CVE-2026-5394

An authenticated administrative user who can import or save DataObject class definitions can inject attacker-controlled composite index metadata and trigger unintended SQL execution in the backend.

This issue affects pimcore: 12.3.3.

An authenticated administrative user who can import or save DataObject class definitions can inject attacker-controlled composite index metadata and trigger unintended SQL execution in the backend.

This issue affects pimcore: 12.3.3.

Duplicate Advisory

This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-r2f4-ff2p-xc64. This link is maintained to preserve external references.

Original Description

An authenticated administrative user who can import or save DataObject class definitions can inject attacker-controlled composite index metadata and trigger unintended SQL execution in the backend.

This issue affects pimcore: 12.3.3.

My name is Oscar Uribe, Security Researcher at Fluid Attacks. I am reaching out because we have identified a security vulnerability in Pimcore 12.3.3 that we would like to report to you so we can coordinate a responsible disclosure together.

As part of our standard disclosure measures, we follow a timeline (outlined at https://fluidattacks.com/advisories/policy), which is aligned with ISO/IEC 29147:2018 and ISO/IEC 30111:2019. In short, the timeline works as follows: we ask for acknowledgment of the report within a few days of your first accessing it, and from there, we are happy to coordinate a joint disclosure date with you, typically within 90 days of the initial discovery. This gives your team reasonable time to assess, develop, and release a fix.

We have reserved the CVE ID "CVE-2026-5394" for this issue, and the advisory will eventually be published at https://fluidattacks.com/advisories/dragons. We are committed to coordinating the timing of that publication with you.

Please feel free to reach out if you have any questions about the report, the process, or the timeline. We are glad to work with you on this.

Description

An authenticated administrative user who can import or save DataObject class definitions can inject attacker-controlled composite index metadata and trigger unintended SQL execution in the backend.

The vulnerable flow accepts compositeIndices from imported JSON, stores the values without strict validation, and later concatenates them directly into ALTER TABLE ... DROP INDEX and ALTER TABLE ... ADD INDEX statements executed through Doctrine DBAL.

Although the original report focused on compositeIndices.index_key, independent code review shows that the strongest and most reliable injection point is compositeIndices.index_columns, because it is inserted verbatim inside the ADD INDEX (...) clause. This permits injection of additional ALTER TABLE subclauses against Pimcore object tables without relying on stacked queries.

Vulnerability

Root cause

1. Source:
   • Pimcore\Model\DataObject\ClassDefinition\Service::importClassDefinitionFromJson() accepts compositeIndices directly from imported JSON.
2. Assignment:
   • Pimcore\Model\DataObject\ClassDefinition::setCompositeIndices() does not enforce an allowlist for index names or column names.
   • The only special handling is a ManyToOne relation rewrite to __id and __type, which is not a security control.
3. Sink:
   • Pimcore\Model\DataObject\Traits\CompositeIndexTrait::updateCompositeIndices() builds raw SQL with string concatenation and executes it via $this->db->executeQuery(...).
4. Missing protection:
   • quoteIdentifier() is used for the SHOW INDEXES query, but not for the dynamic ALTER TABLE statements.
   • No server-side schema validation restricts index_key or index_columns to known safe identifier characters.

Confirmed source-to-sink path

1. importClassDefinitionFromJson() decodes attacker-controlled JSON and forwards compositeIndices.
2. setCompositeIndices() stores those values without sanitizing identifier content.
3. ClassDefinition::save() reaches ClassDefinition\Dao::update().
4. Dao::update() calls updateCompositeIndices() for:
   • object_store_<classId>
   • object_query_<classId>
5. Localizedfield\Dao also calls updateCompositeIndices() for:
   • localized query tables
   • localized store tables

Why this is exploitable

The vulnerable ADD INDEX statement is built as:

'ALTER TABLE `'.$table.'` ADD INDEX `' . $key.'` ('.$columnName.');'

$columnName is produced from implode(',', $columns) and is not quoted or validated. A malicious index_columns element such as:

slider), DROP COLUMN `oo_className` -- 

produces SQL of the form:

ALTER TABLE `object_query_<id>` ADD INDEX `c_poc_idx` (slider), DROP COLUMN `oo_className` -- );

This remains a single ALTER TABLE…

An authenticated administrative user who can import or save DataObject class definitions can inject attacker-controlled composite index metadata and trigger unintended SQL execution in the backend.

This issue affects pimcore: 12.3.3.

An authenticated administrative user who can import or save DataObject class definitions can inject attacker-controlled composite index metadata and trigger unintended SQL execution in the backend.

This issue affects pimcore: 12.3.3.

Duplicate Advisory

This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-r2f4-ff2p-xc64. This link is maintained to preserve external references.

Original Description

An authenticated administrative user who can import or save DataObject class definitions can inject attacker-controlled composite index metadata and trigger unintended SQL execution in the backend.

This issue affects pimcore: 12.3.3.

My name is Oscar Uribe, Security Researcher at Fluid Attacks. I am reaching out because we have identified a security vulnerability in Pimcore 12.3.3 that we would like to report to you so we can coordinate a responsible disclosure together.

As part of our standard disclosure measures, we follow a timeline (outlined at https://fluidattacks.com/advisories/policy), which is aligned with ISO/IEC 29147:2018 and ISO/IEC 30111:2019. In short, the timeline works as follows: we ask for acknowledgment of the report within a few days of your first accessing it, and from there, we are happy to coordinate a joint disclosure date with you, typically within 90 days of the initial discovery. This gives your team reasonable time to assess, develop, and release a fix.

We have reserved the CVE ID "CVE-2026-5394" for this issue, and the advisory will eventually be published at https://fluidattacks.com/advisories/dragons. We are committed to coordinating the timing of that publication with you.

Please feel free to reach out if you have any questions about the report, the process, or the timeline. We are glad to work with you on this.

Description

An authenticated administrative user who can import or save DataObject class definitions can inject attacker-controlled composite index metadata and trigger unintended SQL execution in the backend.

The vulnerable flow accepts compositeIndices from imported JSON, stores the values without strict validation, and later concatenates them directly into ALTER TABLE ... DROP INDEX and ALTER TABLE ... ADD INDEX statements executed through Doctrine DBAL.

Although the original report focused on compositeIndices.index_key, independent code review shows that the strongest and most reliable injection point is compositeIndices.index_columns, because it is inserted verbatim inside the ADD INDEX (...) clause. This permits injection of additional ALTER TABLE subclauses against Pimcore object tables without relying on stacked queries.

Vulnerability

Root cause

1. Source:
   • Pimcore\Model\DataObject\ClassDefinition\Service::importClassDefinitionFromJson() accepts compositeIndices directly from imported JSON.
2. Assignment:
   • Pimcore\Model\DataObject\ClassDefinition::setCompositeIndices() does not enforce an allowlist for index names or column names.
   • The only special handling is a ManyToOne relation rewrite to __id and __type, which is not a security control.
3. Sink:
   • Pimcore\Model\DataObject\Traits\CompositeIndexTrait::updateCompositeIndices() builds raw SQL with string concatenation and executes it via $this->db->executeQuery(...).
4. Missing protection:
   • quoteIdentifier() is used for the SHOW INDEXES query, but not for the dynamic ALTER TABLE statements.
   • No server-side schema validation restricts index_key or index_columns to known safe identifier characters.

Confirmed source-to-sink path

1. importClassDefinitionFromJson() decodes attacker-controlled JSON and forwards compositeIndices.
2. setCompositeIndices() stores those values without sanitizing identifier content.
3. ClassDefinition::save() reaches ClassDefinition\Dao::update().
4. Dao::update() calls updateCompositeIndices() for:
   • object_store_<classId>
   • object_query_<classId>
5. Localizedfield\Dao also calls updateCompositeIndices() for:
   • localized query tables
   • localized store tables

Why this is exploitable

The vulnerable ADD INDEX statement is built as:

'ALTER TABLE `'.$table.'` ADD INDEX `' . $key.'` ('.$columnName.');'

$columnName is produced from implode(',', $columns) and is not quoted or validated. A malicious index_columns element such as:

slider), DROP COLUMN `oo_className` -- 

produces SQL of the form:

ALTER TABLE `object_query_<id>` ADD INDEX `c_poc_idx` (slider), DROP COLUMN `oo_className` -- );

This remains a single ALTER TABLE…