWE-362
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
EUVDEUVD-2026-13818
7.4
Effect is a TypeScript framework that consists of several packages that work together to help build TypeScript applications. Prior to version 3.20.0, when using RpcServer.toWebHandler (or HttpApp.toWebHandlerRuntime) inside a Next.js App Router route handler, any Node.js AsyncLocalStorage-dependent API called from within an Effect fiber can read another concurrent request's context — or no context at all. Under production traffic, auth() from @clerk/nextjs/server returns a different user's session. Version 3.20.0 contains a fix for the issue.
- Record
EUVD-2026-13818- CVSS 3.1
- 7.4 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N - Updated
- 2026-11-02
GitHub AdvisoriesGHSA-38f7-945m-qr2g
7.4
Effect `AsyncLocalStorage` context lost/contaminated inside Effect fibers under concurrent load with RPC
Versions
effect: 3.19.15@effect/rpc: 0.72.1@effect/platform: 0.94.2- Node.js: v22.20.0
- Vercel runtime with Fluid compute
- Next.js: 16 (App Router)
@clerk/nextjs: 6.x
Root cause
Effect's MixedScheduler batches fiber continuations and drains them inside a single microtask or timer callback. The AsyncLocalStorage context active during that callback belongs to whichever request first triggered the scheduler's drain cycle — not the request that owns the fiber being resumed.
Detailed mechanism
1. Scheduler batching (effect/src/Scheduler.ts, MixedScheduler)
// MixedScheduler.starve() — called once when first task is scheduled
private starve(depth = 0) {
if (depth >= this.maxNextTickBeforeTimer) {
setTimeout(() => this.starveInternal(0), 0) // timer queue
} else {
Promise.resolve(void 0).then(() => this.starveInternal(depth + 1)) // microtask queue
}
}
// MixedScheduler.starveInternal() — drains ALL accumulated tasks in one call
private starveInternal(depth: number) {
const tasks = this.tasks.buckets
this.tasks.buckets = []
for (const [_, toRun] of tasks) {
for (let i = 0; i < toRun.length; i++) {
toRun[i]() // ← Every fiber continuation runs in the SAME ALS context
}
}
// ...
}
scheduleTask only calls starve() when running is false. Subsequent tasks accumulate in this.tasks until starveInternal drains them all. The Promise.then() (or setTimeout) callback inherits the ALS context from whichever call site created it — i.e., whichever request's fiber first set running = true.
Result: Under concurrent load, fiber continuations from Request A and Request B execute inside the same starveInternal call, sharing a single ALS context. If Request A triggered starve(), then Request B's fiber reads Request A's ALS context.
2. toWebHandlerRuntime does not propagate ALS (@effect/platform/src/HttpApp.ts:211-240)
export const toWebHandlerRuntime = <R>(runtime: Runtime.Runtime<R>) => {
const httpRuntime: Types.Mutable<Runtime.Runtime<R>> = Runtime.make(runtime)
const run = Runtime.runFork(httpRuntime)
return <E>(self: Default<E, R | Scope.Scope>, middleware?) => {
return (request: Request, context?): Promise<Response> =>
new Promise((resolve) => {
// Per-request Effect context is correctly set via contextMap:
const contextMap = new Map<string, any>(runtime.context.unsafeMap)
const httpServerRequest = ServerRequest.fromWeb(request)
contextMap.set(ServerRequest.HttpServerRequest.key, httpServerRequest)
httpRuntime.context = Context.unsafeMake(contextMap)
// But the fiber is forked without any ALS propagation:
const fiber = run(httpApp as any) // ← ALS context is NOT captured or restored
})
}
}
Effect's own Context (containing HttpServerRequest) is correctly set per-request. But the Node.js ALS context — which frameworks like Next.js, Clerk, and OpenTelemetry rely on — is not captured at fork time or restored when the fiber's continuations execute.
3. The dangerous pattern this enables
// RPC handler — runs inside an Effect fiber
const handler = Effect.gen(function*() {
// This calls auth() from @clerk/nextjs/server, which reads from ALS
const { userId } = yield* Effect.tryPromise({
try: async () => auth(), // ← may read WRONG user's session
catch: () => new UnauthorizedError({ message: "Auth failed" })
})
return yield* repository.getUser(userId)
})
The async () => auth() thunk executes when the fiber continuation is scheduled by MixedScheduler. At that point, the ALS context belongs to an arbitrary concurrent request.
Reproduction scenario
Timeline (two concurrent requests to the same toWebHandler endpoint):
T0: Request A arrives → POST handler → webHandler(requestA)
→ Promise executor runs…
- Record
GHSA-38f7-945m-qr2g- CVSS 3.1
- 7.4 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N - Weakness
- CWE-362
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
NVD
7.4
Effect is a TypeScript framework that consists of several packages that work together to help build TypeScript applications. Prior to version 3.20.0, when using RpcServer.toWebHandler (or HttpApp.toWebHandlerRuntime) inside a Next.js App Router route handler, any Node.js AsyncLocalStorage-dependent API called from within an Effect fiber can read another concurrent request's context — or no context at all. Under production traffic, auth() from @clerk/nextjs/server returns a different user's session. Version 3.20.0 contains a fix for the issue.
- Record
CVE-2026-32887- CVSS 3.1
- 7.4 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N - Weakness
- CWE-362
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSV
7.4
Effect Bug: `AsyncLocalStorage` context lost/contaminated inside Effect fibers under concurrent load with RPC
Effect is a TypeScript framework that consists of several packages that work together to help build TypeScript applications. Prior to version 3.20.0, when using RpcServer.toWebHandler (or HttpApp.toWebHandlerRuntime) inside a Next.js App Router route handler, any Node.js AsyncLocalStorage-dependent API called from within an Effect fiber can read another concurrent request's context — or no context at all. Under production traffic, auth() from @clerk/nextjs/server returns a different user's session. Version 3.20.0 contains a fix for the issue.
- Record
CVE-2026-32887- CVSS 3.1
- 7.4 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N - Weakness
- CWE-362
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVGHSA-38f7-945m-qr2g
7.4
Effect `AsyncLocalStorage` context lost/contaminated inside Effect fibers under concurrent load with RPC
Versions
effect: 3.19.15@effect/rpc: 0.72.1@effect/platform: 0.94.2- Node.js: v22.20.0
- Vercel runtime with Fluid compute
- Next.js: 16 (App Router)
@clerk/nextjs: 6.x
Root cause
Effect's MixedScheduler batches fiber continuations and drains them inside a single microtask or timer callback. The AsyncLocalStorage context active during that callback belongs to whichever request first triggered the scheduler's drain cycle — not the request that owns the fiber being resumed.
Detailed mechanism
1. Scheduler batching (effect/src/Scheduler.ts, MixedScheduler)
// MixedScheduler.starve() — called once when first task is scheduled
private starve(depth = 0) {
if (depth >= this.maxNextTickBeforeTimer) {
setTimeout(() => this.starveInternal(0), 0) // timer queue
} else {
Promise.resolve(void 0).then(() => this.starveInternal(depth + 1)) // microtask queue
}
}
// MixedScheduler.starveInternal() — drains ALL accumulated tasks in one call
private starveInternal(depth: number) {
const tasks = this.tasks.buckets
this.tasks.buckets = []
for (const [_, toRun] of tasks) {
for (let i = 0; i < toRun.length; i++) {
toRun[i]() // ← Every fiber continuation runs in the SAME ALS context
}
}
// ...
}
scheduleTask only calls starve() when running is false. Subsequent tasks accumulate in this.tasks until starveInternal drains them all. The Promise.then() (or setTimeout) callback inherits the ALS context from whichever call site created it — i.e., whichever request's fiber first set running = true.
Result: Under concurrent load, fiber continuations from Request A and Request B execute inside the same starveInternal call, sharing a single ALS context. If Request A triggered starve(), then Request B's fiber reads Request A's ALS context.
2. toWebHandlerRuntime does not propagate ALS (@effect/platform/src/HttpApp.ts:211-240)
export const toWebHandlerRuntime = <R>(runtime: Runtime.Runtime<R>) => {
const httpRuntime: Types.Mutable<Runtime.Runtime<R>> = Runtime.make(runtime)
const run = Runtime.runFork(httpRuntime)
return <E>(self: Default<E, R | Scope.Scope>, middleware?) => {
return (request: Request, context?): Promise<Response> =>
new Promise((resolve) => {
// Per-request Effect context is correctly set via contextMap:
const contextMap = new Map<string, any>(runtime.context.unsafeMap)
const httpServerRequest = ServerRequest.fromWeb(request)
contextMap.set(ServerRequest.HttpServerRequest.key, httpServerRequest)
httpRuntime.context = Context.unsafeMake(contextMap)
// But the fiber is forked without any ALS propagation:
const fiber = run(httpApp as any) // ← ALS context is NOT captured or restored
})
}
}
Effect's own Context (containing HttpServerRequest) is correctly set per-request. But the Node.js ALS context — which frameworks like Next.js, Clerk, and OpenTelemetry rely on — is not captured at fork time or restored when the fiber's continuations execute.
3. The dangerous pattern this enables
// RPC handler — runs inside an Effect fiber
const handler = Effect.gen(function*() {
// This calls auth() from @clerk/nextjs/server, which reads from ALS
const { userId } = yield* Effect.tryPromise({
try: async () => auth(), // ← may read WRONG user's session
catch: () => new UnauthorizedError({ message: "Auth failed" })
})
return yield* repository.getUser(userId)
})
The async () => auth() thunk executes when the fiber continuation is scheduled by MixedScheduler. At that point, the ALS context belongs to an arbitrary concurrent request.
Reproduction scenario
Timeline (two concurrent requests to the same toWebHandler endpoint):
T0: Request A arrives → POST handler → webHandler(requestA)
→ Promise executor runs…
- Record
GHSA-38f7-945m-qr2g- CVSS 3.1
- 7.4 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N - Weakness
- CWE-362
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
Affected products
Affected packages
| Package | Affected | Fixed |
|---|---|---|
effectnpm |
before 3.20.0 | 3.20.0 |
History
| Recorded | Changed | Sources |
|---|---|---|
| first indexed | CVE List, EUVD, GitHub Advisories, NVD, OSV |
Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.
In short
CVE-2026-32887 is a high vulnerability (CVSS 7.4) in Effect-ts Effect, published March 20, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.28%, the 20th percentile. Fixed in effect 3.20.0.
References
Left out here: the rest of 2 source descriptions. The JSON record has them.