CVE-2026-47162

Vim is an advanced text editor that seeks to provide the power of the de-facto Unix editor 'Vi', with a more complete feature set. Vim is a highly configurable text editor built to enable efficient text editing. It is an improved version of the vi editor distributed with most UNIX systems.

Security Fix(es):

Vim is an open source, command line text editor. Prior to version 9.2.0495, a Vimscript code injection vulnerability exists in s:NetrwBookHistSave() in the netrw plugin (runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/autoload/netrw.vim) when serializing browsed directory paths to the history file ~/.vim/.netrwhist. A directory name derived from the filesystem is interpolated into a single-quoted Vimscript string literal without escaping embedded single quotes, allowing a crafted directory name to break out of the string context and execute arbitrary Vimscript, including shell commands via system() and :!, the next time the history file is sourced. This issue has been patched in version 9.2.0495.(CVE-2026-47162)

Vim is an open source, command line text editor. Prior to version 9.2.0496, a code injection vulnerability exists in s:stepmatch() in the cucumber filetype plugin (runtime/ftplugin/cucumber.vim) on Vim builds with +ruby support. Step-definition patterns read from .rb files under the repository's features// or stories// directories are embedded into a Ruby Kernel.eval argument without sufficient escaping, allowing a crafted pattern in an attacker-controlled repository to execute arbitrary Ruby (and through it arbitrary shell commands) when the user invokes a step-jump mapping ([d, ]d). This issue has been patched in version 9.2.0496.(CVE-2026-47167)

Vim is an open source, command line text editor. Prior to version 9.2.0561, the Python omni-completion script in python3complete.vim for Vim with the +python3 interpreter enabled (and the legacy pythoncomplete.vim for builds with the +python interpreter) executes the import and from statements found in the current buffer through Python's import machinery. Because the buffer's working directory is on sys.path, opening a hostile .py file with a sibling Python package and invoking omni-completion runs that package's top-level code as the editing user. This issue has been patched in version 9.2.0561.(CVE-2026-52858)

Vim is an open source, command line text editor. Prior to version 9.2.0565, the update_snapshot() function in src/terminal.c copies the visible terminal screen into the scrollback buffer when a snapshot is taken. For each screen cell it walks the cell's chars[] array with no upper bound, stopping only when it encounters a NUL terminator. When a cell legitimately fills all VTERM_MAX_CHARS_PER_CELL (6) slots — a base character plus five combining marks — the bundled libvterm returns the array without a terminating NUL, so the loop reads past the fixed six-element array and appends the out-of-bounds values to a buffer reserved for only six characters. A program whose output is rendered inside a :terminal window can trigger this with a short byte sequence and no Vim scripting, leading to a crash. This issue has been patched in version 9.2.0565.(CVE-2026-52859)

Vim is an open source, command line text editor. Prior to version 9.2.0597, Vim's Python omni-completion executes reconstructed function and class definitions from the current buffer with exec() as part of populating the completion dictionary. Python evaluates function default values, parameter annotations, and class base expressions at definition time, so a hostile buffer can execute attacker-controlled Python expressions during omni-completion. The existing g:pythoncomplete_allow_import mitigation (GHSA-52mc-rq6p-rc7c) does not cover this path, because the attacker-controlled code is not a harvested import/from statement. This issue has been patched in version 9.2.0597.(CVE-2026-52860)

Vim is an advanced text editor that seeks to provide the power of the de-facto Unix editor 'Vi', with a more complete feature set. Vim is a highly configurable text editor built to enable efficient text editing. It is an improved version of the vi editor distributed with most UNIX systems.

Security Fix(es):

Vim is an open source, command line text editor. Prior to version 9.2.0495, a Vimscript code injection vulnerability exists in s:NetrwBookHistSave() in the netrw plugin (runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/autoload/netrw.vim) when serializing browsed directory paths to the history file ~/.vim/.netrwhist. A directory name derived from the filesystem is interpolated into a single-quoted Vimscript string literal without escaping embedded single quotes, allowing a crafted directory name to break out of the string context and execute arbitrary Vimscript, including shell commands via system() and :!, the next time the history file is sourced. This issue has been patched in version 9.2.0495.(CVE-2026-47162)

Vim is an open source, command line text editor. Prior to version 9.2.0496, a code injection vulnerability exists in s:stepmatch() in the cucumber filetype plugin (runtime/ftplugin/cucumber.vim) on Vim builds with +ruby support. Step-definition patterns read from .rb files under the repository's features// or stories// directories are embedded into a Ruby Kernel.eval argument without sufficient escaping, allowing a crafted pattern in an attacker-controlled repository to execute arbitrary Ruby (and through it arbitrary shell commands) when the user invokes a step-jump mapping ([d, ]d). This issue has been patched in version 9.2.0496.(CVE-2026-47167)

Vim is an open source, command line text editor. Prior to version 9.2.0561, the Python omni-completion script in python3complete.vim for Vim with the +python3 interpreter enabled (and the legacy pythoncomplete.vim for builds with the +python interpreter) executes the import and from statements found in the current buffer through Python's import machinery. Because the buffer's working directory is on sys.path, opening a hostile .py file with a sibling Python package and invoking omni-completion runs that package's top-level code as the editing user. This issue has been patched in version 9.2.0561.(CVE-2026-52858)

Vim is an open source, command line text editor. Prior to version 9.2.0565, the update_snapshot() function in src/terminal.c copies the visible terminal screen into the scrollback buffer when a snapshot is taken. For each screen cell it walks the cell's chars[] array with no upper bound, stopping only when it encounters a NUL terminator. When a cell legitimately fills all VTERM_MAX_CHARS_PER_CELL (6) slots — a base character plus five combining marks — the bundled libvterm returns the array without a terminating NUL, so the loop reads past the fixed six-element array and appends the out-of-bounds values to a buffer reserved for only six characters. A program whose output is rendered inside a :terminal window can trigger this with a short byte sequence and no Vim scripting, leading to a crash. This issue has been patched in version 9.2.0565.(CVE-2026-52859)

Vim is an open source, command line text editor. Prior to version 9.2.0597, Vim's Python omni-completion executes reconstructed function and class definitions from the current buffer with exec() as part of populating the completion dictionary. Python evaluates function default values, parameter annotations, and class base expressions at definition time, so a hostile buffer can execute attacker-controlled Python expressions during omni-completion. The existing g:pythoncomplete_allow_import mitigation (GHSA-52mc-rq6p-rc7c) does not cover this path, because the attacker-controlled code is not a harvested import/from statement. This issue has been patched in version 9.2.0597.(CVE-2026-52860)

Vim is an advanced text editor that seeks to provide the power of the de-facto Unix editor 'Vi', with a more complete feature set. Vim is a highly configurable text editor built to enable efficient text editing. It is an improved version of the vi editor distributed with most UNIX systems.

Security Fix(es):

Vim is an open source, command line text editor. Prior to version 9.2.0495, a Vimscript code injection vulnerability exists in s:NetrwBookHistSave() in the netrw plugin (runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/autoload/netrw.vim) when serializing browsed directory paths to the history file ~/.vim/.netrwhist. A directory name derived from the filesystem is interpolated into a single-quoted Vimscript string literal without escaping embedded single quotes, allowing a crafted directory name to break out of the string context and execute arbitrary Vimscript, including shell commands via system() and :!, the next time the history file is sourced. This issue has been patched in version 9.2.0495.(CVE-2026-47162)

Vim is an open source, command line text editor. Prior to version 9.2.0496, a code injection vulnerability exists in s:stepmatch() in the cucumber filetype plugin (runtime/ftplugin/cucumber.vim) on Vim builds with +ruby support. Step-definition patterns read from .rb files under the repository's features// or stories// directories are embedded into a Ruby Kernel.eval argument without sufficient escaping, allowing a crafted pattern in an attacker-controlled repository to execute arbitrary Ruby (and through it arbitrary shell commands) when the user invokes a step-jump mapping ([d, ]d). This issue has been patched in version 9.2.0496.(CVE-2026-47167)

Vim is an open source, command line text editor. Prior to version 9.2.0561, the Python omni-completion script in python3complete.vim for Vim with the +python3 interpreter enabled (and the legacy pythoncomplete.vim for builds with the +python interpreter) executes the import and from statements found in the current buffer through Python's import machinery. Because the buffer's working directory is on sys.path, opening a hostile .py file with a sibling Python package and invoking omni-completion runs that package's top-level code as the editing user. This issue has been patched in version 9.2.0561.(CVE-2026-52858)

Vim is an open source, command line text editor. Prior to version 9.2.0565, the update_snapshot() function in src/terminal.c copies the visible terminal screen into the scrollback buffer when a snapshot is taken. For each screen cell it walks the cell's chars[] array with no upper bound, stopping only when it encounters a NUL terminator. When a cell legitimately fills all VTERM_MAX_CHARS_PER_CELL (6) slots — a base character plus five combining marks — the bundled libvterm returns the array without a terminating NUL, so the loop reads past the fixed six-element array and appends the out-of-bounds values to a buffer reserved for only six characters. A program whose output is rendered inside a :terminal window can trigger this with a short byte sequence and no Vim scripting, leading to a crash. This issue has been patched in version 9.2.0565.(CVE-2026-52859)

Vim is an open source, command line text editor. Prior to version 9.2.0597, Vim's Python omni-completion executes reconstructed function and class definitions from the current buffer with exec() as part of populating the completion dictionary. Python evaluates function default values, parameter annotations, and class base expressions at definition time, so a hostile buffer can execute attacker-controlled Python expressions during omni-completion. The existing g:pythoncomplete_allow_import mitigation (GHSA-52mc-rq6p-rc7c) does not cover this path, because the attacker-controlled code is not a harvested import/from statement. This issue has been patched in version 9.2.0597.(CVE-2026-52860)

Vim (Vi IMproved) is an updated and improved version of the vi editor.

Security Fix(es):

• vim: command injection when decompressing .tgz archives (CVE-2026-46483)

• vim: Vim: Arbitrary Code Execution via crafted directory names (CVE-2026-47162)

• vim: Vim: Arbitrary code execution via Python omni-completion (CVE-2026-52858)

• vim: Vim: Arbitrary code execution via crafted step-definition patterns (CVE-2026-47167)

For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.

Vim (Vi IMproved) is an updated and improved version of the vi editor.

Security Fix(es):

• vim: command injection when decompressing .tgz archives (CVE-2026-46483)

• vim: Vim: Arbitrary Code Execution via crafted directory names (CVE-2026-47162)

• vim: Vim: Arbitrary code execution via Python omni-completion (CVE-2026-52858)

• vim: Vim: Arbitrary code execution via crafted step-definition patterns (CVE-2026-47167)

For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.

Vim (Vi IMproved) is an updated and improved version of the vi editor.

Security Fix(es):

• vim: command injection when decompressing .tgz archives (CVE-2026-46483)

• vim: Vim: Arbitrary Code Execution via crafted directory names (CVE-2026-47162)

• vim: Vim: Arbitrary code execution via Python omni-completion (CVE-2026-52858)

• vim: Vim: Arbitrary code execution via crafted step-definition patterns (CVE-2026-47167)

For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.

Vim is an open source, command line text editor. Prior to version 9.2.0495, a Vimscript code injection vulnerability exists in s:NetrwBookHistSave() in the netrw plugin (runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/autoload/netrw.vim) when serializing browsed directory paths to the history file ~/.vim/.netrwhist. A directory name derived from the filesystem is interpolated into a single-quoted Vimscript string literal without escaping embedded single quotes, allowing a crafted directory name to break out of the string context and execute arbitrary Vimscript, including shell commands via system() and :!, the next time the history file is sourced. This issue has been patched in version 9.2.0495.

Vim (Vi IMproved) is an updated and improved version of the vi editor.

Security Fix(es):

• vim: command injection when decompressing .tgz archives (CVE-2026-46483)
• vim: Vim: Arbitrary Code Execution via crafted directory names (CVE-2026-47162)
• vim: Vim: Arbitrary code execution via Python omni-completion (CVE-2026-52858)
• vim: Vim: Arbitrary code execution via crafted step-definition patterns (CVE-2026-47167)

For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.

Vim (Vi IMproved) is an updated and improved version of the vi editor.

Security Fix(es):

• vim: command injection when decompressing .tgz archives (CVE-2026-46483)
• vim: Vim: Arbitrary Code Execution via crafted directory names (CVE-2026-47162)
• vim: Vim: Arbitrary code execution via Python omni-completion (CVE-2026-52858)
• vim: Vim: Arbitrary code execution via crafted step-definition patterns (CVE-2026-47167)

For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.

Vim (Vi IMproved) is an updated and improved version of the vi editor.

Security Fix(es):

• vim: command injection when decompressing .tgz archives (CVE-2026-46483)
• vim: Vim: Arbitrary Code Execution via crafted directory names (CVE-2026-47162)
• vim: Vim: Arbitrary code execution via Python omni-completion (CVE-2026-52858)
• vim: Vim: Arbitrary code execution via crafted step-definition patterns (CVE-2026-47167)

For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.

Vim is an open source, command line text editor. Prior to version 9.2.0495, a Vimscript code injection vulnerability exists in s:NetrwBookHistSave() in the netrw plugin (runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/autoload/netrw.vim) when serializing browsed directory paths to the history file ~/.vim/.netrwhist. A directory name derived from the filesystem is interpolated into a single-quoted Vimscript string literal without escaping embedded single quotes, allowing a crafted directory name to break out of the string context and execute arbitrary Vimscript, including shell commands via system() and :!, the next time the history file is sourced. This issue has been patched in version 9.2.0495.

• SECURITY UPDATE: code injection in the netrw plugin via directory history serialization: s:NetrwBookHistSave() wrote each directory history entry into the generated .netrwhist script by concatenating the raw value inside single quotes, so a directory name containing a single quote and vimscript was evaluated when the history file was sourced.
  • debian/patches/CVE-2026-47162.patch: quote the value with string() so the history entry is emitted as a safe vimscript string literal, in runtime/autoload/netrw.vim; matches upstream patch 9.2.0495.
  • CVE-2026-47162

• CVE-2026-47162: fix code injection in netrw via a crafted directory name serialized into .netrwhist by NetrwBookHistSave() using string() to safely encode the value (runtime/autoload/netrw.vim, upstream patch 9.2.0495)

• CVE-2026-47162: fix code injection in netrw via a crafted directory name serialized into .netrwhist by NetrwBookHistSave() using string() to safely encode the value (runtime/autoload/netrw.vim, upstream patch 9.2.0495)

• CVE-2026-47162: fix code injection in netrw via a crafted directory name serialized into .netrwhist by NetrwBookHistSave() using string() to safely encode the value (runtime/autoload/netrw.vim, upstream patch 9.2.0495)

• CVE-2026-47162: use string() in netrw s:NetrwBookHistSave() to safely encode directory-history entries and prevent Vimscript injection

• CVE-2026-47162: fix code injection via NetrwBookHistSave() by quoting the directory name with string()

• CVE-2026-47162: fix code injection via NetrwBookHistSave() by quoting the directory name with string()

• SECURITY UPDATE: Code execution via Python omni-completion executing import and from statements harvested from the current buffer through exec() (gate buffer-derived import execution behind the new g:pythoncomplete_allow_import option, disabled by default)
  • debian/patches/CVE-2026-52858.patch: disable execution of import and from statements found in the buffer during python3complete and pythoncomplete omni-completion unless g:pythoncomplete_allow_import is set
  • CVE-2026-52858
• SECURITY UPDATE: Out-of-bounds read in update_snapshot() in src/terminal.c when a terminal cell fills all VTERM_MAX_CHARS_PER_CELL slots and the bundled libvterm returns the chars array without a NUL terminator
  • debian/patches/CVE-2026-52859.patch: bound the cell.chars[] copy loop in update_snapshot() with i < VTERM_MAX_CHARS_PER_CELL to prevent reading past the fixed six-element array
  • CVE-2026-52859
• SECURITY UPDATE: Code execution via Python omni-completion evaluating function default values, parameter annotations, and class base expressions reconstructed from the current buffer and run through exec()
  • debian/patches/CVE-2026-52860.patch: strip default expressions and annotations from generated function parameters and whitelist dotted class base expressions in python3complete and pythoncomplete get_code() so attacker-controlled expressions are not executed
  • CVE-2026-52860

• SECURITY UPDATE: command injection in the tar plugin: tar#Vimuntar() escaped the tarball name with shellescape() without the special argument before running gunzip/gzip through :!, so characters that Vim expands in a :! command line (such as % and #) survived in the name and let a crafted archive name run arbitrary shell commands.
  • debian/patches/CVE-2026-46483.patch: use the shellescape(name, 1) form for both :! invocations in runtime/autoload/tar.vim; matches upstream patch 9.2.0479.
  • CVE-2026-46483
• SECURITY UPDATE: code injection via netrw directory history: s:NetrwBookHistSave() serialised each history entry into ~/.vim/.netrwhist by wrapping the value in single quotes with string concatenation, so a directory name containing a single quote closed the literal and injected Vimscript that ran when the history file was sourced on the next netrw start.
  • debian/patches/CVE-2026-47162.patch: encode the value with string() in runtime/autoload/netrw.vim; matches upstream patch 9.2.0495.
  • CVE-2026-47162
• SECURITY UPDATE: code execution through Python omni-completion: pythoncomplete and python3complete rebuilt the buffer's Python code and passed it to exec(), including the import and from statements harvested from the buffer, so invoking omni-completion in a hostile Python file executed arbitrary module-level code.
  • debian/patches/CVE-2026-52858.patch: skip import/from statements unless g:pythoncomplete_allow_import is set, in both runtime/autoload/pythoncomplete.vim and python3complete.vim; matches upstream patches 9.2.0561 and 9.2.0568, the latter being required for the opt-in to take effect at all.
  • CVE-2026-52858
• SECURITY UPDATE: out-of-bounds access when a terminal buffer is snapshotted: the per-cell loop in move_terminal_to_buffer() walked cell.chars[] with no upper bound, and libvterm leaves that array unterminated when a cell uses all VTERM_MAX_CHARS_PER_CELL slots (a base character plus five combining marks), so it read past the array and appended the out-of-bounds values to a buffer sized for far fewer bytes.
  • debian/patches/CVE-2026-52859.patch: bound the loop with i < VTERM_MAX_CHARS_PER_CELL and size the buffer for six 6-byte characters, in src/terminal.c; matches upstream patch 9.2.0565 together with its prerequisite 8.1.0611, without which the bounded loop would still overrun the MB_MAXBYTES-sized buffer.
  • CVE-2026-52859
• SECURITY UPDATE: code execution through Python omni-completion definition headers: Scope.get_code() reproduced def and class headers verbatim in the source handed to exec(), and Python evaluates parameter default values, annotations and base-class expressions at definition time, so crafted headers ran arbitrary code during completion even with imports disabled.
  • debian/patches/CVE-2026-52860.patch: strip default values and annotations from parameters and accept only dotted names as base classes, in both runtime/autoload/pythoncomplete.vim and python3complete.vim; matches upstream patch 9.2.0597.
  • CVE-2026-52860
• SECURITY UPDATE: out-of-bounds write reading a crafted spell file: tree_count_words() and sug_filltree() descended the word trie without bounding the depth, so a deeply nested trie wrote past the ends of their MAXWLEN-sized arridx[], curi[] and wordcount[] arrays.
  • debian/patches/CVE-2026-55693.patch: only descend while depth < MAXWLEN - 1 in both trie walkers, in src/spellfile.c; matches upstream patch 9.2.0653.
  • CVE-2026-55693
• SECURITY UPDATE: code injection when netrw opens a remote file: s:NetrwBrowse() passed bufname() unescaped into an :execute'd "b" command, so a buffer name containing the Ex command separator ran arbitrary…

Root has patched CVE-2026-47162 in the vim package for Root:Debian:11. Multiple fixed versions available.

Root has patched CVE-2026-47162 in the vim package for Root:Debian:12. Multiple fixed versions available.

Srinivas Piskala Ganesh Babu discovered that Vim incorrectly handled directory names when serializing browsed paths to the netrw history file. An attacker could possibly use this issue to execute arbitrary code. (CVE-2026-47162)

It was discovered that Vim incorrectly handled step-definition patterns in the cucumber filetype plugin. An attacker could possibly use this issue to execute arbitrary code. (CVE-2026-47167)

It was discovered that Vim incorrectly handled import statements during Python omni-completion. An attacker could possibly use this issue to execute arbitrary code. (CVE-2026-52858)

Andrej Tomči discovered that Vim incorrectly handled certain terminal screen cells when taking a snapshot, leading to an out-of-bounds read. An attacker could possibly use this issue to cause Vim to crash, resulting in a denial of service. (CVE-2026-52859)

David Carliez discovered that Vim incorrectly handled reconstructed function and class definitions during Python omni-completion. An attacker could possibly use this issue to execute arbitrary code. (CVE-2026-52860)