CVE-2026-46475

Flowise is a drag & drop user interface to build a customized large language model flow. Prior to version 3.1.2, assistant create and update mass-assignment allows cross-workspace assistant takeover. This issue has been patched in version 3.1.2.

Flowise is a drag & drop user interface to build a customized large language model flow. Prior to version 3.1.2, assistant create and update mass-assignment allows cross-workspace assistant takeover. This issue has been patched in version 3.1.2.

Summary

Type: Mass assignment via Object.assign(entity, body) -> client-controlled workspaceId (and on create, id) overwritten on the Assistant entity -> cross-workspace data takeover and IDOR. File: packages/server/src/services/assistants/index.ts Root cause: The Assistant controller/service constructs a new Assistant() and copies the request body into it via Object.assign(...) without an explicit field allowlist. The request body therefore can include workspaceId, id, createdDate, updatedDate. The server only rebinds some of these after the assign (e.g. on create, it overwrites workspaceId but not id; on update, it overwrites id but not workspaceId). The remaining client-controlled values land directly on the persisted row, breaking workspace isolation. Same root pattern as the assistant entity's sibling controllers and as DocumentStore before it was patched in commit 840d2ae.

Affected Code

File: packages/server/src/services/assistants/index.ts

// create (line 303) and update (line 381)
Object.assign(newAssistant, requestBody) // <-- BUG: requestBody.id, requestBody.workspaceId accepted

Why it's wrong: Object.assign(target, source) copies every own enumerable property of source onto target. The TypeORM/SQL persistence layer below it does not strip ownership-bearing columns, so workspaceId set in the request body lands as the new workspaceId of the persisted row. The DocumentStore patch (commit 840d2ae) demonstrated the intended fix shape (explicit field-by-field allowlist) but it has not been applied to this entity.

Exploit Chain

1. Attacker is an authenticated member of workspace A. They have a session cookie / JWT for the Flowise web UI. State at this point: attacker can read and write entities scoped to workspace A.
2. Attacker creates a assistant in workspace A via the documented API (or reuses an existing one they own). They note its entity id.
3. Attacker issues a PUT /api/v1/assistants/<id> (or equivalent endpoint) with a JSON body that includes "workspaceId": "<workspace-B-id>" (an arbitrary other workspace's UUID). State at this point: the request reaches the controller as a workspace-A authenticated request.
4. The controller calls Object.assign(updateEntity, body). The body's workspaceId overwrites the entity's workspaceId field. The persistence layer commits the row.
5. Final state: the assistant row is now owned by workspace B. Workspace B members can see it, modify it, and use it. Workspace A loses access (it no longer satisfies their workspace filter). The original creator's workspace audit shows nothing because the operation looked like a normal update.

Security Impact

Severity: High. Cross-workspace boundary violation by any authenticated workspace member. Attacker capability: Any authenticated user with permission to update a assistant can move it to any workspace whose UUID they can guess or enumerate (workspace UUIDs are exposed in many API responses, so enumeration is trivial). Assistants encapsulate LLM configuration, instructions, attached tools, and credentials. Cross-workspace movement via workspaceId overwrite exposes the assistant (including its system prompt and tool list) to the destination workspace. Preconditions: Authenticated session with edit permission for the source assistant. No second factor required. Workspace UUIDs are exposed via the /api/v1/workspaces listing or via any cross-referenced object's workspaceId field, so target enumeration is trivial. Differential: PoC-verified by source inspection of the original GHSA-q4pr-4r26-c69r. Patched build (with the suggested fix below) refuses the workspaceId field; vulnerable build accepts it and persists it.

Suggested Fix

Already fixed in PR https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/pull/6128 (allowlist pattern applied).

// Allowlist pattern (matches commit 840d2ae for DocumentStore):
const…

Flowise is a drag & drop user interface to build a customized large language model flow. Prior to version 3.1.2, assistant create and update mass-assignment allows cross-workspace assistant takeover. This issue has been patched in version 3.1.2.

Flowise is a drag & drop user interface to build a customized large language model flow. Prior to version 3.1.2, assistant create and update mass-assignment allows cross-workspace assistant takeover. This issue has been patched in version 3.1.2.

Summary

Type: Mass assignment via Object.assign(entity, body) -> client-controlled workspaceId (and on create, id) overwritten on the Assistant entity -> cross-workspace data takeover and IDOR. File: packages/server/src/services/assistants/index.ts Root cause: The Assistant controller/service constructs a new Assistant() and copies the request body into it via Object.assign(...) without an explicit field allowlist. The request body therefore can include workspaceId, id, createdDate, updatedDate. The server only rebinds some of these after the assign (e.g. on create, it overwrites workspaceId but not id; on update, it overwrites id but not workspaceId). The remaining client-controlled values land directly on the persisted row, breaking workspace isolation. Same root pattern as the assistant entity's sibling controllers and as DocumentStore before it was patched in commit 840d2ae.

Affected Code

File: packages/server/src/services/assistants/index.ts

// create (line 303) and update (line 381)
Object.assign(newAssistant, requestBody) // <-- BUG: requestBody.id, requestBody.workspaceId accepted

Why it's wrong: Object.assign(target, source) copies every own enumerable property of source onto target. The TypeORM/SQL persistence layer below it does not strip ownership-bearing columns, so workspaceId set in the request body lands as the new workspaceId of the persisted row. The DocumentStore patch (commit 840d2ae) demonstrated the intended fix shape (explicit field-by-field allowlist) but it has not been applied to this entity.

Exploit Chain

1. Attacker is an authenticated member of workspace A. They have a session cookie / JWT for the Flowise web UI. State at this point: attacker can read and write entities scoped to workspace A.
2. Attacker creates a assistant in workspace A via the documented API (or reuses an existing one they own). They note its entity id.
3. Attacker issues a PUT /api/v1/assistants/<id> (or equivalent endpoint) with a JSON body that includes "workspaceId": "<workspace-B-id>" (an arbitrary other workspace's UUID). State at this point: the request reaches the controller as a workspace-A authenticated request.
4. The controller calls Object.assign(updateEntity, body). The body's workspaceId overwrites the entity's workspaceId field. The persistence layer commits the row.
5. Final state: the assistant row is now owned by workspace B. Workspace B members can see it, modify it, and use it. Workspace A loses access (it no longer satisfies their workspace filter). The original creator's workspace audit shows nothing because the operation looked like a normal update.

Security Impact

Severity: High. Cross-workspace boundary violation by any authenticated workspace member. Attacker capability: Any authenticated user with permission to update a assistant can move it to any workspace whose UUID they can guess or enumerate (workspace UUIDs are exposed in many API responses, so enumeration is trivial). Assistants encapsulate LLM configuration, instructions, attached tools, and credentials. Cross-workspace movement via workspaceId overwrite exposes the assistant (including its system prompt and tool list) to the destination workspace. Preconditions: Authenticated session with edit permission for the source assistant. No second factor required. Workspace UUIDs are exposed via the /api/v1/workspaces listing or via any cross-referenced object's workspaceId field, so target enumeration is trivial. Differential: PoC-verified by source inspection of the original GHSA-q4pr-4r26-c69r. Patched build (with the suggested fix below) refuses the workspaceId field; vulnerable build accepts it and persists it.

Suggested Fix

Already fixed in PR https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/pull/6128 (allowlist pattern applied).

// Allowlist pattern (matches commit 840d2ae for DocumentStore):
const…